fers proper ces. thence in- and confequences. For we frequently fee that thofe, confequen- who have had only the first notion, find themselves embarraffed and mistaken, when they are to apply it to a cafe of the leaft delicate or complicated nature. They are fenfible indeed of the general principles, but they do not know how to follow them through their different branches, to make the neceffary diftinctions or exceptions, or to modify them according to time and place. This is the business of reafon, which it discharges fo much the better, in proportion as there is care taken to exercife and improve it. Third advantage: univerfal all cafes. XI. 3. Reafon not only carries its views farther reafon is an than inftinct, with refpect to the unfolding and apmeans, and plication of principles; but has also a more extenapplicable to five fphere, in regard to the very principles it difcovers, and the objects it embraces. For inftinct has been given us only for a fmall number of fimple cafes, relative to our natural state, and which require a quick determination. But befides thofe fimple cafes, where it is proper that man fhould be drawn and determined by a first motion; there are cafes of a more compofite nature, which arise from the different ftates of man, from the combination of certain circumstances, and from the particular fituation of each perfon; on all which 'tis impoffible to form any rules but by reflexion, and by an attentive obfervation of the relations and agreements of each thing. Such are the two faculties with which God has invefted us, in order to enable us to difcern between good and evil. Thefe faculties happily joined, and fubordinate one to the other, concur to the fame effect. One gives the first notice, the other verifies and and proves it; one acquaints us with the principles, the other applies and unfolds them; one serves for a guide in the most preffing and neceffary cafes, the other diftinguishes all forts of affinity or relation, and lays down rules for the most particular cases. 'Tis thus we are enabled to difcern what is good and juft, or which amounts to the fame thing, to know what is the divine will, in respect to the moral conduct we are to obferve. Let us unite at present these two means, in order to find the principles of the law of nature. CHA P. IV. Of the principles from whence reafon may deduce the law of naturea. I. I whence are we to de duce the principles of F we should be afterwards afked, what princi- From ples ought reafon to make ufe of, in order to judge of what relates to the law of nature, and to deduce or unfold it? our anfwer is in general, that the law of we have only to attend to the nature of man, and to his ftates or relations; and as these relations are different, there may be likewise different principles, that lead us to the knowledge of our duties. But before we enter upon this point, it will be proper to make fome preliminary remarks on what we call principles of natural law; in order to prevent the ambiguity or equivocation, that has often entangled this fubject. a See on this and the following chapter, Puffendorf's Law of nature and nations, book 2. chap. 3. II. When nature? Preliminary II. 1. When we inquire here, which are the first remarks. What we by princi ples of na principles of natural law, the queftion is, which are understand thofe truths or primitive propofitions, whereby we may effectually know the divine will in regard to man? and thus arrive by juft confequences, to the knowledge of the particular laws and duties which God impofes on us by right reason. tural law. 2. We muft not therefore confound the principles here in question, with the efficient and productive cause of natural laws, or with their obligatory principle. 'Tis unqueftionable that the will of the fupreme Being is the efficient cause of the law of nature, and the fource of the obligation from thence arifing. But this being taken for granted, we have ftill to inquire how man may attain to the knowledge of this will, and to the discovery of thofe principles which acquainting us with the divine intention, enable us to deduce from thence all our partilar duties, as far as they are discoverable by reafon only. A perfon afks, for example, whether the law of nature requires us to repair unjuft damages, or to be faithful to our engagements? If we are fatisfied with answering him, that the thing is incontestable, because fo it is ordered by the divine will; 'tis plain that this is not a fufficient anfwer to his queftion; and that he may reasonably infift to have a principle pointed out, which fhould really convince him that fuch in effect is the will of God; for this is the point he is in fearch of. Character of III. Let us afterwards obferve that the firft prin thofe prin ciples. ciples of natural laws, ought to be not only true, but but likewife fimple, clear, fufficient, and proper for thofe laws. They ought to be true: that is, they should be taken from the very nature and state of things. False or fuppofed principles muft produce confequences of the fame nature; for a folid edifice can never be raifed on a rotten foundation. They ought to be fimple and clear of their own nature, or at least easy to apprehend and unfold. For the laws of nature being obligatory for all mankind, their first principles fhould be within every body's reach, fo that whofoever has common fenfe may be eafily acquainted with them. It would be very reasonable therefore to miftruft principles that are far fetched, or of too fubtle and metaphyfical a nature. I add that these principles ought to be fufficient and univerfal. They fhould be fuch as one may deduce from thence by immediate and natural confequences, all the laws of nature, and the feveral duties from thence refulting; infomuch that the expofition of particulars be properly only an explication of the principles; in the fame manner pretty near as the production or increase of a plant is only an unfolding of the bud or feed. And as most natural laws are fubject to divers exceptions, 'tis likewife neceffary that the principles be fuch as include the reafons of the very exceptions; and that we may not only draw from thence all the common rules of morality, but that they may alfo serve to restrain thefe rules, according as place, time, and occafion requires. In fine, those first principles ought to be established in fuch a manner, as to be really the proper and Whether we ought to. whole to direct foundation of all the duties of natural law; infomuch that whether we defcend from the principle to deduce the confequences, or whether we afcend from the confequences to the principle, our reafonings ought always to be immediately connected, and their thread, as it were, never interrupted. IV. But, generally speaking, 'tis a matter of mere reduce the indifference, whether we reduce the whole to one one fingle fingle principle, or establish a variety of them. We principle. must confult and follow in this respect the rules of a judicious and exact method. All that can be faid on this head, is, that 'tis not at all neceffary to the folidity or perfection of the fyftem, that all natural laws be deduced from one fingle and fundamental maxim: nay, perhaps the thing is impoffible. Be that as it will, 'tis an idle labor, to endeavour to reduce the whole to this unity. Man cannot attain to the Such are the general remarks we had to propose. If they prove juft, we fhall reap this double advantage from them, that they will inftruct us in the method we are to follow, in order to find and establish the true principles of natural laws; and at the fame time they will enable us to pafs a folid judgment on the different fyftems that in this refpect have been followed. But 'tis time now to, enter upon the fubject. V. The only way to attain to the knowledge of knowledge natural laws, is to confider attentively the nature and laws, but conftitution of man, the relations he has to the beby examinings that furround him, and the ftates from thence of natural ing na ture, confti-refulting. In fact, the very term of natural law, tution, and Rate, and |