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Cicero. The language and opinions of men are very wide, fays he, from truth and right reafon, in feparating the honeft from the useful, and in perfuading themselves that fome honest things are not useful, and other things are useful but not honeft. This is a dangerous notion to human life. Hence we fee that Socrates detefted thofe fophifts, who first feparated those two things in opinion, which in nature are really joined.

In fact, the more we inveftigate the plan of divine providence, the more we find he has thought proper to connect the moral good and evil with the phyfical, or which is the fame thing, the just with the useful. And though in fome particular cafes the thing seems otherwise, this is only an accidental disorder, which is much less a natural confequence of the fyftem, than an effect of the ignorance or malice of man. Whereto we muft add, that in cafe we do not stop at the first appearances, but proceed to confider the human fyftem in its full extent, we fhall find that every thing well confidered and all compenfations made, these irregularities will be one day or other redreffed, as we shall more fully fhew when we come to treat of the fanctions of natural laws.

a In quo lapfa confuetudo deflexit de via, fenfimque eò deducta eft, ut honeftatem ab utilitate fecernens, & conftituerit honeftum effe aliquod quod utile non effet, & utile quod non honeftum : quâ nulla pernicies major hominum vitæ potuit adferri. Cic. de offic. lib. 2. cap. 3. Itaque accepimus, Socratem exfecrari folitum eos, qui primum' hæc naturâ cohærentia opinione diftraxiffent. Idem lib. 3. cap. 13. See likewife Grotius, Rights of war and peace, preliminary difcourse §. 17. and following; and Puffendorf, Law of nature and nations, book 2, chap. 3. §. 10, 11.

V. Here

action is

V. Here a queftion is fometimes propofed; whe- Whether an ther a thing be just because God commands it, or juft, because whether God commands it because it is just?

Pursuant to our principles, the question is not at all difficult. A thing is juft, because God commands it; this is implied by the definition we gave of juftice. But God commands fuch or fuch things, because these things are reasonable in themselves, conformable to the order and ends, he proposed to himfelf in creating mankind, and agreable to the nature and ftate of man. These ideas, though diftinct in themselves, are neceffarily connected, and can be separated only by a metaphyfical abstraction.

God com

mands it?

beauty of

VI. Let us, in fine, obferve that this harmony In what the or surprising agreement, which naturally occurs be- virtue and tween the ideas of juft, honeft, and useful, conftitutes the perfecthe whole beauty of virtue, and informs us at the confifts? fame time in what the perfection of man confifts.

In confequence of the different systems abovementioned, moralifts are divided with regard to the latter point. Some place the perfection of man in fuch a ufe of his faculties as is agreable to the nature of his being. Others in the use of our faculties and the intention of our Creator. Some, in fine, pretend that man is perfect, only as his manner of thinking and acting is proper to conduct him to the end he aims at, namely, his happiness.

But what we have above faid fufficiently fhews, that these three methods of confidering the perfection of man, are very little different, and ought not to be fet in oppofition. As they are interwoven with

one

tion of man

one another, we ought rather to combine and unite them. The perfection of man confists really in the poffeffion of natural or acquired faculties, which enable us to obtain, and actually put us in poffeffion of folid felicity; and this in conformity to the intention of our Creator, ingraved in our nature, and clearly manifested by the state wherein he has placed us *.

A modern writer has judiciously faid; that to obey only through fear of authority, or for the hope of recompence, without efteeming or loving virtue for the fake of its own excellency; is mean and mercenary. On the contrary to practife virtue with an abftra&t view of its fitness and natural beauty, without having any thought of the Creator and Conductor of the univerfe; is failing in our duty to the first and greatest of beings. He only who acts jointly through a principle of reason, through a motive of piety, and with a view of bis principal intereft, is an honeft, wife, and pious man ; which conftitutes without comparison the worthieft and completeft of characters.

Theory of agreable fenfations, chap. 8.

CHAP.

CHA P. IX.

Of the application of natural laws to human actions; and first of conscience".

T

A

S foon as we have discovered the foundati+ What is on and rule of our duties, we have only

meant by

applying the

man actions,

to recollect what has been already faid in the ele- laws to huventh chapter of the first part of this work, concerning the morality of actions, to fee in what manner natural laws are applied to human actions, and what effect ought from thence to refult.

The application of the laws to human actions is nothing else, but the judgment we pass on their morality, by comparing them with the law; a judgment whereby we pronounce that those actions being either good, bad, or indifferent, we are obliged either to perform or omit them, or that we may ufe our liberty in this refpect: and that according to the fide we have taken, we are worthy of praife or blame, approbation or cenfure.

This is done in two different manners. For either we judge on this footing of our own actions, or of those of another perfon. In the first cafe, our judgment is called confcience : but the judgment we pafs on other men's actions is termed imputation. These are, undoubtedly, fubjects of great importance, and of universal use in morality, which deserve therefore to be treated with fome care and circumfpection.

* See the Law of nature and nations, book 1. chap. 3. §. 4. and following: and the Duties of man and a citizen, book 1. chap. 1..5, 6.

VOL. I.

e

II. Con

What is confcience.

Confcience

knowledge

II. Confcience is properly no more than reason itfelf, confidered as inftructed in regard to the rule we ought to follow, or to the law of nature; and judging of the morality of our own actions, and of the obligations we are under in this respect, by comparing them to this rule, pursuant to the ideas we entertain thereof.

Confcience is alfo very frequently taken for the very judgment we pafs on the morality of actions; a judgment which is the refult of perfect reasoning, or the confequence we infer from two exprefs or tacit premiffes. A perfon compares two propofitions, one of which includes the law, and the other the action; and from thence he deduces a third; which is the judgment he makes of the quality of his action. Such was the reasoning of Judas: whofoever delivers up an innocent man to death, commits a crime; here is the law. Now this is what I have done; here is the action. I have therefore committed a crime; this is the confequence, or judgment which his conscience paffed on the action he committed.

III. Conscience supposes therefore a knowledge of fu pofes a the law; and particularly of the law of nature, of the law. which being the primitive fource of justice, is likewife the supreme rule of conduct. And as the laws cannot serve us for rules but inafmuch as they are known, it follows therefore, that conscience becomes thus the immmediate rule of our actions: for 'tis evident we cannot conform to the law but as far as we have notice thereof.

IV. This

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