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under these peculiar circumstances suf-
ficient. Ex parte Peppercorn.
Page 487
Receiving deposits as vendor's agent.
See Sale.

AVERAGE.

Particular, Meaning of. See Insurance,
I.

AWARD.

Under Lands Clauses Consolidation Act,
s. 68. See Arbitration, II.

BALLET.

Divertissement. See Stage.

BANKRUPT.

I. Under stat. 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106,
s. 114, which enacts that the petitioning
creditor shall at his own costs file and
prosecute his petition until the choice of
assignees, the petitioning creditor is per-
sonally liable to the messenger of the
Court of Bankruptcy for his fees and
expenses incurred in taking possession of
the bankrupts' estate up to that period.
Stubbs v. Horn.
Page 89

II. After the choice of assignees the
trade assignee is liable for the messen-
ger's subsequent costs and expenses,
if there is anything to show that the
messenger has acted under his express
directions or from which an express em-
ployment by him may be legitimately
inferred.

1bid.

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c. 106, s. 112, by which a bankrupt after
adjudication is protected from arrest "by
any creditor," extend only to those
creditors whose debts accrued previous
to the bankruptcy. Phillips and Another
v. Poland.
Page 235

V. Therefore where a bankrupt while
privileged under a protection order, and
before his final examination, was arrested
at his residence in respect of debts in-
curred since his bankruptcy: Held, that
the arrest was valid.
Ibid.

VI. A composition deed contained a
clause by which the trustees might re-
quire any person, claiming to be a cre-
ditor of the debtor, to verify his debt or
claim "by statutory declaration, proved
before the commissioners of bankruptcy
or otherwise, as the said trustee or trus-
tees might think fit." Held (reversing
the judgment of the Court of Common
Pleas), that the clause had not the effect
of depriving the creditor who failed to
produce proof to the satisfaction of the
trustee of all benefit under the deed, and
that it was reasonable. Quære, 1.
Whether a court of law can declare a
provision which applies equally to all
classes of creditors, and which the statut-
able majority of the creditors have
thought fit to adopt, void on the ground
that in the opinion of the court it is un-
reasonable. 2. As to the soundness of
the decision in Leigh v. Pendlebury, 15
C. B., N. S. 815. Coles v. Turner.
Page 386

VII. The following clauses, on which
the court below did not adjudicate, were
held not to be unreasonable, on the
ground that they were matters which
might fairly be left to the discretion of
the trustees :-

1. A clause following a power of sale
given to the trustees in respect of
the personal and real estate of the
debtor, conferring upon them power
in their discretion to postpone the
sale of all or any part thereof, and
to lease such unsold portion, either
from year to year or for a term of
years, for such rent as they might
think fit; and to give credit for the
whole or any part of the purchase-
money, either with or without taking
security for the same.

2. A proviso giving the trustees full
discretion to pay dividends at such
place and in such manner as they
should think fit.

3. A clause authorizing the trustees
to give time and to compound for
the payment of debts due to the
debtor, and to abandon such as they
should consider bad.

4. A clause relating to the valuation
of securities held by secured cre-
ditors, that such value should be
agreed upon between the creditor
and trustees; or, in case of dispute,
should be ascertained by two im-
partial valuers, one to be chosen by
the creditor, and the other by the
trustees, or by an umpire to be
named by such valuers before pro-
ceeding to the valuation. Ibid.

VIII. To a declaration on the com-
mon counts the Defendant pleaded a
composition deed under stat. 24 & 25
Vict. c. 134, s. 192, setting it out ver-
batim. The deed purported to have
been made on the 14th November, 1865,
between the several persons whose names
were subscribed and seals affixed in a
schedule, being creditors of the debtor,
on behalf of themselves and all and every
other the creditors of the debtor of the
first part, and the debtor of the second
part; and recited that the debtor was
indebted, &c., and had agreed to pay a
composition of 2s. in the pound, such
composition to be paid to all and every
the creditors of the debtor, whether
executing the deed or not, on the 21st
November inst., and witnessed that in
pursuance of the said agreement, and in
consideration of the payment of such
composition to the said several creditors,
the parties of the first part accepted the
composition in satisfaction of their debts
and released the debtor; and it was
lastly agreed that those presents were
intended to operate as a deed of compo-
sition within the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 1861, and that so soon as
the statutory majority should have exe-
cuted or in writing assented to it, it was
intended that it should be registered
under the 192nd section, in order that
the debtor might obtain the protection
of the court as provided by the 198th
section. After the usual averments in

respect of the assent to the deed of the
statutory majority, its attestation and re-
gistration, the plea concluded by alleging,
that on the said 21st November, 1865,
being after action, the Defendant was
ready and willing, and then tendered
and offered to pay to the Plaintiff the
composition, and that he refused to re-
ceive it; readiness and willingness to
pay it, and that the Defendant brought
it into court. Held, on demurrer :

1. That the plea was good, and stated
a defence arising after action within
the meaning of stat. 15 & 16 Vict.
c. 76, s. 68, and that no formal
commencement in the case of such
plea is necessary.

2. That if the defence had been so
framed as to embarrass the Plaintiff
he should have applied to a judge
at chambers to strike out or amend
the plea; but that such matter is no
ground for demurrer.

3. That the deed was good and the
provisions of it reasonable, both in
respect of the remedy of the cre-
ditors upon the deed, and the way
in which the composition was se-
cured to them.

4. That the recital of the agreement

by the debtor to pay the composi-
tion amounted to a covenant.
5. That it was competent to any cre-
ditor to sue upon the deed.
6. That there was nothing unreason-
able in the provision that the com-
position should be payable within
twenty-eight days from the execu-
tion of the deed, although stat. 24
& 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 192, cl. 4,
allows that number of days for re-
gistration. Brooks v. Jennings.
Page 414

IX. In pleading in bar a deed of in-
spectorship under stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c.
134, s. 192, it is sufficient, without set-
ting out the deed at length, to aver that
it is in all respects an inspectorship deed
within the true intent and meaning of
the statute, and give a general descrip-
tion of it. Corner and Another v.
Sweet.

405

X. To a declaration on the common
counts the Defendant pleaded that he
being a debtor within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act, 1861, a deed was made

between himself of the first part, certain
inspectors of the second part, and his
creditors of the third part; that the deed
related to his debts and liabilities and
his release therefrom, and the distribu-
tion, inspection, management and wind-
ing-up of his estate, and was in all
respects an inspectorship deed within
the true intent, meaning and provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861; that by
the deed it was provided and declared
that if and when a composition of 108.
in the pound should have been paid to
the creditors, or if and when (though
that sum might not have been paid)
the inspectors should certify that the
estate had been fully administered, or
if and when they should certify that the
debtor had made a certain conveyance
mentioned in the deed, which certificate
they were bound to give immediately
upon the conveyance being made, then
and immediately upon such composition
being paid, or upon either of the said
certificates being given, the debtor
should be absolutely released, and the
deed should thereupon operate and be
pleadable as a release as fully as an
order of discharge in bankruptcy; that
whereas it was intended that the deed
should be accepted by the creditors in
lieu of their debts, and whereas it was
essential to the interests of the creditors,
and for the better realization of the
estate, that the debtor should not be
harassed by any proceedings thereafter
to be commenced by the creditors, it
was by the deed declared and agreed
that if any of the creditors should, whilst
the deed was in force, commence any
action in respect of his debt, the deed
should operate as an order of discharge
under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, and
the said declaration and agreement
might be pleaded in bar of or as a
defence to such action in like manner
as an order of discharge under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 1861. It was then averred
in the usual way that a majority in
number, representing three-fourths in
value of creditors whose debts respec-
tively amounted to 107. and upwards,
assented to the deed in writing; that
the Defendant and the inspectors ex-
ecuted it; that the execution was at-
tested, and that the deed having been
stamped was duly registered, and that

with it the statutory affidavit was de-
livered to the chief registrar; that all
conditions had happened, &c., to make
it binding on all the creditors as if they
had been parties to it; that the Plain-
tiffs were creditors, and the claim in the
declaration a debt within the meaning of
the deed; that the deed was in force,
and that by reason of the premises the
Defendant was entitled to plead it in bar
to the action. Held, on demurrer :

1. That the deed was properly plead-

ed, and was to be taken to be a
valid deed in accordance with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,

1861.

2. That on the authority of Gibbons v.
Vouillon, 8 C. B., N. S. 483, the
declaration contained in the deed,
that if any creditor should sue for
his debt such declaration might be
pleaded in bar, afforded a good
answer to the action.
Ibid.

XI. The certificate of appointment of
a creditors' assignee, under stat. 24 & 25
Vict. c. 134, s. 123, is a record of the
Court of Bankruptcy, and conclusive
evidence of the appointment; and may
be used as such in an action by the as-
signee, though it were signed and sealed
after such action was commenced. Kelly
v. Morray.
Page 684

XII. The Plaintiff, being the Defen-
dant in a chancery suit, was ordered by
the Master of the Rolls to pay certain
monies, which he neglected to do; and
he was subsequently adjudicated bank-
rupt, and obtained a protection order.
An attachment having issued out of the
Court of Chancery against him for dis-
obeying its order, the sheriff's officer, to
whom the warrant for levying execution
of the attachment was directed, arrested
him, and, notwithstanding that he there-
upon produced his protection and de-
manded to be discharged, kept him in
custody longer than was necessary for
obtaining a copy of the protection, and
until on the same day he had lodged him
in the sheriff's prison, from whence be
was unable to procure his discharge for
more than a month. Held :-

1. That the arrest upon an attachment
for contempt of an order of the
Court of Chancery for payment of

money was an arrest for debt within |
the meaning of stat. 12 & 13 Vict.
c. 106, s. 113.

2. That as the officer had detained the
bankrupt longer than was necessary
for obtaining a copy of the protec-
tion, though not for an entire day,
he was liable under that section
to a penalty of 5l. for one day's de-
tention, and for no more.

3. That after the bankrupt had been
lodged in the prison, the subsequent
detention was not the act of the
officer. Lees v. Newton. Page 734

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BILL OF EXCHANGE.

I. A bill of exchange was drawn in
England payable to the drawer's order,
directed to and accepted by the drawee
in France, payable in France, and was
indorsed by the drawer in blank and de-
livered to the Defendant in England, and
by him indorsed in blank and delivered
to the Plaintiff in England, who in-
dorsed and delivered it to one B. in
France, where it was duly presented
and dishonoured. Held, that, in an
action on the bill brought in England
against an indorser indorsing in England,
notice of dishonour good according to
the law of France was due notice of dis-
honour according to the law of England.
Hirschfield v. Smith.

284

II. The law of France requires the
indorsement of a bill of exchange to be

special, and to state a date and con-
sideration; and after this bill had been
accepted and indorsed to the Plaintiff,
he altered it by turning the indorsements
in blank of the drawer and the defendant
into special indorsements, with a state-
ment of a date and consideration; and
beyond this, in the special indorsement
of the drawer to the Plaintiff, he inserted
the rate of exchange according to which
payment was to be made, and there was
placed on the face of the bill a super-
scription of the same words, purporting
to make them part of the acceptor's cou-
tract, to which the special indorsement
of the drawer was made to refer by the
words ut retro therein inserted. Held:-
1. That the alterations rendered the
bill void.

2. Semble, that the bill would not
have been rendered void by the
alterations made by the Plaintiff if
they had not gone beyond the turn-
ing of the indorsements in blank
into special indorsements according
to the requirements of the law of
France.
Ibid.

III. A bill of exchange, purporting to
be drawn by C., was presented to S. for
acceptance by P., the indorsee. S.,
having stopped payment, wrote to the
Plaintiffs through P., who presented
the bill, saying that the Defendant
would intervene and accept on behalf of
the drawer, and that they presumed the
Plaintiffs would discount the bill on
Defendant's signature being attached.
The Defendant having accepted for the
honour of the drawer, the money was
advanced. The bill afterwards proved
to have been forged. Held:-

1. That the Defendant was liable on
his acceptance, as he was estopped
from disputing that the bill was a
genuine instrument.

2. Semble, that this was, in effect, a
bill payable to bearer. Phillips and
Another v. Im Thurm.
Page 499

IV. A railway company incorporated
to make a railway under a special Act
of Parliament, with which the general
Railway Acts are incorporated, is not
empowered, in the absence of express
authority, to accept bills of exchange.

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As to shipowner's lien on goods during
currency of bill given for freight.
See Shipping, VI.

Freight made payable by, "as per char-
ter-party." See Shipping, VIII.
Shipowner's duty where importer fails to
take delivery at time expressed in.
See Shipping, I.

Consignor's rights against shipowners on
re-indorsement to him after a wrongful
delivery. See Shipping, III.
Naming of person, as both shipper and
consignee in, not conclusive evidence of
an insurable interest. See Insurance,
II.

Exceptions in, of barratry and perils of
the seas. See Shipping, II.

Statute 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111. See Ship-
ping, III., IV.

BILL OF SALE.

A company incorporated by stat. 25
& 26 Vict. c. 89, under the name of the
Glucose Sugar and Colouring Company
(Limited), and having for its object,
inter alia, the manufacture of Glucose
sugar, gave a bill of sale to the Plain-
tiff as security for a debt due for plant
bought by the company for the purpose
of its trade. The instrument stated at
its conclusion, that in witness thereof
the company had thereunto affixed their
common seal. One of the articles of
association provided that the directors
might make regulations for the use of
the seal; and, although there was no
resolution of the company in that re-
spect, it was stated by the secretary to
be the practice to affix the seal in the
presence of the board, and for two di-
rectors and the secretary to attest the
sealing; and under the seal two of the

directors signed their names, describing
themselves as directors, and the secre-
tary countersigned his name, describing
himself as secretary. The affidavit filed
with the bill of sale, as required by stat.
17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 1, and made by
the secretary of the company, mentioned
the registered name of the company, and
the place where its principal office was
situate, and gave no other description of
its occupation. Held:-

1. That as the company was a trading
company it was within its province
to give the bill of sale.

2. That the description contained in
the affidavit of the registered name
of the company and its principal
office was a sufficient description
of its "residence and occupation,"
within that act.

3. (Byles, J., dubitante,) that the
two directors had signed merely as
directors joining in the execution,
and not as attesting witnesses; and
therefore that it was not necessary
to give a description of their resi
dence and occupation in the affidavit.
Shears v. Jacobs.
Page 492

BLANK,

Indorsement in, of bill of lading. See
Shipping, III., IV.

BLOOD,

Corruption of. See Descent.

BOATS

Employed to land cargo. See Insur-
ance, V., VI.

BOND.

I. To a declaration on a bond reciting
that one S. was appointed collector of
poor rates and of sewers and general
rates, that he might be re-appointed
collector of all or some or one of the said
rates, and that the Defendants were
sureties, the condition being, that if S.
should effectually perform the duties
and account for the monies "of the

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