In fine, we understand by an effential error that whose object is fome neceflary circumftance in the affair, and which for this very reafon has a direct influence on the action done in confequence thereof; infomuch that were it not for this error, the action would never have been done. Hence this is denominated likewife an efficacious error. By neceffary circumftances, we are to understand thofe which are neceffarily required, either by the very nature of the thing, or by the intention of the agent, formed at the proper time, and made known by fuitable indications. 'Twas thus, for inftance, an effential error in the Trojans, at the taking of their town, to fhoot their darts against their own people, miftaking them for enemies, because of their being armed after the Greek manner. Again; a perfon marries another man's wife, fuppofing her to be a maid, or not knowing that her husband is ftill living: this regards the very nature of the thing, and is of course an effential error.

On the contrary, accidental error is that which has no neceffary connexion of itself with the affair, and confequently cannot be confidered as the real cause of the action. A person abuses or infults another, taking him for fome body else, or because he supposes the prince is dead, as it had been groundlefly reported &c. Thefe are errors meerly accidental, which fubfift indeed in the mind of the agent, and have accompanied him in the action, but cannot be confidered as its real cause.

'Tis likewise observable that thefe different qualities of ignorance or error, may concur and be found united in the fame cafe. 'Tis thus an error of the fact may

be

be either effential or accidental; and both the one and the other may be either voluntary or involuntary, vincible or invincible.

So much may fuffice for what regards the underftanding. Let us proceed now to examine into the other faculties of the foul, which concur alfo to the production of human actions.

CHAP. II.

Continuation of the Principles relative to the nature of man. Of will and liberty.

1.

pinefs and

fift in.

T was not fufficient, pursuant to the views of The Will. the Creator, that the human foul fhould be What happoffeffed of the faculty of knowing things and of good conforming thereof ideas; it was likewife requifite it should be endowed with an active principle to fet it in motion, and with a power whereby man, after knowing the objects that occur to him, fhould be capable of determining to act or not to act, according as he judges proper. This faculty is what we call the will.

The will is therefore nothing elfe but that power of the foul, by which it is determined of itfelf, and by virtue of an active principle inherent in its nature, to feek for what is agreeable to it, to act after a certain manner, and to do or to omit an action, with a view of happiness.

By Happiness we are to understand the internal fatisfaction of the foul, arifing from the poffeffion

of

Inftincts,

Inclinati

ons,

of good: and by good whatever is fuitable or agreeable to man for his prefervation, perfection, conveniency, or pleasure. The idea of good determines that of evil, which in its moft general fignification, implies whatever is oppofite to the prefervation, perfection, conveniency, or pleasure of man.

II. Inftincts, inclinations, and paffions are reducions, Paffi- ble to the will. Instincts are fentiments excited in the foul by the wants of the body, which determine it to provide immediately against them. Such are hunger, thirst, the averfion for whatever is hurtful, &c. The inclinations are a propenfity of the will, which leads it rather towards fome forts of objects than others, but in an even, tranquil manner, a manner fo proportioned to all its operations, that instead of obstructing or interrupting, it generally facilitates them. As for the paffions, they are, indeed, in the fame manner as the inclinations, motions of the will towards certain objects, but motions of a more impetuous and turbulent kind, motions that difpoffefs the foul of its natural tranquillity, and hinder it from directing properly its operations. Then it is that the paffions become one of the most dangerous diftempers of man. The caufe of the paffions is, generally, the allurement of fome fenfible good, which folicits the foul, and impels it with too violent an impreffion.

'Tis eafy to conceive, by what has been here faid, that the inclinations, paffions, and instincts have a very great affinity with one another. They are all alike propenfities or motions, which have frequently the fame objects; but there is this difference between

I

these

thefe three species of motions, that inftincts are neceffarily the fame in all men, by a natural consequence of their conftitution, and of the union between the body and the foul; whereas the inclinations and paífions, particularly confidered, have nothing neceffary in their nature, and are furprisingly different in different men.

Let us make an obfervation here, which falls in very naturally: 'tis that we often give the name of Heart to the will, confidered as fufceptible of the forementioned motions; and the reason of this in all probability is, because these motions were supposed to have their feat in the heart.

what it con

III. Such is the nature of the foul, that the will Liberty: ia not only acts always fpontaneously, that is, by its fifts. own proper motion, of its own accord, and by an internal principle; but likewise that its determinations are generally accompanied with liberty.

We give the name of liberty to that force or power of the foul, whereby it modifies and regulates its operations as it pleases, fo as to be able to fufpend, continue, or alter its deliberations and actions; in a word, fo as to be capable to determine and act with choice, according as it thinks proper. 'Tis by this excellent faculty, that man has a kind of command over himself and his actions: and as he is hereby rendered also capable of conforming to rule and anfwerable for his conduct, it is therefore neceffary to give a further explication of the nature of this faculty.

Will and liberty being faculties of the foul, they cannot be blind, or deftitute of knowledge; but

necef

Ufe of liberty in our

neceffarily fuppofe the operation of the understanding. How is it poffible in fact to determine,, fufpend, or alter our refolutions, unless we know what is proper for us to chufe? It is contrary to the nature of an intelligent and rational being to act without intellection and reason. This reafon may be either fuperficial or bad; yet it has fome appearance at leaft, fome glimmering, that makes us give it a momentary approbation. Wherever there is election or choice, there must be a comparison; and a comparifon implies at least a confused reflexion, a kind of deliberation, though of a quick and almost imperceptible nature, on the fubject before us.

The end of our deliberations is to procure us fome advantage. For the will tends generally towards good, that is, to whatsoever is really or apparently proper for rendering us happy; infomuch that all actions depending on man, and that are any way relative to his end, are for this very reafon fubject to the will. And as truth, or the knowledge of things, is agreeable to man; and in this fignification truth is also a good, it follows therefore that truth forms one of the principal objects of the will.

Liberty, like the will, has goodness and truth for its object; but it has lefs extent with regard to actions; for it does not exercise itself in all the acts of the will, but only in those which the foul has a power of fufpending or altering as fhe pleases.

IV. But if any one should inquire which are thofe judgments acts wherein liberty difplays itself? We answer, that in refpect to they are eafily known by attending to what paffes within us, and to the manner, in which the mind

truth.

conducts