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The authors, realizing that pathological lying is a type of delinquency, and "following the rule that for explanation of conduct tendencies one must go to the youthful beginnings," have attempted to gain the fullest possible information about developmental and family history, early environment, and early emotional experiences. It is unfortunate that the authors have refrained from publishing the mental tests and other exact details. Just that massing of detail is what is wanted. Largely through this lack the accounts of the cases are literary rather than scientific. The information obtained, with few exceptions, such as the results of the Aussage test and the summary of the results of the mental tests, are such as could be obtained by any social worker.
A characteristic statement of the authors, which will give an idea of their attitude toward this work, is the following, from page 13 of the introductory chapter: "We confess to no particular pleasure in writing up this rather sordid material; the task is undertaken because such studies offer the only way to gain that better understanding which is necessary for adequate treatment of special types of human beings." It might seem strange to those who regard delinquency and mental disease with objective equanimity that it is necessary to characterize the material as "sordid," and that after the great amount of time devoted to these cases, and after careful study, there should not have been any particular pleasure in writing up the results. Perhaps the reason for this is that, after all, the book contains merely a summary of work done without any new point of view or new information.
As a contribution to the casuistic literature the volume will prove of value in that a series of cases are carefully recorded in regard to their social histories, their environmental difficulties, their heredity, and in regard to the impression they made on so experienced and keen an observer as Dr. Healy.
It is a question whether one is justified at present in drawing the sharp line that the authors do between the pathological liar and swindler and more pronounced forms of disease such as epilepsy, insanity, and mental defect. In the chapter on borderline mental types the authors state that they keep these cases separate in order to emphasize that pathological lying by an insane person does not make a pathological liar in the true sense. "We should hesitate, therefore," they go on to say, "to give in legal form a verdict of insanity in several of these borderline cases we cite. They are very difficult to classify, and the question of responsibility called for sometimes in court work is unanswerable."
Pathological lying and swindling is considered in itself a borderline condition somewhere between normality and mental disease. A well-known experience with such conditions is that it is not always possible to evaluate the significance of individual traits unless, as in the case of disease, the symptoms become exaggerated and the clinical picture becomes clear.
In the analysis of the cases made by the authors, one finds emphasis laid upon habit formation, lack of parental correction, early experience with lying, mental conflict, early sex experiences and habits, and home conditions. As an inventorial method, this may have value. From a point of view, however, of diagnostics, it is difficult to correlate the facts of this group with the precision that is demanded of the physician, so as to base very definitely upon them prognosis and treatment. The authors are naturally very modest in dealing with the latter points.
Altogether the book is disappointing to those who realize the importance of the subject and who had hoped for more definite help from the authors. The methods employed are, with the exception of the mental tests, but an elaboration of the methods that have been used by the laity since early times. One misses the careful laboratory tests for the will, which have been carried out in similar cases by Kraepelin.1
1 4 KRAEPELIN, PSYCHIATRIE, 8 ed., 2067.
The insistence of the authors that pathological lying and swindling forms a group quite distinct from psychotic and epileptic conditions does not help our advance. On the contrary, the only hope for ultimate progress in this field of research lies in the possibility of correlating the phenomena here observed with those recognized elsewhere. It is important to apply the point of view of the pathologist in dealing with these subjects, that is to say, the significance of mild disturbances may become clear and reasonable in the light of knowledge obtained in the study of severe variations from the normal. Nearly all that we know about physiology of the human body has been obtained in studying exaggerated conditions produced either spontaneously or experimentally. In the field of psychiatry the experimental method has so far been inapplicable. The methods of the psychologists have been applied as far as possible. These methods, however, are largely introspective. In psychiatric research we are therefore dependent upon such experiments as nature provides spontaneously. It is left to our ingenuity to find the correlations.
We are probably still far from this desired end. In the meanwhile, those who are wise will refrain from superficial judgments and will endeavor to explain delinquency in its various forms as a manifestation of the same fundamental causes that operate in other and better recognized pathological conditions. HERMAN M. ADLER.
THE PRINCIPLES OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE according to the Hanafi, Malavi, Shafi'i and Hanbali Schools. By Abdur Rahim, M.A., Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. London: Luzar & Co. 1911. pp. xvii, 443.
PRINCIPLES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW. An essay at a Complete Statement of
HINDU LAW, A Treatise. By P. R. Ganapathi Iyer, B.A., B.L., High Court
These books on the personal law of Mohammedans and Hindus, as administered in British India, have, one need not say, no interest for the practising lawyer in this part of the world. But they contain much that cannot but be of significance to the student of the science of law who would keep abreast of the march of that science in the world of to-day.
The work of Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim is of special interest as indicating what might be called a humanist movement in Anglo-Mohammedan law. He points out that the book of chief authority upon Mohammedan law has been studied in India, not from the original Arabic writings, but from an English version in which it was frequently impossible for the translator to find words to convey the exact legal significance of technical Arabic expressions. Moreover the author of the Hedaya assumed that the reader was familiar with the principles of Mohammedan legal science and with the Koran and the Hadith. Thus, we are told, and it is quite credible, the translator's way of stating the arguments of the classical Mohammedan jurists "has at times led to the misapplication of their dicta." One is reminded at once of the situation in the modern Roman law when the Humanists in the sixteenth century and the Historical School in the nineteenth century set up the cry of "back to the texts," which had been overlaid by the gloss or pushed aside by the usus modernus. In the same spirit Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim takes us to the classical
Nor is this mere pedantry or mere worship of the past in the one case more
than in the other. Hanifa, and, in a lesser degree, Malik, Shafi'i and Hanbal, were jurists of a high order. The method of analogical deduction, the theory of juristic equity and the doctrine of consensus of opinion which he developed, were worthy of the Roman jurists and indeed did for a slender store of jural materials much the same service which interpretation and natural law in the hands of the Roman jurisconsult did for the narrow and arbitrary rules of the ius strictum. The student of universal history will welcome the clear and wellwritten statement in English of the development of juristic science during the Arabian hegemony and of the stages by which it led to the Anglo-Mohammedan law of to-day which Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim has given us.
Mr. Justice Tyabji has a different purpose. His endeavor is to expound the Mohammedan law, as applied in India to-day, dogmatically in the form of a code, a method which Sir James Stephen made familiar in English law and one which Mr. Spencer Bower has been employing more recently with marked success. Except as another example of the possibilities of this mode of exposition the American lawyer has no concern with it. It should be said, however, that the work seems to have been well done and shows that systematic method has made notable progress in Indian legal literature. The tendency to appeal to the classical texts, which had full scope in the academic lectures of Mr. Justice Rahim, can find few opportunities in a dogmatic exposition. Yet here also it is manifest in more than one spot and is a good augury of independent legal thought in a people who are showing a great natural aptitude for the law.
Hindu law appears to afford less opportunity for a humanist movement. The great Arabian jurists were lawyers through and through. The authoritative texts by which they were bound were not many and were so elastic that juristic science had full scope. On the other hand the Hindu lawyer has to deal with inspired or sacred texts that go into great detail. Hence Mr. Ganapathi Iyer's book has much less interest for the student of comparative law and universal legal history. Moreover his English legal training has led him to take Austin's Jurisprudence and Maine's Ancient Law for something like sacred texts in jurisprudence, although he does reject the view of the latter in connection with the question whether Manu sets forth a system of law that was ever actually administered.
The reviewer cannot pretend to be competent to pass upon the merits of these works. But as one compares them with the Anglo-Indian law books of a generation ago he cannot but perceive that the native lawyers in India have been making rapid progress and that a legal juristic development is going on of which students of jurisprudence must take account.
THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD. By Edwin M. Borchard. New York: The Banks Law Publishing Company. 1915. pp. xxxvii, 988. This is an unusually interesting book, partly because of its timeliness and partly because of its clearness. The subject is a broad one; and even the subtitle, "The Law of International Claims," does not indicate the number of topics here brought together.
That the discussion is timely and clear is shown by the following passages: "The weaker countries of Latin America, knowing the advantages under which diplomatic protection has placed aliens, have in their municipal laws, constitutions, and treaties emphasized the legal equality which exists as between national and alien. Relying upon this presumably liberal doctrine of complete equality, the Latin-American states insist upon the application of the general principle that the alien is bound by the local law, and that the propriety of their conduct toward resident foreigners is to be tested by their municipal
laws. The Pan-American conferences of 1889 and 1901 passed formal resolutions, which subsequently found their way into constitutions and statutes, to the effect that foreigners have the same civil rights as the citizens of the nation and that the Latin-American states have not, nor do they recognize in favor of foreigners, any other obligations and responsibilities than those which by their laws they have toward their own citizens. . . . The United States has vigorously opposed the attempt of the Latin-American countries to pass upon the scope of their international duty. . . . The principle that equality of treatment between nationals and aliens releases a state from pecuniary responsibility for injury to aliens is conditional upon the fact that its administration of justice satisfies the standard of civilized justice established by international law. Foreign states, however, undertake to judge for themselves as to the local state's compliance with international standards a defect in the system which arbitration has done much to remedy. The United States has never taken the position that one who acquires a residence in a foreign country does so at his peril and assumes the risk of ill-treatment or injury identically with citizens. . . . One reason why the alien is not bound to submit to unjust treatment equally with nationals, against which the national has no judicial redress, is because the latter is presumed to have a political remedy, whereas the alien's inability to exercise political rights deprives him of one of the principal safeguards of the rights of the citizen. For this reason diplomatic interposition may be invoked by the alien for the enforcement of his rights" (§ 44).
Topics peculiarly interesting in the light of the present European war, and perhaps on that account inserted in a treatise dealing primarily with citizens abroad, include the whole subject of belligerent and private rights in time of war, requisitions, contributions, and neutral obligations (§§ 98-108), and the nationality of vessels (§§ 207-209), unneutral conduct, contraband, blockade, and the like (§§ 351–368).
This enumeration of some subjects just now of special consequence fails to indicate the book's more permanent value; and as there has been substantially no predecessor in the field covered by the title "The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad," the student and the practitioner may find it useful to know that among the matters treated-many of them not easily found elsewhere — are these: "temporary allegiance" of aliens (§61), dual and no nationality (§ 11), citizens in international and in constitutional law (§ 12), status of foreign corporations (§ 23), right of excluding aliens (§ 26), expulsion (§§ 27-33), subjection to territorial law (§ 41), extraterritoriality (§ 43), aliens in war (§ 46), mob violence (§§ 89-92), civil war injuries (§§ 93-96), the Drago doctrine (§ 119), denial of justice (§§ 127-130), method of presenting a private claim (§ 137), consular administration of decedents' estates (§ 166), the backward countries of near and far East (§ 168), extraterritorial protection (§§ 180-182), consular service (§ 184), naturalized citizens abroad (§ 199), occasional protection of foreigners (§§ 201-203), American seamen (§ 206), passports (§§ 214-220), international effects of naturalization (§§ 231-242), domicil and declaration of intention (§§ 243-252), dual nationality (§§ 253-261), married women and widows (§§ 263-268), children (§§ 269-273), partnerships and corporations (§§ 274-282), heirs and administrators (§§ 284-289), instructions for claimants against foreign governments (§§ 303-304), consular registration of citizens (§§ 311-313), expatriation (§§ 315-333), the Calvo clause (§§ 371-378), failure to exhaust local remedies (§§ 381-383).
The annotation is voluminous, and so are the bibliographies (pp. xxviixxxvii, 865-927). EUGENE WAMBAUGH.
ENGLISH COURT HAND, A.D. 1066 TO 1500. Illustrated chiefly from the public records. By Charles Johnson and Hilary Jenkinson. In two parts. Part I: Text, pp. xlviii, 250; Part II: Frontispiece and xliv Plates. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1915.
A work worth doing and wonderfully well done. Those of us who have tried to decipher the court hand of the later middle ages without help from those skilled in the art have sought in vain for books which would really clear up difficulties. A short study of this book should enable one to read any courthand manuscript sufficiently accurately for ordinary purposes.
The text may be divided into three parts. The first is a general sketch of the development of court hand, a description of methods of abbreviation, a list of common abbreviations and of ligatures, hints on transcription, a classification of documents written in court hand, and a bibliography. This part is clearly written, and is a sufficient though concise introduction to the reading of court-hand manuscripts. The second part is a history of the form of the separate letters, abbreviations and signs, numerals and punctuation and paragraph marks. This part is most valuable. Typical letter-forms, separated from their context, are so brought together that the development of form can be seen, and the typical forms of a given time may be distinguished from later and earlier forms. The reproduction of the forms is made with great clearness, and it is quite apparent that in an obscurely written bit the most welcome help could be had by comparison with these type-forms. The third part consists in a transcription of the documents which are given in facsimile in the volume of plates.
This second volume of plates is one of the best may the reviewer not speak in superlatives, and say the very best facsimile reproductions of manuscripts extant, not even forgetting the wonderful reproduction of the Florentine manuscript of Justinian's Digest. Both in line and in color the plates leave nothing to be desired. The documents are well selected to give a complete picture of court hand. They are charters, writs, exchequer roils, plea rolls, fines, deeds, bonds, memoranda, and letters-all the current writings of the time.
A study of the plates, with the help of the text, would certainly enable one to read any ordinary manuscripts of the middle ages, and to check the transscription of another. What can we do but be grateful for this luxurious tool, and hope for time to use it? Each part may be procured separately, but who, having one, could bear to lack the other?
J. H. BEALE.
A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY. By Frederic W. Maitland and Francis C. Montague. Edited with notes and appendices by James F. Colby. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1915. pp. x, 229. Professor Colby has performed a service in collecting in this little book articles by Maitland and Montague, which have appeared scattered through Traill's Social England, and in arranging them to form a connected history of English Law. Occasionally he has added in brackets extracts from Jenks' short history and from Pollock and Maitland's larger work in order to aid the continuity. But these additions are few. More valuable are the editor's own list of readings which follow each chapter. They are well chosen, and, while not exhaustive, are useful to the law student who is seriously investigating legal history. For these short essays are really of more value to the layman than to him. In 187 pages one can give but a very brief outline of our system of law. Necessarily it is the machinery by which the law was made that is emphasized, not the development of law in particular internal branches.