establishing any fuch maxim, affures us, that when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the. things contained in the law; these having not the law are a law to themselves. Which fhew the work of the law written in their hearts, their confcience alfo bearing witness.

True it is, that a bad education, vicious habits, and irregular paffions, may offufcate the mind; and that neglect, levity, and prejudices, precipitate men frequently into the groffeft errors in point of religion and morals. But this proves only that men may make a bad use of their reason, and not that the natural rectitude of the faculties is fubverted. What we have still to say, concerning this point, will help to fet it in a clearer light.

manner per

tention, and

VIII. Let us proceed now to a clofer inquiry into In what the operations of the understanding. The percep- ception, attion, or view and knowledge of things, is commonly examen, are formed by the concurrence of two actions; one from formed. the object, and is the impreffion which this object makes on us; the other from the mind, and is properly a glance, or fimple look of the foul, on the object it is defirous of knowing. But as a first look is not always fufficient, 'tis neceffary that the mind should apply itself for some time to a serious confideration of the object, to the end it may acquire a juft knowledge of things, and form thereof exact ideas. This Application, with which the foul continues to view the object in order to know it well, is called attention; and if it turns itfelf different ways, to confider the object on all Sides, this is a Rom. ii. 14, 15. B 4

termed

Evidence;

termed examen or enquiry. We may therefore affirm, that the perception or knowledge of things depends intirely in respect to the mind, on its natural vigor and attention.

IX. 'Tis by thefe helps, drawn from his own Probability fund, that man attains at length a clear and distinct knowledge of things and their relations; as alfo of ideas, and the conformity of thefe ideas with their originals; in short, that he acquires the knowledge of truth.

We give the name of evidence, to this clear and distinct view of things and their mutual relations; a point to which we should be particularly attentive. For this evidence being the effential character of truth, or the fure mark whereby one cannot help diftinguishing it, the confequence is, that it neceffarily produces fuch an internal conviction, as forms the highest degree of certainty. 'Tis true that all objects do not present themselves with fo ftrong a light, and that notwithstanding the great care and application a man may ufe, all that he is frequently able to attain, is only a glimmering light, which according to its ftrength or weakness, produces different degrees of probability and feeming truth. But this must be abfolutely the cafe of every being, whofe faculties are limited: 'Tis fufficient that man, in refpect to his destination and state, is capable of knowing with certainty thofe things which concern his perfection and happiness; and moreover, that he is able to diftinguish between probability and evidence, as alfo between the different degrees of probability, in order to proportion his affent to these differences. Now a perfon need enter but ever fo little into him

self,

felf, and reflect on the operations of his mind, to be convinced, beyond any poffibility of doubt, that man is really poffeffed of this difcernment.

fes, the ima

X. The fenfes, taken for the fenfitive faculty, the of the fenimagination also, and the memory, must be all re- gination,and duced to the understanding. In fact, the fenfes, con- memory. fidered in this manner, are nothing else but the understanding itself, inafmuch as it makes ufe of the fenfes and organs of the body, to perceive corporeal objects. The imagination likewife is nothing but the understanding, as it perceives abfent objects, not in themselves, but by their images formed in the brain. The memory, in fine, is no more than the underftanding, confidered as poffeffed of the faculty of retaining the ideas it forms of things, and capable of representing them to itself whenever there is occafion; advantages that depend principally on the care we take in repeating frequently thofe ideas.

tion of the

ing confifts

in

XI. From what has been hitherto faid with regard The perfeeto the understanding, it follows, that the object understandof this faculty of the foul is truth, with all the acts and means that lead us to it. Upon this fuppofition, the perfection of the understanding confifts in the knowledge of truth, this being the end for which is defigned.

it

There are two things, among others, oppofite to this perfection, ignorance and error, which are two maladies, as it were, of the foul. Ignorance is no more than a privation of ideas or knowledge; but error is a non-conformity or oppofition of our ideas to the nature and state of things. Error being therefore

the

ledge of obftacles to

truth. Two

this perfection, igno

rance and

error.

Different forts of er

law, and of

the fubverfion of truth, is much more oppofite to it than ignorance, which is a kind of medium between truth and error.

'Tis to be obferved here, that we do not speak of the understanding, truth, ignorance, and error, purely to know what these things are in themselves; our main design is to confider them as principles of our actions. In this light, ignorance and error, though naturally distinct from one another, are generally mixt, as it were, and confounded; infomuch that whatsoever is faid of one, ought equally to be applied to the other. Ignorance is frequently the caufe of error: but joined or feparate, they follow the fame rules, and produce the same effect by the influence they have over our actions or omiffions. Perhaps, were we to examine into things exactly, error only, properly speaking, can be looked upon as a principle of action, and not fimple ignorance, which being nothing more of itself than a privation of ideas, cannot be productive of any thing.

XII. There are feveral forts of ignorance and errors. 1. Er. ror, whofe different divifions 'tis proper for us to ror of the obferve. 1. Error confidered in refpect to its obthe fact. 2. ject, is either of the law, or of the fact. 2. With and involun- regard to its origin, ignorance is voluntary or invofential and luntary, error is vincible or invincible. 3. In relaaccidental. tion to the influence of the error on a particular affair or action, it is efteemed effential or accidental.

Voluntary

tary. 3. Ef

Error is of the law or fact according as people are mistaken either in refpect to the difpofition of the law, or in regard to a fact that is not fufficiently. known. For instance, it would be an error of the

law,

law, were a prince to fuppofe himself intitled to declare war against a neighbouring ftate, only because it infenfibly increases in ftrength and power. Such was likewise the error fo common formerly among the Greeks and Romans, that it was allowable for parents to expofe their children. On the contrary, the idea Abimelech had of Sarah the wife of Abraham, by taking her for an unmarried perfon, was an error of the fact.

The ignorance a perfon lies under through his own fault, or an error contracted by neglect, and which might have been avoided by ufing all poffible care and attention, is a voluntary ignorance, or a vincible and furmountable error. Thus the polytheism of the Pagans was a vincible error; for they had only to make a right ufe of their reafon, in order to be convinced that there was no neceffity for fuppofing a plurality of gods. The fame may be faid of an opinion established among most of the ancients, that pyracy was lawful against thofe with whom there was no treaty fubfifting, and that it was allowable to confider them as enemies. Ignorance is involuntary, and error invincible, when they are fuch as could neither have been prevented nor removed, even by all the care and endeavours that are morally poffible; that is, judging of them according to the conftitution of human things, and of common life. Thus the ignorance of the chriftian religion, under which the people of America laboured, before they had any communication with the Europeans, was an involuntary and invincible ignorance.

? See another example in St. Matthew, chap. xv. v. 4, 5,

In