Such is the rule. It may happen nevertheless, as we have already hinted, that the neceffity a person is under, may furnish a favorable exception, fo as to hinder the action from being imputed. To explain this, we should be obliged to enter into fome particulars that belong to another place. 'Tis fufficient here to obferve, that the circumstances a perfon is under, give us frequently room to form a reasonable prefumption, that the legislator himfelf excufes him from fuffering the evil with which he is menaced, and therefore allows him to deviate from the decifion of the law; and this may be always prefumed, when the fide a person takes, in order to extricate himself from his perplexity includes a leffer evil than that with which he is menaced. opinion. IX. But Puffendorf's principles concerning this Puffendorf" queftion feem to be neither just in themselves, nor well connected. He lays down as a rule, that constraint, as well as phyfical and actual violence, excludes all imputation, and that an action extorted through fear, ought no more to be imputed to the immediate agent, than to the fword which a perfon ufes in giving a wound. To which he adds, that with regard to fome very infamous actions, it is a mark of a generous mind to chufe rather to die than to ferve as an inftrument to fuch flagitious deeds, and that cafes like thefe ought to be excepted. But it has been justly observed, that this author gives too a See the Duties of man and a citizen, book i. chap. 1. §. 24. and the Law of nature and nations, book 1. chap. 5. §. 9. with Barbeyrac's notes. VOL. I. S great Of actions in which fons than great an extent to the effect of constraint; and that the example of the ax or fword, which are mere paffive inftruments, proves nothing at all. Besides, if the general principle is folid, we don't fee why he should have excepted particular cases; or at least he ought to have given us fome rule to distinguish thefe exceptions with certainty. X. 10. But if the perfon who does a bad acmore per- tion through fear, is generally anfwerable for it, the author of the constraint is not lefs fo; and we may justly render him accountable for the fhare he has one are concerned. had therein. This gives us an opportunity to add fome reflexions on those cases in which several perfons concur to the fame action; and to establish some principles whereby we may determine in what manner the action of one perfon is imputable to another. This fubject being of great ufe and importance, deferves to be treated with fome exactness. 1. Every man, ftrictly speaking, is answerable only for his own actions, that is, for what he himfelf has done or omitted: for with regard to another person's actions, they cannot be imputed to us, but inasmuch as we have concurred to them, and as we could and ought to have procured, hindered, or at leaft directed them after a certain manner. The thing fpeaks for itself. For to impute another man's actions to a perfon, is declaring that the latter is the efficient, though not the only cause thereof; and consequently that this action depended in fome measure on his will, either in its principle, or execution. 2 2. This 2. This being premised, we may affirm that every man is under a general obligation of doing all he can to induce every other perfon to discharge his duty, and to prevent him from committing a bad action, and confequently not to contribute thereto himself, either directly or indirectly, with a preme-→ ditated purpofe and will. 3. By a much stronger reafon we are answerable for the actions of thofe over whom we have a particular infpection, and whofe direction is committd to our care; wherefore the good or evil done by those persons, is not only imputable to themselves, but likewife to thofe to whofe direction they are fubject; according as the latter have taken or neglected the care that was morally neceffary, fuch as the nature and extent of their commiffion and power required. 'Tis on this footing we impute, for example, to the father of a family, the good or bad conduct of his children. 4. Let us obferve likewife, that in order to be reasonably esteemed to have concurred to another man's action, 'tis not at all neceffary for us to be fure of procuring or hindering it, by doing or omitting particular things; 'tis fufficient in this refpect, that we have fome probability, or verifimilitude. And as on the one fide, this default of certainty does not excufe neglect, on the other if we have done all that we ought, the want of fuccefs cannot be imputed to us; the blame in that cafe falls intirely upon the immediate author of the action. 5. In fine, 'tis proper alfo to remark, that in the queftion now before us, we are not inquiring into the degrees of the virtue or malice which is found Three forts of moral causes; prin in the action itself, and rendering it better or worse, augments its praife or cenfure, its recompence or punishment. All that we want is, to make a proper eftimate of the degree of influence a perfon has had over another man's action, in order to know whether he can be confidered as the moral caufe thereof, and whether this cause is more or less efficacious. To diftinguifh this properly, is a matter of fome importance. XI. In order to measure, as it were, this degree of influence, which decides the manner wherein we cipal; fub- can impute to any one, another man's action, there altern; and collateral. are feveral circumstances and diftinctions to observe, without which we fhould form a wrong judgment of things. For example, 'tis certain that a fimple approbation, generally fpeaking, has much less efficacy to induce a perfon to act, than a strong perfuafion or a particular inftigation. And yet the high opinion we conceive of a person, and the credit from thence arifing, may occafion a fimple approbation to have sometimes as great, and perhaps a greater influence over a man's action, than the most preffing perfuafion, or the strongest instigation from another quarter. We may range under three different claffes, the moral caufes that influence another man's action. Sometimes 'tis a principal cause, infomuch that the perfon who executes is only a fubaltern agent; fometimes the immediate agent, on the contrary, is the principal caufe, while the other is only the fubaltern; and at other times they are both collateral caufes, which have an equal influence over the action. XII. A XII. A perfon ought to be esteemed the principal caufe, who by doing or omitting fome things, influences in fuch a manner another man's action or omiffion, that, were it not for him, this action or omission would not have been, though the immediate agent has knowingly contributed to it. An officer, by an exprefs order of his general or prince, performs an action evidently bad: in this cafe the prince or general is the principal caufe, and the officer only the fubaltern. David was the principal caufe of the death of Urias, though Joab contributed thereto, being fufficiently apprized of the king's intention. In like manner Jezabel was the principal caufe of the death of Naboth ". I mentioned that the immediate agent must have contributed knowingly to the action. For fuppofe he could not know whether the action be good or bad, he can then be confidered only as a fimple inftrument; but the person who gave the orders, being in that cafe the only and abfolute cause of the action, is the only one that is anfwerable for it. Such in general is the cafe of fubjects, who ferve by order of their fovereign in an unjust war. But the reafon why a fuperior is deemed the principal caufe of what is done by those that depend on him, is not properly their dependance; 'tis the order he gives them, without which 'tis fuppofed they would not of themselves have attempted the action. From whence it follows, that every other perfon, who has the fame influence over the actions of his equals, or even of his fuperiors, may for the 2 See 2 Sam. chap. ii. and I Kings, chap. xxi. S 3 fame |