the primum mobile of all our determinations; our hearts being never inclined towards any particular good, but by the natural impreffion which determines us to good in general. 'Tis not in our power to change this bent of the will, which the Creator himfelf has implanted in us. vidence. V. This fyftem of providence extends to all be- 'Tis the fyings endowed with fenfe and knowledge. Even ftem of proanimals themselves have a like inftinct; for they all love themselves, endeavouring at felf-prefervation by all forts of means, eagerly purfuing whatever seems good or useful to them, and turning, on the contrary, from whatever appears prejudicial or bad. The fame propenfity fhews itself in man, not only as an inftinct, but moreover as a rational inclination approved and ftrengthened by reflexion. Hence whatsoever prefents itself to us as an object proper to promote our happiness, must of neceffity please us; and every thing that appears oppofite to our felicity, becomes of course the object of our averfion. The more we ftudy man, the more we are convinced that here, in reality, lies the fource of all our tastes; here the grand fpring which fets us in motion. VI. And indeed, if it be natural to every intelli- The defire gent and rational being, to act always with a fixt is effential of happiness view and determinate end; 'tis no lefs evident, that to man, and infeparable this view or end must be ultimately reduced to from reafon. himself, and confequently to his own advantage and happiness. The defire therefore of happiness is as effential to man, and as infeparable from his nature, as Self-love is that has no ous in itself. as reafon itself; for reafon, as the very etymology of the word implies, is nothing more than a calculation and account. To reafon is to calculate, and to draw up an account, after balancing every thing, in order to fee on which fide the advantage lies. It would therefore imply a contradiction, to fuppofe a rational being, that could absolutely forego its intereft, or be indifferent with regard to its own felicity. VII. We must therefore take care not to confia principle der felf-love, and that fenfe or inclination which fixes thing vici- us fo ftrongly to our happiness, as a principle naturally vicious, and the fruit of human depravation, This would be accufing the author of our existence, and converting his nobleft gifts into poison. Whatever comes from a being fupremely perfect, is in itself good; and were we to condemn the fenfe or inclination of felf love as bad in itself, under a pretence that by a misconstruction and wrong use thereof it is the fource of an infinite number of diforders, we should for the very fame motives be obliged to condemn reason; becaufe 'tis from the abufe of this faculty that the groffeft errors and most extravagant irregularities of men proceed. It may appear furprizing to fome that we should have stopt here, to investigate and explain the truth of a principle, which one would imagine is obvious to every body, to the learned as well as the vulgar. And yet it was abfolutely neceffary; because this is a truth of the very last importance, which gives us the key, as it were, of the human fyftem. 'Tis true, that all ethic writers agree that man is made for happiness, and naturally defires it (for how is it poffible poffible not to hear the voice of nature, which rifes from the very bottom of the heart?) But a great many, after acknowledging this principle, seem to lofe fight of it, and not attending to the confequences that flow from thence, they erect their systems on different, and fometimes quite opposite foundations. attain to VIII. But if it be true that man does nothing but Man cannot with a view of happiness, 'tis no lefs certain that happines reason is the only way he has to attain it. but by the help of rea In order to establish this fecond propofition or fon. truth, we have only to attend to the very idea of happiness, and to the notion we have of good and evil. Happiness is that internal fatisfaction of the foul which arifes from the poffeffion of good; good is whatever is agreeable to man for his prefervation, perfection, entertainment, and pleasure. Evil is the oppofite of good. Man inceffantly experiences, that there are fome things convenient, and others inconvenient to him that the former are not all equally convenient, but fome more than others; in fine, that this conveniency depends, for the most part, on the ufe he knows how to make of things, and that the fame thing which may fuit him, ufing it after a certain manner and measure, becomes unfuitable when this use exceeds its limits. 'Tis only therefore by investigating the nature of things, as alfo the relations they have between themselves and with us, that we are capable of difcovering their fitnefs or difagreement with our felicity, of difcerning good from evil, of ranging every thing in its proper order, of fetting a right VOL. I. E value Reafon is therefore value upon each, and of regulating confequently our researches and defires. But is there any other method of acquiring this discernment, but by forming just ideas of things and their relations, and by deducing from these first ideas the confequences that flow from thence by exact and close argumentations? Now 'tis reafon alone that directs all these operations. Yet this is not all : for as in order to arrive at happiness, it is not fufficient to form juft ideas of the nature and ftate of things, but 'tis alfo neceffary that the will should be directed by those ideas and judgments in the series of our conduct; fo 'tis certain, that nothing but reafon can communicate and fupport in man the neceffary strength for making a right use of liberty, and for determining in all cafes according to the light of his understanding, in spite of all the impreffions and motions that may lead him to a contrary pursuit. IX. Reason is therefore the only means, in every the primi- refpect, that man has left to attain to happiness, and tive rule of the principal end for which he has received it. All man. the faculties of the foul, its inftincts, inclinations, and even the paffions are relative to this end; and confequently 'tis this fame reason that is capable of pointing out the true rule of human actions, or, if you will, fhe herself is this primitive rule. In fact, were it not for this faithful guide, man would lead a random life, ignorant even of what regards himself, unacquainted with his own origin and destination, and with the use he ought to make of whatever furrounds him; ftumbling, like a blind man, at every step; ftep; loft in fine, and bewildered in an inextricable labyrinth. Right in ge X. Thus we are conducted naturally to the firft What is idea of the word Right, which in its moft general netal? fense, and that to which all the particular fignifications bear fome relation, is nothing elfe but whatever reason certainly acknowledges as a fure and + concife means of attaining happiness, and approves as fuch. This definition is the refult of the principles hitherto established. In order to be convinced of its exactness, we have only to draw these principles together, and unite them under one profpect. In fact, fince right (droit) in its primary notion fignifies whatever directs, or is well directed; fince direction supposes a scope and end, to which we are defirous of attaining; fince the ultimate end of man is happiness; and, in fine, fince he cannot attain to happiness but by the help of reafon; does it not evidently follow, that Right in general is whatever reafon approves as a fure and concise means of acquiring happiness? 'Tis likewife in confequence of these principles, that reafon giving its approbation to itself, when it happens to be properly cultivated, and arrived to that state of perfection in which it knows how to use all its difcernment, bears, by way of preference or excellence, the appellation of right reason, as being the first and fureft means of direction whereby man is enabled to acquire felicity. That we may not forget any thing in the analyfis of these firft ideas, 'tis proper to obferve here, that the Latins express what we call Right by the |