lamented that his regiment "was thoroughly demoralized," and there were some instances of intemperance and lawlessness, in one case a Japanese patrol bringing in several American soldiers who had been found at midnight in a Chinese house. But as a whole, the conduct of the Americans was much better than that of most of the Europeans. That the Chinese felt the difference was apparent in the number of American flags that they raised over their houses and shops. It was significant, too, that the districts of the city that were occupied by European regiments were avoided, as far as possible, by the Chinese, while the district controlled by the Americans was thronged.

Nor need any American be ashamed of the policy of his Government. It is true that the majority of the Americans in China believe that our national policy, prior to and during the Boxer uprising, was weak and short-sighted. They spoke highly of Minister Conger and several of the American Consuls, particularly of Consul John Fowler, at Chefoo. But I was repeatedly told that our Government did not appear to realize that there were any other American citizens or properties in China than those in the Peking Legation; that it did practically nothing to rescue its citizens in the prefecture of Paoting-fu and the province of Shan-si; that, while Americans condemn the policy of the European Powers, they have been for years sponging benefits secured by them for all foreigners; and that, if it had not been for their control of the situation, not an American could have lived in China. The opinion was well-nigh universal that the Washington Administration was too much influenced by the astute Chinese Minister, Wu Tingfang, who was believed to be an adept in "the ways that are dark and the tricks that are vain," and whose alleged success in "hoodwinking the Government and people of the United States" provoked the average foreigner in the Far East to the use of strong language.

Though I confess that I am not able satisfactorily to explain

the course of our Government in some important particulars, it seems to me that these sweeping criticisms are too severe. During the dark days of the siege of Peking, I was brought into frequent correspondence with President McKinley and Secretary of State Hay, and I vividly and gratefully remember the sympathy and cooperation which they invariably gave. They were as anxious as any one, and tried to do their best in circumstances new, strange and of extraordinary difficulty. As for the Chinese Minister to the United States, of course he did what he could to "save face" for his country. That was an essential part of his duty. But while we cannot always agree with him, we should, as friends of China, recognize the fact that by his ability and tact, he largely increased popular interest in and respect for the Chinese people.

Taking our Government's policy as a whole, I believe that it has been more in accord with Christian principles than that of any other nation. If our Government has erred in trusting the Chinese too much, that is (at least better than erring by trusting them too little. If it has failed to do for its own citizens all that it ought to have done, it has not wronged or humiliated the Chinese Government. There is no blood of Chinese women and children on the hands of Americans in China. No record of outrage and iniquity blackens the page on which the American part of the Boxer outbreak is written. If our nation has been unjust to any, it has been to its own. Generations will pass before the northern provinces will forget the bitterness of resentment which they now feel towards the European Powers. But already the Chinese are beginning to understand that the American Government is a friend; that it does not seek their territory; that it will not be a party to extortion; that it does not want to destroy China but to save her; that its object is not to rule her, but to fit her to rule herself, and that it desires only freedom for its citizens to trade and to communicate those ideas of religion which we ourselves originally

received from the East, which have brought to us inestimable blessings, and which will, in China as in America, result in the noblest character for the individual and the most stable institutions for the state.

The Chinese keenly appreciate the fresh evidence of America's spirit of justice in connection with the payment of the indemnity. When, before the payment of the first installment in 1902, the fall in the value of the silver tael led the European Powers to insist that China should pay in gold, thereby virtually increasing the indemnity, it was the United States again which did everything in its power to moderate the demands of the European nations. If the legislative branch of the American Government would only deal as justly with the Chinese in the United States as the State Department deals with the Chinese in China, the era of good feeling would be greatly promoted.

But America is not prominent enough in China to make her example a determinate factor in the attitude of the Empire towards foreigners, nor are the people as a whole likely to discriminate in favour of a few Americans among the hosts of aggressive, grasping, domineering Europeans.

Moreover, the majority of the Chinese hear only what their scholars and officials tell them, and these worthies are careful to adjust the account to suit their own purposes, and to save the national "face." They blandly assure the credulous people that the foreign armies did not follow the court because they dared not; that the alien troops left the capital because they were driven out by Chinese patriots; and that the Boxers inflicted crushing defeat upon their foes. During my visit in Tsingtau, the Germans were digging sewers, broad and deep, with laterals to every house and public building, and many of the Chinese actually believed that these sewers were intended to be underground passageways, down which the foreigners could flee to their boats when they were assailed by the redoubtable Boxers ! The best-informed men I met in China, from Sir

Robert Hart down, were fearful that the end was not near, and that an official order might repeat the whole bloody history. At a conference with forty representative missionaries of all denominations in Shanghai, August, 1901, a very large majority agreed with the Rev. Dr. Parker, of the Southern Methodist Church, in the statement: "We are not out of the trouble yet; the reactonaries are in the minority, but they are in power. They have learned nothing and they will try again to drive us out unless the Powers unseat them and reinstate the Emperor and the Reform Party."

T

XXVII

HOPEFUL SIGNS

HE future is not necessarily so doubtful as the facts and opinions cited in the preceding chapter might in

themselves seem to indicate. It is true that the daily press often contains accounts of tumults and revolutions in China. But an Empire a third larger than all Europe, with an enormous population, a weak central Government, corrupt local officials, few railroads and frequent floods, famines and epidemics, is certain to have uprisings somewhere most of the time. A European reading in the daily despatches from the United States of strikes, riots, martial law, the burning of negroes, the mobbing of Chinese and the corruption of cities, might with equal justice get the impression that our own country is in continual turmoil. The Imperial Government in China pays little attention to what is going on in other parts of the country.

"Each province has its own army, navy, and system of taxation.

So long as the provincial government sends its Peking supplies, administers a reasonable sop to its clamorous provincial duns, quells incipient insurrections, gives employment to its army of expectants, staves off foreign demands, avoids rows of all kinds, and, in a word, keeps up a decent external surface of respectability, no questions are asked; all reports and promotions are passed; the Viceroy and his colleagues' enjoy happiness,' and every one makes his 'pile.' The Peking Government makes no new laws, does nothing of any kind for any class of persons, leaves each province to its own devices, and, like the general staff of an army organization, both absorbs successful men, and gives out needy or able men to go forth and do likewise."1

E. H. Parker, "China," pp. 167, 169.