of the one leased, and to receive for it the same rent the wood building brought him, when its probable rental value would be considerably greater, and its cost presumably more. Had this been an agreement by a builder to rebuild the old building, it would scarcely be urged that the covenant would bind him to erect a new one differing from it so radically as would a brick or a stone structure from one of wood. Had Cordes been selling this land to Miller with a similar agreement respecting the building, it would be equally plain that the change in the law could not work a change in his contract so seriously increasing his responsibility. But in principle the cases suggested would not differ from this in the least. Cordes undertook for something which by a change in the law has become illegal; and his covenant has thereby been discharged. In this case Cordes prepared accommodations for Miller which the latter has accepted and now occupies. But they were different from the old, and Miller could not have been compelled to accept them. The arrangement was therefore one outside the lease,—not one in compliance with its terms. Probably the course of the parties has in effect been equivalent to an offer on one side and an acceptance on the other of the new quarters in place of the old and under the old lease; but no question concerning that arrangement arises here. The judgment must be reversed, and judgment entered for Cordes with costs of both courts. The other justices concurred. INJUNCTION AGAINST BREACH OF CONTRACT PHILADELPHIA BALL CLUB V. LAJOIE 202 Pa. 210 (1902) Bill in equity to enjoin defendant from furnishing his services as a ball player to a rival baseball organization. Appeal by plaintiff from a decree dismissing his bill for an injunction. POTTER J. The defendant in this case contracted to serve the plaintiff as a baseball player for a stipulated time. During that period he was not to play for any other clubs. He violated his agreement, however during the term of his engagement, and in disregard of his contract, arranged to play for another and a rival organization. The plaintiff by means of this bill sought to restrain him, during the period covered by the contract. The court below refused an injunction, holding that to warrant the interference prayed for, "the defendant's services must be unique, extraordinary and of such character to render it impossible to replace him; so that his breach of contract would result in irreparable loss to the plaintiff." In the view of the court the defendant's qualifications did not measure up to this high standard. We think however that in refusing relief unless the defendant's services were shown to be of such a character as to render it impossible to replace them he has taken extreme ground. The court below finds from the testimony that, "the defendant is an expert baseball player in any position; that he has a great reputation as a second baseman; that his place would be hard to fill with as good a player; that his withdrawal from the team would weaken it as would the withdrawal of any good player, and would probably make a difference in the size of the audience attending the game." We think thus stating it, he puts it very mildly and that the evidence would warrant a stronger finding as to the ability of the defendant as an expert player. He had been for several years in the service of the plaintiff's club, and has been reengaged from season to season at a constantly increasing salary. He has become thoroughly familiar with the action and methods of the other players in the club and his own work was peculiarly meritorious as an integral part of the team work which is so essential. In addition to these features which render his services of peculiar and special value to the plaintiff and not easily replaced, Lajoie is well known and has a great reputation among the patrons of the sport for the ability in the position which he fills, and thus the most attractive drawing card for the public. He may not be the sun in the baseball firmament but he is certainly a bright particular star. We feel, therefore, that the evidence in this case justifies the conclusion that the services of the defendant are of such a unique character, and display such a special knowledge, skill and ability as renders them of peculiar value to the plaintiff, and so difficult of substitution that their loss will produce irreparable injury in the legal significance of that term to the plaintiff. The action of the defendant in violating his contract is a breach of good faith, for which there would be no adequate remedy of loss and the case therefore properly calls for the aid of equity in negatively enforcing the performance of the contract by enjoining its breach. The court cannot compel the defendant to play for the plaintiff, but it can restrain him from playing for any other club in violation of his agreement. Reversed. AN INJUNCTION WILL BE GRANTED TO PREVENT THE CORT V. LASSARD, ET AL. 18 Ore., 221 (1889) LORD, J. This is a suit wherein the plaintiff, who is a theatrical manager, seeks to enjoin and prevent the defendants, who are acrobats, from performing at a rival theater in the same place. The plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the plaintiff and defendants entered into a contract whereby it was agreed that the defendants were to perform as acrobats, exclusively for the plaintiff, during a period of six weeks, at a salary of $60 per week, etc., that the plaintiff has performed all the conditions of his said contract, and gone to large expense in advertising, etc., and would have derived large emoluments from the performance of the defendants, which are alleged to be unique and attractive; that said defendants, after performing for the plaintiff for the space of three weeks, refused to perform longer, and engaged themselves to perform as acrobats at another theater mentioned, in said city; and that said performance of the said defendants will attract large crowds, etc., and will largely diminish, if permitted to be given, the receipts of the plaintiff and cause an irreparable loss, etc., and diminish the attractions of his. said theater, etc.; that the said defendants are entirely impecunious, and unable to respond to an action for a breach of the contract, etc. The answer denies nearly all the material allegations, but admits the hiring, etc., and then avers affirmatively that the plaintiff failed to fulfill his part of the contract, etc., and that the plaintiff discharged them, etc.; all of which was put in issue by the reply. Upon all the issues presented by the pleadings, the finding of the court was favorable to the plaintiff, with this exception; "That the performance of the said defendants was not of an unique or unusual character, but that of an ordinary acrobat and tumbler, which could have been easily supplied, with little or no delay or expense; and that said service was of a common and ordinary character, and not such as could be enjoined in equity for a breach of contract to perform," etc. As a result, the court found, as a conclusion of law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in equity, and that his suit be dismissed. The contention of counsel for the plaintiff is to this effect: (1) That it is immaterial whether the performance is unique, or involves special knowledge or skill; and (2) that the finding is contrary to the evidence, which will show that the performance was unique and unusual. In this case, there is no negative clause in the contract; but the suit, as decided by the court, assumes and admits that such a stipulation is not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, but that it is enough to warrant equity to interfere if the contract alleged to have been broken stipulated for services which are unique and extraordinary in their character, or which involve special skill or knowledge or ability, and provided that such services were to be rendered at a particular place or places, and for a specified time. The question whether a court of equity will apply the preventive remedy of injunction to contracts for the services of professional workers of special merit, or leave them to the remedy at law for damages, has been the subject of much discussion, and the existence of the jurisdiction fully established. It is not, perhaps, possible, nor is it necessary, to reconcile the decisions; but the ground of the jurisdiction, as now exerted, rests upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy. In an early English case, where the jurisdiction was invoked to prevent the actor Kean from performing at another theater upon a contract for personal services, at which there was a stipulation to the effect that he should not perform at any other theater in London during the period of his engagement, it was held, as the court could not enforce the positive part of the contract, it would not restrain by injunction a breach of the negative part. Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333. But this case was expressly overruled in Lumley v. Wagner (1 De Gex, M. & G. 604) upon a like contract for personal services, to sing, during a certain period of time, at a particular theater, and not to sing elsewhere without written authority, upon the ground that the positive and negative stipulations of such contract formed but one contract, and that the court would interfere to prevent the violation of the negative stipulation, although it could not enforce the specific performance of the entire contract. In delivering this opinion, among other things, the Lord Chancellor said: "The agreement to sing for the plaintiff during three months at his theater, and during that time not to sing for anybody else, is not a correlative contract. It is, in effect, one contract, and though, beyond all doubt, this court could not interfere to enforce the specific performance of the whole of this contract, yet, in all sound construction and according to the true spirit of the agreement, the engagement to perform for three months at one theater must necessarily exclude the right to perform at the same time at another theater. It was clearly intended that J. Wagner was to exert her vocal abilities to the utmost to aid the theater to which she agreed to attach herself. I am of opinion that if she had attempted, even in the absence of any negative stipulation, to perform at another theater, she would have broken the spirit and true meaning of the contract, as much as she would with reference to the contract into which she has actually entered." In Montague v. Flockton (L. R. 16 Eq. 189) it was held that an actor who enters into a contract to perform for a certain period at a particular theater may be restrained by injunction from performing at any other theater during the pendency of his engagement, notwithstanding that the contract contains no negative clause restricting the actor from performing elsewhere. Referring to Lumley v. Wagner, supra, the ViceChancellor said. "It happened that the contract did contain a negative stipulation and finding it there, Lord St. Leonard relied upon it; but I am satisfied that, if it had not been there, he would have come to the same conclusion, and granted the injunction on the grounds the Mdlle. Wagner, having agreed to perform at Mr. Lumley's theater, could not at the same time be permitted to perform at Mr. Gye's. But, however that may be, it is comparatively unimportant, because the subsequent authorities have completely settled this point." As a result of these English authorities, while conceding that specific performance of such contracts could not be enforced, the jurisdiction is established that relief may be granted on a contract for such services, even though it contains no negative clause, upon the ground that a contract to act or play at a particulat place for a specified time necessarily implies a prohibition against performing at any other place during that period. The American courts, while they recognize the existence of the jurisdiction, have exhibited much hesitancy in applying it to such enlarged uses. Until Daly v. Smith (49 How. Pr. 150) was decided, the doctrine of Lumley v. Wagner, supra, was either entirely rejected or only partially accepted. Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315; Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. Ch. 528; Fredericks v. Mayer, 13 How. Br. 566; Butler v. Galletti, 21 How. Pr. 465; Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill, 487; Hayes v. Willio, 11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 167. In that case (Daly v. Smith, supra) the authorities are carefully discriminated, and the injunction was granted restraining an actress from violating her agreement to play at the plaintiff's theater for a stated period; and the case is on all fours with Lumley v. Wagner, supra. See also Hahn v. Society, 42 Md. 465; McCaull v. Braham, 16 Fed. Rep. 37. In Fredericks v. Mayer (13 How. Pr. 567) and Butler v. Galletti (21 How. Pr. 466) the court indicates the principle that where the services involve the exercise of powers of the mind, as of writers or performers, which are purely and largely intellectual, they may form a class in which the court will interfere, upon the ground that they are individual and peculiar. |