ject and the great utility and necessity of the risk counterbalanced those considerations, and made the risk reasonable. The same risk would have been unreasonable, had the creature on the track been a kitten, because the value of the collateral object would have been small. There is no general rule that human life may not be put at risk in order to save property; but since life is more valuable than property, such a risk has often been held unreasonable in particular cases, which has given rise to dicta to the effect that it is always so. But in the circumstances of other cases a risk of that sort has been held reasonable.

Sometimes the collateral object, and therefore the utility and necessity of the risk, which relate to that object only, cannot be considered at all in deciding upon the reasonableness of the risk. There are certain objects which the law designs to protect, which may be called legal objects, and others which it does not attempt to protect, which may be called personal objects. Thus the law protects human life and bodily safety, the safety of property, and various other valuable objects. To some extent it protects pecuniary condition, i. e., the avoidance of pecuniary loss is generally, but, as the decisions now stand, not always, a legal object. A person has rights of life, bodily security, property, and pecuniary condition, and other rights in various objects or conditions of fact. But generally, subject to some exceptions which are not important here, the law does not protect the state of a person's mind or feelings. There is no general right of mental security, as there is of bodily security, which can be violated by a person's being subjected to disagreeable or painful mental experiences, such as fright, anxiety, mortification, or discomfort.

There are various special rules as to what objects are legal, to be protected by the law, and what are purely personal and are denied legal protection, which cannot be gone into here in detail. Thus an object may be made a legal one as between two persons by some agreement or arrangement between them. For example, although generally a person is not excused for taking a risk which would otherwise be unreasonable because he will thereby promote his own

I have explained the nature of the right of pecuniary condition, and how it differs from the right of property, in Chapter XI of my book, LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW, where also I have criticised the decisions which in certain cases have refused protection against pecuniary loss on the ground that no right was violated, and tried to show that they were based on a misconception.

comfort or convenience, comfort and convenience being personal objects only, yet as between a carrier and his passenger the passenger's comfort and convenience are legal objects, and a passenger may subject himself to some risk to promote his own comfort and convenience without, as against the carrier, being therefor chargeable with contributory negligence. So the performance of a legal duty, i. e., the object to be attained by such performance, is a legal collateral object. A person may be excused for taking a risk in the performance of his duty. Not so as to mere moral duties, nor as to contract duties to third persons. The rule seems to be that if the collateral object is a legal one, it may be taken account of; if a purely personal one, not. Some examples of the disregarding of personal objects are as follows.

6

A railroad train did not stop at a station where it ought to have stopped. Therefore a passenger for that station tried to get off while the train was in rapid motion, and was hurt. He was held guilty of contributory negligence. The court said that it was no excuse that his wife was expecting him by that train, and would be anxious about him if he did not arrive. The saving his wife from anxiety was a purely personal object.'

A man having to attend to a sudden call of nature, out of modesty sought a place where he could not be seen. It was also a dangerous place, and he was injured. Apparently there was no other private place available. The court said that the purpose for which he went there could not be taken account of in determining whether he was negligent in doing so. The dictates of modesty did not create any legal object.8

A building in which were stored a large sum of money and also a horse took fire. The possessor of the building was bound to use care to save both, but it was only possible to save one. From motives of humanity he saved the horse and let the money go. He was held not to have used due care for the money. As property, the horse was of much less value than the money, and the saving of suffering to the horse was not a legal object. If he could not save both pieces of property, he should have saved the more valuable one.9

The James Adger, 3 Blatchf. 515 (1856).

7 I cite this case from memory, not having been able to find it again.

8 Van Schaick v. Huson River R. R. Co., 43 N. Y.

527 (1871).

9 Toledo, P. & W. R. R. Co. v. Pindar, 53 Ill. 447 (1870).

When the collateral object is the saving of expense, there is no doubt that that is a legal object. A person, though he may be bound to go to some expense to prevent harm, need not incur an unreasonable expense. The excessive expense of taking certain precautions against danger, which might have been taken, has often been held a sufficient reason for not taking them.10 But the pecuniary condition of the person called upon to incur the expense, so that a given expenditure will be more or less onerous to him, is generally not important. The precautions which a railroad company, for instance, ought to take for the safety of its passengers are the same for a poor company, which can ill afford the expense of taking them, as for a rich one." The question in such cases is: can such an expenditure be reasonably required in general? No company need take precautions which would call for an expenditure which it would be unreasonable to require from railroad companies generally. So the successful conduct of a business and the making of profits are legal objects as between all persons concerned in it; so that an employer cannot be required to take precautions for the safety of his employees in it, which would cost more than such a business could afford.

However, some courts have held that poor persons may be excused on the ground of their poverty from taking expensive precautions which a rich person would be bound to take. There are a good many cases where young children have been allowed to play in dangerous city streets unattended, and have been run over and hurt. On the question whether the child's parents were negligent in permitting him to get into the street or to be there alone, some courts have held that the poverty of the parents, which made it impossible for them to give close attention to the child, because of the pressure of other work, or to employ a servant to attend to the child, was not relevant, 12 while other courts have held it relevant.13

Conduct which is not directed to any object, which is aimless, is per se unrational. When, however, in a particular case the col

10 Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 169 (1810); Cooper v. Dallas, 83 Tex. 239, 18 S. W. 565 (1892).

11 Denver & R. G. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77, 69 Pac. 578 (1902); Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. St. 339 (1868).

12 Cumming v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 669, 10 N. E. 855 (1887). 13 Del Rossi v. Cooney, 208 Pa. St. 233, 57 Atl. 514 (1904).

lateral object cannot be considered, it must not be assumed that the risk was taken wantonly and for no object. The question will then be, whether, considering how people generally act and the ordinary exigencies of life, it will generally be reasonable to act in that way, can a general rule be laid down that that sort of conduct is generally reasonable or unreasonable; 14 e. g., is it generally reasonable to get off of a fast moving railroad train because it does not stop at one's station? However, the fact that no reason is shown for doing a dangerous act may be evidence that it was unreasonable and negligent.15

/The test of reasonableness is what would be the conduct or judgment of what may be called a standard man in the situation of the person whose conduct is in question.

A standard man does not mean an ideal or perfect man, but an ordinary member of the community. He is usually spoken of as an ordinarily reasonable, careful, and prudent man. That definition. is not exactly correct, because in certain cases other qualities than reasonableness, carefulness, or prudence, e. g., courage, may be important; but it will do for our present purpose. It is because the jury is supposed to consist of standard men, and therefore to know of their own knowledge how such a man would act in a given situation, that questions of reasonableness and negligence are usually left to the jury.

he

Every man, whether he is a standard man or not, is required to act as a standard man would. If by chance he is not such a man, may, as has been said, make a mistake and act so as to be guilty of legal negligence, though he has used all such care and forethought as he was capable of. In the case of contributory negligence there is an exception to this rule in the case of abnormal persons, such as children and persons of unsound mind. They are not required to act like a standard man, but only to use such judgment as they are capable of. But as to negligence which is not merely contributory, as to negligent wrongs against others, the standard man test applies to their conduct also. Women are not abnormal persons, except perhaps in respect to courage.

Anything that a standard man would do is reasonable. If there are several different courses which he might take, any one of them

14 Le Blanche v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 1 C. P. D. 286 (1876).
15 Finlayson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 1 Dill. 579 (1871).

is reasonable, even though one would be more reasonable than another.16 All that the law requires of a man is reasonable conduct, not the most reasonable nor even the more reasonable. Also even a standard man, being human and therefore fallible, may err in his judgment. Conduct which in fact causes injury, if due to an error of judgment which a standard man might make, is not negligent. This is the meaning of the statement above mentioned, that mere error of judgment is not negligence. But this must be distinguished from an error which a standard man would not make.

The situation of the actor is subjective, not objective. It consists of such facts as are known to him. It would plainly be absurd and unjust to require a person to regulate his conduct with reference to facts of which he was ignorant.17 When, however, a person knows that he is ignorant of essential facts, it may be unreasonable for him to act at all. But in some circumstances a person may be charged with knowledge which in fact he has not, and be held to accountability as if he had it. When a person is under a duty to take precautions against a possible danger, there is usually an ancillary duty to use care to find out what precautions are needed; and for the purpose of the principal duty he is charged with all knowledge which he would have got by properly performing the ancillary duty.

The jury in deciding whether certain conduct involved an unreasonably great risk are deemed to be acquainted with the teachings of common experience, and evidence to prove that is not necessary nor admissible. It has been thought that the actor himself must be deemed to have the same knowledge, and should be held negligent, if he does something that the common experience of mankind shows to be unreasonably dangerous. It is believed that the cases of the jury and the actor are not parallel, and that as to the latter there is only a primâ facie presumption that he has such knowledge, which he may, if he can, rebut by evidence of his ignorance. Thus if a man should try to open a can which he knew to contain nitro-glycerine with a chisel and hammer, and an explosion

16 Cartwright v. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co., 52 Mich. 606, 18 N. W. 380 (1884); Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Wright, L. R. 11 App. Cas. 152 (1886).

17 The Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 524 (1872); Minneapolis Gen. Electric Co v. Cronon, 166 Fed. 651 (1908); Western Union Tel. Co v. Meyer, 61 Ala. 158 (1878); Blood v. Tyngsborough, 103 Mass. 509 (1870).