judgment there in the sense which his words naturally mean. The three lords who delivered judgment, Lord Cranworth, Lord Chelmsford, and Lord Kingsdown, all go into the question of domicile. Lord Cranworth clearly intimates that the old view as to domicile was not correct, and that modern improved views existed. He says (10 H. L., 283), in order to acquire a new domicile, etc., a man must intend 'quatenus in illo exuere patriam.' It is not enough if you take a house in another place, and that it is tolerably certain that you had better remain there all the days of your life. That does not signify. You do not lose your domicile of origin merely because you go to some other place that suits you better, unless you mean to cease to be a Scotchman and become an Englishman, or a Frenchman, or a German. In that case if you give up everything you left behind you and establish yourself elsewhere, you may change your domicile. It is therefore clear to my mind that Lord Cranworth entertained the view as to domicile which the words of Lord Wensleydale naturally and in their ordinary meaning import. import. Lord Chelmsford is, if possible, still more clear. After stating that two definitions of domicile which had been mentioned were in his opinion liable to exception, he proceeds (Id., 285): "The present intention of making a place a person's permanent home can exist only where he has no other idea than to continue there, without looking forward to any event, certain or uncertain, which might induce him to change his residence. If he has in his contemplation some event upon the happening of which his residence will cease, it is not correct to call this even a present intention of making it a permanent home. It is rather a present intention

of making it a temporary home though for a period indefinite and contingent. And even if such residence should continue for years, the same intention to terminate it being continually present to the mind, there is no moment of time at which it can be predicated that there has been the deliberate choice of a permanent home. In a question of change of domicile the attention must not be too closely confined to the nature and character of the residence by which the new domicile is supposed to have been acquired. It may possibly be of such a description as to show an intention to abandon the former domicile; but that intention must be clearly and unequivocally proved.' He then clearly adopts Lord Wensleydale's definition as I understand it, and states it at length. Lord Kingsdown expressed his concurrence with the other judgments and added (Id., 291): 'Upon the question of domicile I would only wish to say that I apprehend that change of residence alone, however long and continued, does not affect a change of domicile as regulating the testamentary acts of the individual. It may be, and it is, a necessary ingredient; it may be, and it is, strong evidence of an intention to change the domicile, but unless, in addition to residence, there is intention to change the domicile in my opinion no change of domicile is made.' I adopt the definition of Lord Wensleydale. I think it is approved of by the three noble and learned lords whose opinions I have quoted; and as I think there is no evidence of intention of the testator to change his domicile, in my judgment the domicile of the testator was French."

SECTION 17. PRINCIPAL RULES GOVERNING DOMICILES. The four principal rules governing domiciles are as follows:

(a) Every person must have a domicile;

(b) No person can have more than one domicile at the same time;

(c) A person keeps one domicile until he acquires another, and

(d) Every person, sui juris, has the right to change domicile at his own will.

Vol. XII.-7.

CHAPTER IV.

SITUS OF STATUS.

SECTION 18. DEFINITION OF STATUS.

"The status of an individual, used in a legal sense, is the legal relation in which that individual stands to the rest of the community.'

"These legal relations may be various. One who is under age does not occupy the same relation to the rest of the community as one who is an adult; the relations of a single man differ from those of one who is married; one who is competent to transact business occupies a different relation from one who is not; a legitimate or adopted child from one who is not; a ward from one who is not under guardianship; a fiduciary from one who is acting for himself, etc. All these and others that need not be enumerated are instances of status." "

SECTION 19. SITUS OF PERSONAL CAPACITY.

Personal capacity must be considered under two different subdivisions, i. e., personal capacity in the case of voluntary acts and personal capacity in the case of involuntary acts.

SECTION 20. VOLUNTARY ACTS.

In the case of a voluntary act of a party, his personal capacity is determined by the law of the place which was his actual situs at the time the act was performed. By going into a state or country 1 1 Niboyt vs. Niboyt, 4 P. D., 11. 'Minor on Conflict of Laws, Sec.

68.