sidered that in that writing was contained the agreement WILLES, J. I am of the same opinion and on the same ground. Suppose this document is conclusive, then the amount of payment not being stated, it appears that the paper does not contain the contract in its complete form, and oral evidence may therefore be properly received to show what the agreed payment was. And on this evidence being given it turns out that fourteen shillings was the sum charged and paid, and that is not denied. The receipt is for fourteen shillings, when a less sum, eight shillings, was due for the carriage to Nine Elms. Then what were the six shillings paid for? The bargain to carry to Nine Elms was complete, and yet there is a further sum due. Is it inconsistent to hold that in addition to the contract to carry to Nine Elms, there was a contract to carry to King's Cross? I cannot see anything in this which alters the written agreement. The rule is, no doubt, that you cannot make any alteration in an agreement reduced to writing, by evidence of a contemporaneous parol contract; but here (a) 12 C. B., N. S. 75. 1866. MALPAS v. LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAIL. Co. 1866. MALPAS บ. LONDON AND ERN RAIL. Co. the evidence adduced has not that effect; it proves only an additional contract, and, one not at variance with the former one. I wish to remark that in the case of Jeffery v. SOUTH-WEST- Walton (a), the reporter, notwithstanding his high character, appears to have misrepresented Lord Ellenborough in giving the reasons of his judgment. The agreement there was for the hire of a horse, and after it had been made, a memorandum in pencil was written upon a card and kept by the Plaintiff. But it did not purport to be the agreement between the parties, and it did not mention the subject matter of the contract. Yet Lord Ellenborough is made to say, "the written agreement merely regulates the time of hiring and the rate of payment, and I shall not allow any evidence to be given by the Plaintiff in contradiction of these terms; but I am of opinion that it is competent to the Plaintiff to give in evidence suppletory matter as part of the agreement." The ruling in that case might nevertheless be sustained upon another principle in the law of evidence, for the memorandum had been acted upon by both parties, and on that ground of estoppel the decision was a sound one. In Van Toll v. The South-Eastern Railway Company (b), the document was held conclusive between the parties upon a similar ground. KEATING, J. I am of the same opinion. It is very important that it should be understood that our judgment does not proceed on the assumption that a consignor, on signing such a note as the present, can depart from his written agreement. This is the case of an additional contract, which does not contradict or vary the writing signed by the Plaintiff. SMITH, J. The question before us is not whether the verdict was against evidence, but whether there was any evidence to go to the jury of a contract to carry to King's Cross. It is said that it is not competent for us to go beyond the document signed by the Plaintiff, but evidence was given of the price for which the cattle were to be taken, that not being in the memorandum, which, therefore, did not contain all that passed. On arriving at the proof of that transaction it became necessary to ascertain the distance to which the animals were to be carried, and that question I could not withdraw from the jury. Rule discharged. PHILLIPS and Another v. POLAND. The provisions of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 112, by which a bankrupt after adjudication is protected from arrest "by any creditor," extend only to those creditors whose debts accrued previous to the bankruptcy. Therefore where a bankrupt while privileged under a protection order, and before his final examination, was arrested at his residence in respect of debts incurred since his bankruptcy: Held, that the arrest was valid. THE January 20. Protection order. Debt incurred after adjudica tion and before final examina HE facts of this case appeared from the affidavits to be Bankrupt. as follows:-Early in March, 1864, the Defendant filed his petition in the Court of Bankruptcy, and on the 22nd of the same month was duly adjudicated a bankrupt. Protection was granted, and renewed from time to time, till tion. "Creditors." 24th November, 1865, when the bankrupt being unable 12 & 13 Vict. from illness to attend to pass his final examination, the c. 106, s. 112. protection was further extended to the 29th January of this year. In August and September, 1865, the Defendant contracted debts with the Plaintiff in respect of certain goods delivered to him, for the price of which an action. was soon after commenced; and on the 9th December judgment in the action was signed. On the 16th December, a writ of ca. sa. was issued on that judgment, and on the same day the Defendant was arrested at his residence in Great Portland Street by an officer of the sheriff of Middlesex. He thereupon stated to the officer that he was 1866. PHILLIPS บ. POLAND. privileged from arrest by reason of the protection order, and produced it; but was removed nevertheless to Whitecross Street Prison. On the 19th December, a summons was heard before Byles, J., at Chambers, to discharge the Defendant from custody on the above grounds, but his Lordship declined to make the order prayed for. A rule was then obtained calling upon the Plaintiffs and the sheriff of Middlesex to show cause respectively why the Defendant should not forthwith be discharged out of custody as to the above-mentioned action, on the ground that he was privileged from arrest both at common law and by the protection granted by the commissioners under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 112, till he had passed his final examination. Bullar, for the Plaintiff, showed cause.-The Bankruptcy Act, 1861 (24 & 26 Vict. c. 134, s. 230, Sched. G.), repeals amongst other portions of the Act of 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106), the interpretation clause of that statute, sect. 276; and the 232nd section enacts, that "The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849," "The Bankruptcy Act, 1854," and "The Bankruptcy Act, 1861," shall be construed as one Act. The 112th section of the Act of 1849 provides, that "if the bankrupt be not in prison or custody at the date of the adjudication, he shall be free from arrest or imprisonment by any creditor in coming to surrender, and after such surrender during the time by this Act limited for such surrender, and for such further time as shall be allowed him for finishing his examination, and for such time after finishing his examination until his certificate be allowed as the Court shall from time to time by endorsement on the summons of such bankrupt think fit to appoint," &c. Section 113 enacts, "that if any bankrupt shall be arrested for debt, or on any escape warrant in coming to surrender, or shall after his surrender and while protected by order of the Court be so arrested, he shall, on producing such protection to the officer who shall arrest him, and giving such officer a copy thereof, be immediately discharged." The question is whether the Plaintiff is a "creditor" within the meaning of the above 112th section. The word as there used can only apply to those persons who were creditors at the time of the bankruptcy. Here the Plaintiff became a creditor after the adjudication, and in the absence of clear and express words, taking away his common law rights, the Plaintiff is entitled to his remedy: Grace v. Bishop (a). It is clear that the word "creditor" in the interpretation clause of statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, can only apply to one who was so at the time of the bankruptcy; and sections 116, 142 and 144 where the word "creditor" occurs must be construed accordingly; it is, in fact, the only mode in which the term is used throughout the Act. On the possibility of construing the same word differently, in different sections of an Act of Parliament, the judgment of Lord Denman, in Reg. v. The Poor Law Commissioner in re the Holborn Union (b), may be referred to. The cases of Ockford v. Freston (c), Bateman v. Freeston (d), and Ex parte Freston (e), are not applicable: they turned on the 257th section of the Act of 1849, now repealed. The language of the Lord Chancellor in the last case, though general, must be taken in connection with the subject-matter of the case before him. Quain, for the sheriff, pointed out that in Grace v. Bishop the bankrupt had passed his last examination, whereas here it was not so, and he prayed that in the event of the rule being made absolute, the Court would impose terms by which the sheriff should be protected. (a) 11 Er. 424. (d) 30 L. J., Q. B. 133. 1866. PHILLIPS v. POLAND. |