iftence of

IV. The existence of God, that is, of a firft, in- of the extelligent, and self-existent being, on whom all things Gene depend as on their first cause, and who depends himself on no one; the existence, I fay, of fuch a being is one of thofe truths that fhew themselves to us, at the first glance. We have only to attend to the evident and fenfible proofs, that accoft us, as it were, from all parts.

The chain and fubordination of caufes among themselves, which neceffarily requires we should fix on a first cause; the neceffity of acknowledging a first mover; the admirable structure and order of the univerfe; are all fo many demonftrations of the existence of God, within the reach of every capacity. Let us unfold them in a few words.

The neceffi

intelligent

V. 1 We behold an infinite number of things, First proof. which form all together the affemblage we call the ty of a felfuniverfe. Something therefore must have always ex- exiftent and ifted. For were we to fuppofe a time in which there being. was abfolutely nothing, 'tis evident that nothing could have ever exifted; because whatsoever has a beginning, must have a cause of its existence; fince nothing can produce nothing. It must be therefore acknowledged that there is fome eternal being, who exists neceffarily and of himself, for he can be indebted to no one else for his origin; and it implies a contradiction that such a being does not exist.

Moreover, this eternal being, who neceffarily and of himself fubfifts, is endued with reafon and underftanding. For to pursue the fame manner of ing, were we to fuppofe a time in which there was

argu

nothing

We must

not feek for

verfe,

nothing but inanimate beings, it would have been' impoffible for intelligent beings, fuch as we now be hold, ever to exift. Intellection can no more proceed from a blind and unintelligent cause, than a being, of any kind whatsoever, can come from nothing. There must therefore have always existed a father of fpiritual beings, an eternal mind, the fource from whence all others derive their existence. Let what system foever be adopted concerning the nature and origin of the foul, our proof fubfifts ftill in its full force. Were it even to be fuppofed that the cogitative part of man is no more than the effect of a certain motion or modification of matter; yet we fhould ftill want to know how matter acquired this `activity, which is not effential to it, and this particular and fo much admired organization, which it cannot impart to itself. We fhould inquire, who is it that has modified the body in a manner proper to produce fuch wonderful operations as those of intellection, which reflects, which acts on the very body itself with command, which furveys the earth and measures the heavens, recollects past transactions, and extends its views to futurity. Such a master-piece must come from the hands of an intelligent cause wherefore 'tis abfolutely neceffary to acknowledge a firft, eternal, and intelligent being.

VI. An eternal spirit, who has within himself the this being principle of his own existence and of all his faculties, in this uni- can be neither changed nor destroyed; neither dependant nor limited; he should even be invested with an infinite perfection, fufficient to render him the fole and first cause of all, fo that we may have no occafion to feek for any other.

But

But does not (fome will afk) this quality of eternal and intelligent being, belong to matter itself, to the universe, or to fome of the parts thereof?

I answer, that this fuppofition is abfolutely contrary to all our ideas. Matter is not effentially and of itself intelligent; nor can it be fuppofed to acquire intellection but by a particular modification received from a caufe fupremely intelligent. Now this firft cause cannot have fuch a modification from any other being; for he thinks effentially and of himself; wherefore he cannot be a material being. Besides, as all` the parts of the universe are variable and dependant; how is it poffible to reconcile this with the idea of an infinite and all perfect being?

As for what relates to man, his dependance and weakness is much more fenfible than that of other creatures. Since he has no life of himself, he cannot be the efficient caufe of the existence of others. He is unacquainted with the ftructure of his own body, and with the principle of life; incapable of difcovering in what manner motions are connected with ideas, and which is the proper fpring of the empire of the will. We must therefore look out for an efficient, primitive, and original caufe of mankind, beyond the human chain, be it supposed ever so long; we must trace the cause of each part of the world beyond this material and visible universe.

proof. The

VII. 2. After this firft proof, drawn from the ne- Second ceffity of a firft, eternal, and intelligent being, di- neceffity of stinct from matter; we proceed to a fecond, which a first movfhews us the Deity in a more fenfible manner, and more within the reach of common capacities. The

VOL. I.

K

proof

er.

Third proof.

proof I mean, is the contemplation of this visible world, wherein we perceive a motion and order, which matter has not of itself, and must therefore receive from fome other being.

b

Motion or active force is not an effential quality of body extension is of itself rather a paffive being; it is easily conceived at reft, and if it has any motion, we may well conceive it may lose it without being ftript of its exiftence; 'tis a quality or ftate that paffes, and is accidentally communicated from one body to another. The first impreffion must therefore proceed from an extrinfic caufe; and as Ariftotle has well expreffed it, "The first mover of bodies must not be moveable himself, must not be a body. This has been alfo agreed to by Hobbes. But the acknowledging, fays he, of one God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the defire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their feveral virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befal them in time to come. For be that from any effect be feeth come to pafs, fhould reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himSelf profoundly in the pursuit of caufes; fall at last come to this, that, there must be (as even the heathen philofophers confeffed) one first mover; that is a first and eternal caufe of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God.

VIII. 3. But if matter has not been able to move The ftruc- of itself, much lefs was it capable to move to the

ture, order,

and beauty

of the univerfe.

2 Ariftot. Metaphyf.

↳ Leviathan, chap. 12. p. 53. ed. 1651.

exact degree, and with all the determinations, neceffary to form fuch a world as we behold, rather than a confufed chaos.

In fact, let us only caft our eyes on this univerfe, and we shall every where difcover, even at `the first glance, an admirable beauty, regularity, and order; and this admiration will increase in proportion as in fearching more clofely into nature, we enter into the particulars of the structure, proportion, and use of each part. For then we fhall clearly fee, that every thing is relative to a certain end, and that thefe particular ends, though infinitely varied among themfelves, are fo dextrously managed and combined, as to conspire all to a general defign. Notwithstanding this amazing diverfity of creatures, there is no confufion; we behold several thousand different species, which preferve their distinct form and qualities. The parts of the univerfe are matched and balanced, in order to preferve a general harmony; and each of thofe parts has exactly its proper figure, proportions, fituation, and motion, either to produce its particular effect, or to form a beautiful whole.

'Tis evident therefore, that there is a defign, a choice, a vifible reafon in all the works of nature; and confequently it is plain there is a wifdom and understanding, obvious, as it were, even to our very fenfes.

effect of

XI. Though there have been fome philofophers The world who have attributed all this to chance, yet this is fo is not the ridiculous a thought, that I queftion whether a more chance. extravagant chimera ever entered into the mind of man. Is it poffible for any one to perfuade him