compare the perfons now mentioned, to young people, whofe judgment has not yet acquired its full maturity, and who ought to liften and conform to the counfels of their fuperiors. The authority therefore, and example of fage and enlightened men, may in' fome cafes, in default of our own lights, prove a reasonable principle of determination and conduct.

But, in fine, as thofe foundations of probable conscience are not fo folid as to permit us to absolutely build upon them, we must therefore establish as a Tenth Rule, that we ought to use all our endeavours to increase the degree of verifimilitude in our opinions, in order to approach as near as poffible to the clear and demonstrative confcience; and we must not be satisfied with probability, but when we can do no better.

CHAP. X.

Of the merit aud demerit of human action; and of their imputation relative to the laws of

I.

IIN explaining the

N explaining the nature of human actions con- Diftinction fidered with regard to right, we obferved, of imputability and that an effential quality of thefe actions is to be fu- imputation." fceptible of imputation; that is, the agent may ture of a be reasonably looked upon as the real author thereof,

See on this and the following chapter, Puffendorf's Law of nature and nations, book 1. chap. 5. and chap. 9.

Of the na

moral caufe.

b Part 1.

chap. 3.

may

Of the na

ture of im

It fuppofes a

knowledge

may have it fet up to his account, and be made anfwerable for it; infomuch that the good or bad effects from thence arifing, can be justly attributed and referred to him as to the efficient caufe, concerning which we laid down this principle, that every voluntary action is of an imputable nature.

We give in general the name of moral cause of an action, to the perfon that produced it, either in the whole or part, by a determination of his will; whether he executes it himself phyfically and immediately, fo as to be the author thereof; or whether he procures it by the act of fome other person, and becomes thereby its caufe. Thus, whether we wound a man with our own hands, or fet affaffins to way-lay him, we are equally the moral caufe of the evil from thence refulting.

It was observed likewife, that we muft not confound the imputability of human actions with their actual imputation. The former, as has been now mentioned, is a quality of the action; the second is an act of the legiflator, judge, or some other perfon, who lays to fomebody's charge an action that is of an imputable nature.

II. Imputation is properly therefore a judgment putation. by which we declare, that fomebody being the author or moral caufe of an action commanded or forbidden of the law by the laws, the good or bad effects that refult from this action, ought to be actually attributed to him; that he is confequently answerable for them, and as fuch is worthy of praife or blame, of recompence or · punishment.

as well as of the fact.

This

This judgment of imputation, as well as that of conscience, is made by applying the law to the action, and comparing one with the other, in order to decide afterwards the merit of the fact, and to make the author confequently feel the good or evil, the punishment or recompence which the law has thereto annexed. All this neceffarily supposes an exact knowledge of the law and of its right fenfe, as well as of the fact and fuch circumftances thereof, as may any way relate to the determination of the law. A want of this knowledge must render the application false, and the judgment vicious.

III. Let us produce a few examples. One of the Examples. Horatii, who remained conqueror in the combat between the brothers of this name and the three Curiatii, inflamed with anger againft his fifter for bewailing the death of one of the Curiatii her lover, and for bitterly reproaching him therewith, inftead of congratulating him for his victory, flew her with his own hand. He was accused before the Duumvirs; and the queftion was, to know whether the law against murderers ought to be applied to the prefent cafe, in order to make him undergo the punishment? This was the opinion of the judges, who in fact condemned the young Roman. But appeal being made to the people, they judged quite otherwise. Their notion was that the law ought not to be applied to the fact; because a Roman lady, who feemed to be more concerned about her own particular intereft, than fenfible of the good of her country, might in fome measure be confidered and treated as an enemy; wherefore they pronounced the young

Principles.

1. We ought

putation

only.

man innocent. Let us add another example of an advantageous imputation, or of a judgment of recompence. Cicero, in the beginning of his confulate, discovered the confpiracy of Catiline, which menaced the republic with ruin. In this delicate conjuncture, he behaved with so much prudence and addrefs, that the confpiracy was ftifled without any noife or fedition, by the death of a few of the criminals. And yet J. Cæfar, and fome other enemies of Cicero, accused him before the people, for having put citizens to death contrary to rule, and before the fenate or people had paffed judgment against them. But the people attending to the circumstances of the fact, to the danger the republic had escaped, and to the important fervice Cicero had done, far from condemning him as an infringer of the laws, decreed him the glorious title of father of his country.

IV. In order to fettle the principles and foundanot to infer tions of this matter, we must observe, 1. That we actual im- ought not to conclude the actual imputation of an from impu- action merely from its imputability. An action, to tability merit actual imputation, must neceffarily have the concurrence of these two conditions: first, that it be of an imputable nature; and fecondly, that the agent be under fome obligation of doing or omitting it. An example will clear up the thing. Let us fuppofe two young men with the fame abilities and conveniences, but under no obligation of knowing algebra: one of them applies himself to this fcience, and the other does not; though the action of the one and the other's omiffion, are by themselves of an im

putable

putable nature; yet in this cafe they can be neither good nor bad. But were we to fuppofe that these two young men are defigned by their prince, the one to be a counsellor of ftate, and the other for fome military employment; in this cafe, their application or neglect in inftructing themselves in jurifprudence, for example, or the mathematics, would be justly imputed to them. The reason is, they are both in that case indifpenfibly obliged to acquire fuch knowledge as is neceffary for discharging properly the offices or employments to which they are called. Hence it is evident, that as imputability supposeth the power of acting or not acting; actual imputation requires moreover, that a perfon be under an obligation of doing one or the other.

tion fuppo

between the

its confe

quences.

V. 2. When we impute an action to a perfon, 2. Imputawe render him, as has been already obferved, an- fes fome fwerable for the good or bad confequences of what connexion he has done. From thence it follows, that in order action and to make a juft imputation, there must be fome neceffary or accidental connexion between the thing done or omitted, and the good or bad confequences of the action or omiffion; and befides, the agent must have had some knowledge of this connexion, or at least he must have been able to have fome probable forefight of the effects of his action. Otherwife the imputation cannot take place, as will appear by a few examples. A gunfmith fells arms to a man who has the appearance of a fenfible, fedate perfon, and does not seem to have any bad defign. And yet this man goes inftantly to make an unjust attack on another perfon, and kills him. VOL. I.

R

Here the gunfmith