572 ENGLAND AND FRANCE PREFER A DECLARED NEUTRALITY.

tion presents for settlement a novel and startling problem in the ethics of public law. The ordinary observance of a nation's natural or general neutrality would have spared life and property, abridged the war, and been unattended with practical harm or help to either belligerent. On the part of England and France, their preference to elect the position and attitude of a declared neutrality was the first step toward open sympathy and contingent aid, and was so regarded at the time. This false move created a bad precedent, and readily paved the way to subsequent unneutral and undisguised hostile conduct.

The responsibility for this novel, if not unprecedented course by neutral nations, can only be settled by fixed rules of law, and the established and inherent principles of justice, as sanctioned by the recognized usages and the practice and comity of nations. That enemies, allies, or mercenaries, should have pursued such a course, creating so undesirable a precedent, would have caused but little surprise. But that avowed, professing, proclaimed, or declared neutrals should so far forget their neutral duty, or the rights of a known friendly belligerent, either by making a precipitate recognition of one belligerent, or uttering rhetorical denunciations of the other, with the possible ulterior view of helping one and harming the other, is in contravention of the first principles of a natural, honest, and sincere neutrality; in derogation of the public international law, and, as affecting England, in flagrant violation of her own municipal law, and the solemn injunctions and formal warnings as contained in the Queen's Royal Proclamation.

Admitting the general right of independent nations

DISREGARD OF SELF-IMPOSED DUTIES, INDEX OF BAD FAITH. 573

to elect and take such neutral attitude as they may deem politic or expedient, yet, whenever they shall have once publicly taken their choice from policy, timidity, selfishness, or other motive, then are they bound, by every principle of honor, justice, good faith, and fair dealing, firmly to adhere to their chosen position, without vacillation or deviation. And the obligation to observe this becomes, if possible, stronger, whenever the attitude elected to be taken shall be that of a declared neutrality. The formal declaration of the sovereign of this election, would seem to bind all its servants, as well as its subjects, to the strictest impartiality, and a due observance of its general and particular injunctions is imperative. The slightest departure from either affords a well-grounded cause for representation, remonstrance, or complaint; and a consequent right to demand reparation or apology, explanation or indemnity. Doubtless the instances will be rare when this self-imposed duty can be positively disregarded without bad faith. It is not to be supposed that any sovereign would voluntarily declare neutrality except optimâ fide. Nor can it reasonably be presumed that any faithful executive government would deliberately advise such a measure, without an intent rigidly to enforce it, and seasonably supply all the needed administrative means required to cause the due enforcement of such proclaimed or declared neutrality.

An act of such solemnity, so deeply affecting the material interests of a friendly belligerent, ought to be sustained by all the ordinary resources, measures, and moral means which may be at the command or within the control of the existing government, whether such measures be of an executive, legal, legislative, or judicial character.

574

WANT OF GOOD FAITH LEADS TO RETALIATION.

If, therefore, a neutral government shall fail to conform its conduct to this imperative duty, such failure will obviously furnish ground for suspicion of its sincerity toward an admitted neutral belligerent and of treachery toward its sovereign. Toward the belligerent, such delinquency should be deemed a fraudulent and hostile act; toward its sovereign, such remissness should be deemed a treacherous act, compromising the good faith of that sovereign. In the one hypothesis, a neutral belligerent is deceived, in the other, a confiding sovereign will have been betrayed. By either the act of deception or act of perfidy, a neutral nation becomes compromised, and its honor may have been sold out to the highest bidder or most unscrupulous emissary.

The obvious, though it may be remote result of such perfidy may be to provoke ulterior retaliation; to be retorted at a time and in a manner least calculated to incommode the sufferer, and best calculated to inflict loss and injury upon the unfaithful wrong-doer.

There can be only a slight distinction made between the liability of a state and the responsibility of its public servants. In theory, the English sovereign who wears the crown can do no wrong. But no such theoretical immunity can well be extended to the responsible advisers of the crown, or to the state itself whose political liability is coextensive with the official responsibility of the ministry. A bad minister may make a bad precedent only to be followed, if not immediately, yet at some future period of the world's history. Persons or states wantonly and causelessly aggrieved, have long memories; and a national wound or grievance remains and rankles long after its infliction; and if unredressed, may be faithfully transmitted to succeeding generations.

BELLIGERENCY EXISTING, NEUTRAL RIGHTS MUCH DISCUSSED. 575

Among nations, therefore, whenever any wrong has been from inadvertence committed, it is well and wise to proffer seasonable apology, explanation, or indemnity for it; and if committed designedly, to offer ample reparation, in kind or its equivalent if practicable, so as effectually to remove all lurking cause of national alienation, disaffection, or animosity.

The preservation of amicable relations, if such can be continued or restored through adequate remuneration, is infinitely more important to a state than the mere saving the wounded pride or self-esteem of a haughty and hasty, or blind and blundering ministry. The penalty to a state may be too great, to the minister but trivial and unimportant.

Legal questions as to neutral rights and privileges can only arise where there is an admitted belligerency existing. Capture, prize, and adjudication may then take place, and neutral rights and belligerent duties be fully discussed. This will probably continue so to be, until the extinction of maritime capture shall be adopted by the European nations, as was proposed by the American Government to the Paris Convention of 1856. There are still in abeyance other questions of difference between the United States and European states, which are likely to remain outstanding and unsettled, unless adjusted by treaty or other appropriate mode which may be satisfactory to the United States. That adjustment cannot be effected by treaties of alliance, as they would be in derogation of the policy adopted and bequeathed by Washington; nor can it be effected by arrangements which would contravene the principles and policy of the Monroe doctrine. If the United States were in any way delinquent, she would soon find

576 NEUTRAL DUTIES, WHEN IMPOSED, BIND STATE AND CITIZEN.

a way of removing all grounds of difference, as her avowed policy is and long has been, to claim only what is right and submit to nothing wrong. Indeed, for all nations, it will be found to be easier to do what is right than to attempt to avoid it by doing something wrong.

Differences in the decisions of the legal tribunals are limited in number, and will be particularly noticed in the authorities hereafter to be cited. They involve rather technical points than matters of principle and policy.

As universal neutrality presupposes peace, such a state of neutrality cannot originate either controversy or discussion. But a particular or declared neutrality implies an actual or possible belligerency. It is indispensable that there shall be parties belligerent, before the state and character of a neutral is capable of being defined. As war begets a state of belligerency, so belligerency necessarily precedes the debatable condition and character of neutrality.

Unlike allies, neutrals are presumed in theory to take neither side; observing the strictest impartiality toward both parties engaged, dispensing their good offices alike to each, neither doing or wishing harm to either belligerent, nor exhibiting any disposition to help either belligerent. And the attitude of neutrality, when publicly taken by a state or sovereign, imposes upon such state or sovereign the necessity of a strict observance of all these varied, negative, passive, in short, neutral duties. And the same obligations which are imposed upon the state are likewise enjoined upon the subject or citizen; so that any conceded or declared neutral duties must be alike observed by state or citizen, sovereign or subject, people or the servants of the people

or state.