INJUNCTION-Continued. * * the plaintiff in such action at law, in such sum as the circuit * the collection of which may be stayed by such injunction." Lawton v. Richardson, 12. 2. Where, after the issuance of an injunction restraining a plankroad company from using upon its roadbed any material except that authorized by the existing statute, an act is passed permitting the use of other materials, the injunction should be modified accordingly. Township of Erin v. Detroit & Erin Plank-Road Co., 465. See EQUITY JURISDICTION (2, 3). INSANE PERSONS. Where, pending an appeal from an order committing one accused of crime to the asylum for the dangerous and criminal insane, the respondent is discharged from the asylum, and the criminal case against him nolle prossed, the appeal will be dismissed without a determination of the questions raised. People v. Maguire, 65. INSANITY-See WITNESSES (8). INSOLVENCY-See INTEREST; RECEIVERS; SET-OFF (2). INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-See ASSAULT (2); CARRIERS (5); CRIMINAL LAW (2); TRIAL (1, 3, 4, 11–13, 15). INSURANCE. 1. Failure of the insured to give notice of an injury within the time required by an accident policy is waived by the insurance company's asking for further information after receiving notice, without suggesting that the notice came too late. Hohn v. Inter-State Casualty Co., 79. 2. An accident insurance company which, before the expiration of the time allowed for furnishing the company with proof of the duration of disability, refuses absolutely to pay any amount, on the ground that immediate notice of the injury was not given, cannot deny the right of the insured to recover for the full time of disability on the ground that a less time was claimed in the proof of disability furnished. Id. See ACCIDENT INSURANCE; FIRE INSURANCE; LIFE INSURANCE. INTENT-See ASSAULT (1, 2); CRIMINAL LAW (4); FALSE PRETENSES (1). INTEREST. A creditor of an insolvent corporation is equitably entitled to interest upon a dividend payable to him from the date of the order directing the dividend, where payment has been delayed by an unsuccessful contest by the receiver. Citizens' Savings Bank v. Vaughan, 156. 115 MICH.-47. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 1. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 185, Pub. Acts 1893, the * * * 2. The provision of the liquor law (Act No. 313, Pub. Acts 1887) See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2); PUBLIC OFFICERS (1). ISSUE, PRESUMPTION AS TO LEGITIMACY OF See SEDUCTION (1). JOINT DEFENDANTS-See SET-OFF (1). JUDGMENTS-See BASTARDY (2, 3); CONTEMPT; EQUITY PRAC TICE (1-4); JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (6); MANDAMUS (1); REPLEVIN (2); RES JUDICATA. JUDICIAL NOTICE. The court cannot take judicial notice that the weather on the 1st of April in portions of the Northern Peninsula is always such that the lakes and streams are not open for the floating of logs. Haines v. Gibson, 131. See CARRIERS (2); FIXTURES (2). JUDICIAL SALE-See BANKRUPTCY (2). JURISDICTION - See BANKRUPTCY (1); EQUITY JURISDICTION; JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (1-3, 6-8). JURY. 1. A challenge for cause in a criminal proceeding, based upon the fact that the juror has read something about the case, is properly overruled where he states that he does not remember what he has read, that he is not prejudiced against the accused, and that he can render a fair and impartial verdict. People v. Summers, 537. 2. A sheriff is not disqualified from acting upon a commission for drawing talesmen in a criminal case because his name is indorsed on the information as a witness for the people. Id. See ARREST (1, 2); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1); JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (4, 5). JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. 1. One who performs labor or furnishes material in the erection of a public building, may maintain an action of assumpsit in justice's court on the contractor's bond given pursuant to 3 How. Stat. § 8411a, 2 How. Stat. § 8411b, 8411c, where the amount claimed is within the jurisdiction of the justice, although the penalty of the bond is in excess of his jurisdiction; it being the object of the statute to protect the interests of individual laborers and material men, whose claims are frequently small in amount, by securing to each a speedy remedy upon the bond. People, for use of Holmes, v. Cotteral, 43. 2. It is not within the power of a justice of the peace to amend his docket after it is once made up and officially signed by him. Kluck v. Murphy, 128. 3. An action of replevin is not brought to recover "debt or dam. ages;" and, therefore, Act No. 460, Local Acts 1895, § 9, conferring upon justices of the peace in the city of Detroit original jurisdiction in all civil actions wherein the debt or damages do not exceed $100, and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil actions wherein the debt or damages do not exceed $500, except in certain specified cases, not including actions of replevin, does not enlarge the replevin jurisdiction of Detroit justices, but leaves it to be governed by the general statute (2 How. Stat. § 6856), which fixes the limit at $100. Bostwick v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 363. 4. The statement of counsel on a motion to quash in justice's court, that the defendant, who was arrested on a civil warrant, was a juror in attendance on the circuit court, is too informal to establish the fact of his privilege from arrest. Brower v. Tatro, 368. 5. But the filing of an affidavit sworn to on February 18th, showing that defendant was on that day engaged in the circuit court as a juror, that cases were assigned for each day from February 18th to and including the following week, and that, by reason of his duties as a juror, he could not go to trial on February 19th in the case against him, entitled him to a continuance, and it was error to proceed to judgment in his absence. Id. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-Continued. 6. A judgment of a justice's court, regular upon its face, cannot be impeached in a collateral proceeding by showing that neither of the parties to the case in the justice's court was a resident of the county where the justice resided. Miller v. Smith, 427. 7. A justice of the peace is not disqualified from trying an action of assumpsit because he had written defendant to the effect that he had the claim for collection, and had been instructed to inform him that suit would be brought if it was not paid. Taggart v. Waters, 638. 8. Under 2 How. Stat. § 8038, providing that, at any time within 30 days after the final determination of a suit in justice's court against the principal defendant in garnishment proceedings, the justice shall, at the request of the plaintiff, issue a summons against the garnishee, commanding him to appear and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against him, the jurisdiction of the justice to issue the summons is limited to 30 days after judgment, not to 30 days after the ex piration of the time for appeal. Kayser v. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank, 688. See ARREST (1, 2); COSTS (2). KILLING STOCK-See RAILROAD COMPANIES (3-6). LACHES See TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1); VENDOR AND PURCHASER (3). LAND CONTRACTS-See ADVERSE POSSESSION; TRESPASS; VENDOR AND PURCHASER (7). LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. A lease provided for the renting of "one-half of cellar in front of stairway * * * in store * * *, corner of C. street. I consent to his occupying the side of said store on C. street, from rear of show window at corner of C. street to entrance to cellar, as a fruit and nut stand, on the sidewalk next to the building,-for" a certain term. The lease contained the usual covenant for quiet and peaceable possession. Held, that the cellar alone was rented, and a mere license given to occupy the sidewalk space, to which the covenant did not apply. Brown v. Schiappacasse, 47. 2. The lease being unambiguous in its terms, what the parties intended by the language employed was a matter of law for the court, to be determined from an examination of the instrument itself, without the aid of parol evidence. Id. 3. 3 How. Stat. § 5774, provides that, in all cases of neglect or refusal to pay rent on a lease at will or otherwise, seven days' notice to quit, given in writing by the landlord to the tenant, shall be sufficient to determine the lease. 2 How. Stat. § 8295 et seq., prescribes a summary procedure to recover the possession of lands withheld by a tenant after the determination of his estate as above provided. Held, that a tenant's right to the LANDLORD AND TENANT-Continued. possession of leased premises terminates upon his failure to pay the rent due within the time fixed by the notice; that the landlord may then exercise his common-law right peaceably to re-enter and take possession to the exclusion of the tenant; and that such right is in no way abridged by the remedy provided at law. Smith v. Detroit Loan & Building Ass'n, 340. 4. Where a landlord, by notice to quit, terminates a tenancy for nonpayment of rent, and afterwards, during the tenant's temporary absence, gains possession of the premises and removes the tenant's goods, he is not liable to the latter for injuries inflicted by his agents in repelling the efforts of the tenant to regain possession, unless more force was used than was necessary to accomplish the result. Id. LATERAL SUPPORT. If the pressure of a superstructure is the cause of land's caving into an excavation made by the owner of the adjoining premises, no damages can be recovered for the loss of lateral support. Hemsworth v. Cushing, 92. LEADING QUESTIONS-See CRIMINAL LAW (10). LEASE-See FIXTURES (1); LANDLORD AND TENANT; TENANCY IN COMMON (2). LEGAL HOLIDAYS-See INTOXICATING LIQUORS (1). LEGITIMACY OF ISSUE-See SEDUCTION (1). LIBEL AND SLANDER. 1. Where the cashier of a bank, who suspected that a minor employed as janitor and underclerk was in the habit of taking small sums of money from the bank, and that this occasioned the shortage in the bank accounts which occurred from day to day, accused the boy of the theft in the presence of the bookkeeper, who was the only other person who had access to the funds, and who, as well as the cashier, was interested in their safe keeping, and later in the same day informed the boy's father, in a private conversation, that his son had taken the money, the communications were the subject of a qualified privilege, and not actionable in the absence of proof of express malice. Livingston v. Bradford, 140. 2. The mere fact that the cashier, for the purpose of determining whether the suspected employé was responsible for the shortages, placed marked coins where the latter might take them if he were so disposed, was not sufficient to establish express malice. Id. 3. In the course of a dispute over some wood which plaintiff was attempting to prevent defendant and his tenant from hauling away from premises claimed by her, defendant was alleged to have said to plaintiff, in the presence of the tenant: "You are not a decent woman; you do not keep a respectable house." Held, that defendant could not complain that the jury, in |