not to stagger or weaken our conviction, as long as they are fuch difficulties only as embarrass or puzzle the mind, without invalidating the proofs themfelves. This rule is fo very useful in the study of the sciences, that one fhould keep it always in fight *. Let us refume now the thread of our reflexions.

voluntary,

ftrained.

XII. The denomination of voluntary or human actions are actions in general is given to all thofe that depend and involunon the will; and that of free, to fuch as come within tary; free, neceffary, the jurifdiction of liberty, which the foul can fufpend and conor turn as it pleases. The oppofite of voluntary is involuntary; and the contrary of free is neceffary, or whatever is done by force or constraint. All human actions are voluntary, inafmuch as there are none but what proceed from ourselves, and of which we are the authors. But if violence, ufed by an external force, which we are incapable to refift, hinders us from acting, or makes us act without the confent of our will; as when a perfon ftronger than ourfelves lays hold of our arm to ftrike or wound another perfon, the action refulting from thence be-. ing involuntary, is not, properly fpeaking, our deed or action, but that of the agent from whom we fuffer this violence.

a There is a wide difference between feeing that a thing is abfurd, and not knowing all that regards it; between an unanswerable queftion in relation to a truth, and an unanswerable objection against it; though a great many confound thefe tavo forts of dif ficulties. Thofe only of the last order are able to prove, that what was taken for a known truth cannot be true, because otherwife fome abfurdity must ensue. But the others prove nothing but the ignorance we are under in relation to several things that regard a known truth. Biblioth. Raifon. Tom. 7. p. 346.

The fame cannot be faid of actions that are forced and constrained, only as we are determined to commit them, thro' fear of a great and imminent evil with which we are menaced: As for inftance, were an unjuft and cruel prince to oblige a judge to condemn an innocent perfon, by menacing to put him to death if he did not obey his orders. Actions of this fort, tho' forced in fome fenfe, because we commit them with reluctancy, and would never confent to them were it not for a very preffing neceffity; fuch actions, I fay, are ranked nevertheless among the number of voluntary actions, because after all, they are produced by a deliberation of the will, which chufes between two inevitable evils, and determines to prefer the least to the greateft. This will become more intelligible by a few examples.

action is at the

But fuppofe a

A perfon gives alms to a poor man, who expofes his wants and mifery to him; this fame time both voluntary and free. man that travels alone and difarmed, falls into the hands of robbers, and that these mifcreants menace him with inftant death, unless he gives them all he has; the furrender which this traveller makes of his money in order to fave his life, is indeed a voluntary action, but conftrained at the fame time, and void of liberty. For which reason there are fome that distinguish these actions by the name of mixt 2, as partaking of the voluntary and involuntary. They are voluntary, by reafon the principle that produces them is in the agent itself, and the will determines to commit them as the leaft of two evils: but they * See Puffendorff law of nature and nations, book I. chap. IV. §. 9.

par

partake of the involuntary, because the will executes them contrary to its inclination, which it would never do, could it find any other expedient to clear itself of the dilemma.

Another neceffary elucidation is, that we are to suppose that the evil with which we are menaced, is confiderable enough to make a reasonable impreffion upon a prudent or wife man, fo far as to intimidate him; and besides that, the person who compels us has no right to restrain our liberty; infomuch that we do not lye under an obligation of bearing with any hardship or inconveniency, rather than displease him. Under these circumstances, reafon would have us determine to fuffer the leffer evil, fuppofing at least that they are both inevitable. This kind of conftraint lays us under what is called a moral neceffity; whereas when we are abfolutely compelled to act, without being able, in any fhape whatsoever, to avoid it, this is termed a phyfical neceffity..

'Tis therefore a neceffary point of philofophical exactness to distinguish between voluntary and free. In fact, 'tis easy to comprehend, by what has been now faid, that all free actions are indeed voluntary, but all voluntary actions are not free. Nevertheless, the common and vulgar way of fpeaking, frequently confounds thofe two terms, of which we ought to take particular notice, in order to avoid all ambiguity.

We give likewife the name of manners fometimes to free actions, inafmuch as the mind confiders them as susceptible of rule. Hence we call morality the art which teaches those rules of conduct, and the method of conforming thereto our actions.

XIII. We

Our facul

ties help

XIII. We shall finish what relates to the faculties

one another of the foul by fome remarks, which will help us to reciprocally. understand better their nature and ufe.

Of reafon

and virtue.

1. Our faculties affift one another in their operations, and when they are all united in the fame fubject, they act always jointly. We have already observed that the will fuppofes the understanding, and that the light of reafon serves for a guide to liberty. Thus the understanding, the will, and liberty; the fenses, the imagination, and memory; the instincts, inclinations, and paffions, are like so many different fprings, which concur all to produce a particular effect; and 'tis by this united concurrence we attain at length to the knowledge of truth, and the poffeffion of folid good, on which our perfection and happiness depends.

XIV. 2. But in order to procure to ourselves thofe advantages, 'tis not only neceffary that our faculties be well conftituted in themfelves, but moreover we ought to make a good ufe of them, and maintain the natural fubordination there is between them and the different motions, which lead us towards, or divert us from, certain objects. 'Tis not therefore fufficient to know the common and natural state of our faculties, we should likewise be acquainted with their state of perfection, and know in what their real ufe confifts. Now truth being, as we have seen, the proper object of the understanding, the perfection of this faculty is to have a diftinct knowledge of truth; at least of thofe important truths, which concern our duty and happi

nefs.

nefs. For fuch a purpose, this faculty fhould be formed to a close attention, a just discernment, and folid reafoning. The understanding thus perfected, and confidered as having actually the principles which enable us to know and to diftinguish the true and the useful, is what is properly called reason; and hence it is that we are apt to speak of reafon as of a light of the mind, and as of a rule by which we ought always to be directed in our judgments and actions.

If we confider in like manner the will in its state of perfection, we fhall find it confifts in the force and habit of determining always right, that is, not to defire any thing but what reason dictates, and not to make use of our liberty but in order to chufe the beft. This fage direction of the will is properly called Virtue, and fometimes goes by the name of Reason. And as the perfection of the foul depends on the mutual fuccours which the faculties, confidered in their most perfect ftate, lend to one another; we understand likewise sometimes by reason, taken in a more vague, and more extenfive fenfe, the foul itself, confidered with all its faculties, and as making actually a good ufe of them. Thus the term reafon carries with it always an idea of perfection, which is fometimes applied to the foul in general, and at other times to fome of the faculties in particular.

the diverfity

XV. 3. The faculties, of which we are treating, Caufes of are common to all mankind; but they are not we obferve found always in the fame degree, neither are they in the condetermined after the fame manner. Befides, they have their periods in every man; that is, their in

creafe,