But it is quite doubtful whether a fireman employed under the charter and ordinances of Oshkosh owes any duty, as a fireman, to rescue persons from burning buildings. Both charter and ordinances are silent on the subject, although an ordinance requires them to aid in the removal of endangered goods and property. It may well be that for the rescue of persons in peril from a conflagration the Legislature or Common Council relied upon the promptings of humanity which in such emergencies always insure the utmost efforts of all who can aid therein, whether fireman or not, to save the lives of those in peril. But whether a fireman owes any such duty by reason of his employment is not here determined. We assume, for the purposes of this case, that he does, and have stated above the limits of that duty, if it exists. On this hypothesis, the precise question to be determined is whether the fact that it was not, under the circumstances, the duty of plaintiff as a fireman to rescue the body of Mrs. Paige, renders him competent to make a valid contract for a reward for so doing. It is difficult to perceive how it can properly be said that it was within the scope or line of the plaintiff's duty to do the act, when it was not his duty to do it.. It is conceded, for the purposes of the case, that it was his duty as a fireman to rescue Mrs. Paige from the flames if he could do so without hazarding his own life. It was not his duty to do so at the hazard of his life. Can it properly be said that it was in the line or scope of his duty to rescue her at the imminent peril of losing his life, when his duty did not require him to do so? We confess our inability to perceive any satisfactory grounds upon which this question may be answered affirmatively. In the law of agency we find that principals are often held responsible for the unauthorized acts of their agents because such acts are within the scope of the authority of such agents, although not within their actual authority. The principal is held in such a case because he has clothed his agent with apparent authority to do the act, and a person to whom the agent is accredited may deal with him on the faith that he has the authority to bind his principal which he appears to have, and may hold the principal as effectually as though the agent had actual authority in the premises. Hence, when it is said that a given act of an agent, although unauthorized, is within the scope of his authority, and therefore binds his principal, it only signifies that the principal has apparently given his agent authority to do the act, and, as against a person dealing with the agent in good faith, he shall not be heard to deny the agent's authority. But where the question is one of duty, there seems to be no room for the application of any such principle. If it is not the duty of a per son to render a specified service, we fail to comprehend how it can correctly be said that the service is within the line or scope of his dutythat is to say, that although it is not actually his duty to render the service, yet, because it is his apparent duty to do so, he shall be held to the same consequences as though it were his actual duty. It seems to us that the mere statement of the proposition is sufficient to show that it is untenable. It follows, from the views above expressed, that inasmuch as the plaintiff could not rescue the body of Mrs. Paige from the burning building without imminent peril of losing his own life, and inasmuch as it was not his duty as a paid officer and member of the Fire Department to do so, he is in a position to claim the reward alleged to have been offered by the defendant for such rescue. The judgment of nonsuit must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial. DISTINCTION BETWEEN A BUSINESS CIRCULAR AND AN OFFER TO SELL MOULTON V. KERSHAW 59 Wisconsin, 316 (1884) The case is thus stated by Taylor, J.: "The complaint alleges that the defendants were dealers in salt in the city of Milwaukee, including salt of the Michigan Salt Association; that the plaintiff was a dealer in salt in the city of La Crosse, and accustomed to buy salt in large quantities, which fact was known to the defendant; that on September 19, 1882, the defendants, at Milwaukee, wrote and posted to the plaintiff at La Crossse a letter of which the following is a copy: ""Milwaukee, September 19, 1882. "J. H. Moulton, Esq., La Crosse, Wis.: "Dear Sir: In consequence of a rupture in the salt trade, we are authorized to offer Michigan fine salt, in full carload lots of 80 to 95 barrels, delivered at your city, at 85 cents per barrel, to be shipped per C. & N. W. R. R. Co. only. At this price it is a bargain, as the price in general remains unchanged. Shall be pleased to receive your order. ""Yours truly, "C. J. KERSHAW & SON.' "The balance of the complaint reads as follows: 'And this plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that said defendants did not send said letter and offer by authority of, or as agents of, the Michigan Salt Association, or any other party, but on their own responsibility. And the plaintiff further shows that he received said letter in due course of mail, to wit, on September 20, 1882, and that he, on that day, accepted the offer in said letter contained, to the amount of 2,000 barrels of salt therein named, and immediately, and on said day, sent to said defendants at Milwaukee a message by telegraph, as follows: "La Crosse, September 20, 1882. "To C. J. Kershaw & Son, Milwaukee, Wis. : You may ship me as offered in your J. H. MOULTON. ""That said telegraphic acceptance and order was duly received by said defendants on September 20, 1882, aforesaid; that 2,000 barrels of said salt was a reasonable quantity for this plaintiff to order in response to said offer, and not in excess of the amount which the defendants, from their knowledge of the business of the plaintiff, might reasonably expect him to order in response thereto. ""That although said defendants received said acceptance and order of this plaintiff on said September 20, 1882, they attempted, on September 21, 1882, to withdraw the offer contained in their said letter of September 19, 1882, and did, on said September 21, 1882, notify this plaintiff of the withdrawal of said offer on their part; that this plaintiff therupon demanded of the defendants the delivery to him of 2,000 barrels of Michigan fine salt, in accordance with the terms of said offer, accepted by this plaintiff as aforesaid, and offered to pay them therefor in accordance with said offer on their part; that this plaintiff thereupon demanded of the defendants the delivery to him of 2,000 barrels of Michigan fine salt, in accordance with the terms of said offer, accepted by this plaintiff as aforesaid, and offered to pay them therefor in accordance with said terms, and this plaintiff was ready to accept said 2000 barrels, and ready to pay therefor in accordance with said terms. Nevertheless, the defendants utterly refused to deliver the same, or any part thereof, by reason whereof this plaintiff sustained damage to the amount of $800. "Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants for the sum of $800, with interest from September 21, 1882, besides the costs of this action.' "To this complaint the defendants interposed a general demurrer. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer and from the order overruling the same the defendants appeal to this court." TAYLOR, J. The only question presented is whether the appellants' letter, and the telegram sent by the respondent in reply thereto, constitute a contract for the sale of 2,000 barrels of Michigan fine salt by the appellants to the respondent at the price named in such letter. We are very clear that no contract was perfected by the order telegraphed by the respondent in answer to appellants' letter. The learned counsel for the respondent clearly appreciated the necesstity of putting a construction upon the letter which is not apparent on its face, and in their complaint have interpreted the letter to mean that the appellants by said letter made an express offer to sell the respondent, on the terms stated, such reasonable amount of salt as he might order, and as the appellants might reasonably expect him to order, in response thereto. If in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action it is necessary to prove these allegations, then it seems clear to us that the writings between the parties do not show the contract. It is not insisted by the learned counsel for the respondent that any recovery can be had unless a proper construction of the letter and telegram constitute a binding contract between the parties. The counsel for the respondent claims that the letter of the appellants is an offer to sell to the respondent, on the terms mentioned, any reasonable quantity of Michigan fine salt that he might see fit to order, not less then one carload. On the other hand, the counsel for the appellants claim that the letter is not an offer to sell any specific quantity of salt, but simply a letter such as a business man would send out to customers or those with whom he desired to trade, soliciting their patronage. To give the letter of the appellants the construction claimed for it by the learned cousel for the respondent would introduce such an element of uncertainty into the contract as would necessarily render its enforcement a matter of difficulty, and in every case the jury trying the case would be called upon to determine whether the quantity ordered was such as the appellants might reasonably expect from the party. This question would necessarily involve an inquiry into the nature and extent of the business of the person to whom the letter was addressed, as well as to the extent of the business of the appellants. So that it would be a question of fact for the jury in each case to determine whether there was a binding contract between the parties. And this question would not in any way depend upon the language used in the written contract, but upon proofs to be made outside of the writings. As the only communications between the parties, upon which a contract can be predicated, are the letter and the reply of the respondent, we must look to them, and nothing else, in order to determine whether there was a contract in fact. We are not at liberty to help out the written contract, if there be one, by adding by parol evidence additional facts to help out the writing so as to make out a contract not expressed therein. If the letter of the appellants is an offer to sell salt to the respondent on the terms stated, then it must be held to be an offer to sell any quantity at the option of the respondent not less than one carload. The difficulty and injustice of construing the letter into such an offer is so apparent that the learned counsel for the respondent do not insist upon it, and consequently insist that it ought to be construed as an offer to sell such quantity as the appellants, from their knowledge of the business of the respondent, might expect him to order. The cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellants (Beaupre P. & A. Tel. Co., 21 Minn. 155, and Kinghorne v. Montreal Tel. Co., U. C. 18 Q. B. 60) are nearer in their main facts to the case at bar, and in both it was held there was no contract. We, however, place our opinion upon the language of the letter of the appellants, and hold that it cannot be fairly construed into an offer to sell to the respondent any quantity of salt he might order, nor any reasonable amount he might see fit to order. The language is not such as a business man would use in making an offer to sell to an individual a definite amount of property. The word "sell" is not used. They say, "we are authorized to offer Michigan fine salt," etc., and volunteer an opinion that at the terms stated it is a bargain. They do not say, we offer to sell to you. They use general language, proper to be addressed generally to those who were interested in the salt trade. It is clearly in the nature of an advertisement or business circular, to attract the attention of those interested in that business to the fact that good bargains in salt could be had by applying to them, and not as an offer by which they were to be bound, if accepted, for any amount the persons to whom it was addressed might see fit to order. We think the complaint fails to show any contract between the parties, and the demurrer should have been sustained. By The Court. The order of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law. WHERE A BUYER HAS ACCEPTED PROPERTY BEFORE, HE HOBBS V. MASSASOIT WHIP COMPANY 158 Mass. 194 (1893) Contract, upon an account annexed for one hundred and eight dollars and fifty cents, for 2,350 eelskins sold by the plaintiff to the defend |