СНАР. II.

That God, in confequence of his authority over us, has actually thought proper to prescribe to us laws or rules of conduct.

thority over

feribing laws

O prove the existence of God, and our God exerdependance in refpect to him, is establish-cifes his auing the right he has of prefcribing laws to man. But us by prethis is not fufficient; the question is, whether he has to us. actually thought proper to exercise this right. He can undoubtedly impofe laws on us; but has he really done it? And though we depend on him for our life and for our phyfical faculties, has he not left us in a state of independance in respect to the moral ufe to which we are to apply them? This is the third and capital point we have still left to examine.

the very re

which we

II. We have made fome progrefs already in this re- First proof, search, by discovering all the circumftances neceffary to drawn from establish an actual legiflature. On the one fide we find lations of a fuperior, who by his nature is poffeffed, in the very have been highest degree, of all the conditions requifite to establish Speaking. a legitimate authority; and on the other we behold man, who is God's creature, endowed with underftanding and liberty, capable of acting with knowledge and choice, fenfible of pleasure and pain, fufceptible of good and evil, of rewards and punishments. Such an aptitude of giving and receiving laws cannot be useless. This concurrence of relations and circumftances undoubtedly denotes an end, and must have

fome

Second proof,

drawn from

which God

refpect to

from the ne

to accom

plish this end.

fome effect; juft as the particular organization of the eye fhews we are deftined to fee the light. Why fhould God have made us exactly fit to receive laws, if he intended none for us? This would be creating fo many idle and ufelefs faculties. 'Tis therefore not only poffible, but very probable, that our deftination in general is fuch, unless the contrary should appear by much fronger reafons. Now inftead of there being any reafon to deftroy this firft prefumption, we fhall fee that every thing tends to confirm it.

III. 2. When we confider the beautiful order which the fupreme wisdom has established in the phyfical the end world, 'tis impoffible to perfuade ourselves, that he propofed to has abandoned the fpiritual or moral world to chance. himfelf with and diforder. Reafon, on the contrary, tells us, man, and that a wife being propofes to himself a reasonable end ceflity of in every thing he does, and that he ufes all the nemoral laws, ceffary means to attain it. The end which God had in view with regard to his creatures, and particularly with refpect to man, cannot be any other, on the one fide, than his glory; and on the other, the perfection and happiness of his creatures, as far as their nature or conftitution will admit. These two views, fo worthy of the Creator, are perfectly combined. For the glory of God confifts in manifefting his perfections, his power, his goodness, wisdom, and juftice; and thefe virtues are nothing elfe but the love of order and of the good of the whole. Thus a being abfolutely perfect and fupremely happy, willing to conduct man to that state of order and happinefs which fuits his nature, cannot but be willing, at the fame time to employ whatever is neceffary for fuch

fuch an end; and confequently he must approve of those means that are proper, and difapprove of fuch as are improper for attaining it. Had the conftitution of man been merely phyfical or mechanical, God himfelf would have done whatever is expedient for his work: But man being a free and intelligent creature, capable of difcernment and choice; the means which God ufes to conduct him to his end, ought to be proportioned to his nature, that is fuch as man may engage in, and concur with, by his own. actions.

Now as all means are not equally fit to conduct us to a certain end, all human actions cannot therefore be indifferent. Plain it is, that every action contrary to the ends which God has proposed, is not agreable to God; and that he approves, on the contrary, thofe which of themfelves are proper to promote his ends. Since there is a choice to be made, and one road rather than another to be followed, who can queftion but our Creator is willing we fhould take the right road; and that, instead of acting fortuitoufly and rafhly, we should behave like rational creatures, by exercising our liberty, and the other faculties he has given us, in the manner most agreable to our ftate and deftination, in order to promote his views, and to advance our own happiness, together with that of our fellow creatures?

on of the

IV. These confiderations affume a new force, when Confirmatiwe attend to the natural confequences of the oppofite preceding fyftem. What would become of man and fociety, proofs. were every one to be fo far master of his actions,

as to do every thing he lifted, without having any

24

other

a

other principle of conduct by caprice or paffion? Let us fuppofe, that God abandoning us to ourfelves, had not actually prefcribed any rules of life, or fubjected us to laws; most of our talents and faculties would be of no manner of ufe to us. Το what purpose would it be for man to have the torch of reafon, were he to follow only a grofs inftinct, without watching over his conduct? What would it avail him to have the power of fufpending his judgment, were he to yield stupidly to the first impreffions? And of what fervice would reflexion be, were he neither to chufe nor deliberate; and were he instead of liftening to the counfels of prudence to be hurried away by blind inclinations? Thefe faculties, which form the excellence and dignity of our nature, would not only be rendered hereby intirely frivolous, but moreover would become prejudicial even by their excellence; for the higher and nobler the faculty is, the more the abuse of it proves dangerous.

This would be not only a great misfortuue for man confidered alone, and in respect to himself; but would ftill prove a greater evil to him confidered in the ftate of fociety. For this more than any other ftate requires laws, to the end that each person may fet limits to his pretenfions without invading another man's right. Were it otherwife, licentioufness must be the confequence of independance. To leave men abandoned to themfelves, is leaving an open field to the paffions, and paving the way for injustice, violence, perfidy and cruelty. Take away natural laws, and that moral tie which fupports juftice and honesty amongst a whole nation, and establishes

alfo particular duties either in families or in the other relations of life; man would be then the most savage and ferocious of all animals. The more dexterous and artful he is, the more dangerous he would prove to his equals; his dexterity would degenerate into craft, and his art into malice. Then we fhould be ftript of all the advantages and sweets of fociety; and thrown into a ftate of war and libertinifm.

drawn from

of God.

V. 3. Were any one to fay, that man himself Third proof, would not fail to remedy thefe diforders, by efta- the goodneis blishing laws in fociety; (befide that human laws would have very little force were they not founded on the principles of confcience) this remark fhews there is a neceffity for laws in general, whereby we gain our caufe. For if it be agreable to the order of reason that men fhould establish a rule of life among themselves, in order to be fcreened from the evils they might apprehend from one another, and to procure thofe advantages that are capable of forming their private and public happiness; this alone ought to convince us, that the Creator, infinitely wifer and better than ourselves, muft have undoubtedly purfued the fame method. A good parent that takes care to direct his children by his authority and counfels, is able to preserve peace and order in his family; is it then to be imagined, that the common father of mankind fhould neglect to give us the like affiftance? and if a wife fovereign has nothing fo much at heart as to prevent licentiousness by falutary regulations; how can any one believe that God who is a much greater friend to man than man is to his equals, has left all mankind without direction and