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if they contemn his orders and continue together for one hour afterwards, such contempt shall be felony, without benefit of clergy. (2) And, farther, if the reading of the proclamation be by force opposed, or the reader be in any manner wilfully hindered from the reading of it, such opposers and hinderers are felons, without benefit of clergy: and all persons to whom such proclamation ought to have been made, and knowing of such hinderance, and not dispersing, are felons, without benefit of clergy. There is the like indemnifying clause, in case any of the mob be unfortunately killed in the endeavour to disperse them: being copied from the act of Queen Mary. And, by a subsequent clause of the new act, if any person, so riotously assembled, begin, even before proclamation, to pull down any church, chapel, meeting-house, dwelling-house, or out-houses, they shall be felons, without benefit of clergy. (3)

2. By statute 1 Hen. VII, c. 7, unlawful hunting in any legal forest, park, or warren, not being the king's property, *by night, or with painted faces, [*144] was declared to be single felony. But now, by the statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, to appear armed in any inclosed forest or place, where deer are usually kept, or in any warren for hares or conies, or in any high road, open heath, common, or down, by day or night, with faces blacked, or otherwise disguised, or (being so disguised) to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer, to rob a warren, or to steal fish, or to procure, by gift or promise of reward, any person to join them in such unlawful act, is felony, without benefit of clergy. (4) I mention these offences in this place, not on account of the damage thereby done to private property, but of the manner in which that damage is committed: namely, with the face blacked or with other disguise, and being armed with offensive weapons, to the breach of the public peace and the terror of his majesty's subjects.

3. Also by the same statute, 9 Geo. I, c. 22, amended by statute 27 Geo, II, c. 15, knowingly to send any letter without a name, or with a fictitious name, demanding money, venison, or any other valuable thing, or threatening (without any demand) to kill any of the king's subjects, or to fire their houses, out-houses, barns, or ricks, is made felony without benefit of clergy. (5) This offence was formerly high treason by the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 6.

4. To pull down or destroy any lock, sluice or floodgate, erected by authority of parliament on a navigable river, is, by statute 1 Geo. II, st. 2, c. 19, made felony, punishable with transportation for seven years. By the statute 8 Geo. II, c. 20, the offence of destroying such works, or rescuing any person in custody for the same, is made felony without benefit of clergy; and it may be inquired of and tried in any adjacent county, as if the fact had been therein committed. By the statute 4 Geo. III, c, 12, maliciously to damage or destroy any banks, sluices, or other works on such navigable river, to open the flood-gates or otherwise obstruct the navigation, is again made felony, punishable with transportation for seven years. And by statute 7 Geo. III, c. 40*(which repeals all former acts relating to turnpikes), maliciously to pull down [*145] or otherwise destroy any turnpike-gate or fence, toll-house or weighing engine thereunto belonging, erected by authority of parliament, or to rescue any person in custody for the same, is made felony without benefit of clergy; and the indictment may be inquired of and tried in any adjacent county. (6) The remaining offences against the public peace are merely misdemeanors and no felonies; as,

5. Affrays (from affraier, to terrify) are the fighting of two or more persons in some public place, to the terror of his majesty's subjects; for, if the fighting

(2) The punishment is now reduced to transportation or imprisonment (statute 1 Vic. c. 91, or penal servitude may be substituted. Statute 16 and 17 Vic. c. 99.

(3) Subsequent statutes embrace other cases than these here mentioned, and the punishment is now reduced to penal servitude.

(4) The statutes relating to these offences were repealed and consolidated by 7 and 8 Geo. JV, cc. 27 and 29, and the punishment greatly mitigated.

(5) This subject is covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. cc. 96, 97, 100.

(6) Upon the subject of this paragraph, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 97.

be in private, it is no affray, but an assault. (b) Affrays may be suppressed by any private person present, who is justifiable in endeavouring to part the combatants, whatever consequence may ensue. (c) But more especially the constable, or other similar officer, however denominated, is bound to keep the peace; and to that purpose may break open doors to suppress an affray, or apprehend the affrayers; and may either carry them before a justice, or imprison them by his own authority for a convenient space till the heat is over; and may then perhaps also make them find sureties for the peace. (d) The punishment of common affrays is by fine and imprisonment; the measure of which must be regulated by the circumstances of the case; for, where there is any material aggravation, the punishment proportionately increases. As where two persons coolly and deliberately engage in a duel; this being attended with an apparent intention and danger of murder, and being a high contempt of the justice of the nation, is a strong aggravation of the affray, though no mischief has actually ensued. (e) Another aggravation is when thereby the officers of justice are disturbed in the due execution of their office or where a respect to the particular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than in common ones; as in the king's court and the like. And upon the same account also all affrays in a church or church-yard are esteemed very heinous [*146] offences, as being indignities to him to whose service those places are consecrated. Therefore mere quarrelsome words, which are neither an affray nor an offence in any other place, are penal here. For it is enacted by statute 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 4, that if any person shall, by words only, quarrel, chide, or brawl, in a church or church-yard, the ordinary shall suspend him, if a layman, ab ingressu ecclesiæ; and, if a clerk in orders, from the ministration of his office during pleasure. And if any person in such church or church-yard proceeds to smite or lay violent hands upon another, he shall be excommunicated ipso facto; or if he strikes him with a weapon, or draws any weapon, with intent to strike, he shall, besides excommunication (being convicted by a jury), have one of his ears cut off: or, having no ears, be branded with the letter F in his cheek. (7) Two persons may be guilty of an affray: but,

6. Riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies, must have three persons at least to constitute them. An unlawful assembly is when three or more do assemble themselves together to do an unlawful act, as to pull down enclosures, to destroy a warren or the game therein; and part without doing it, or making any motion towards it. (f) (8) A rout is where three or more meet to do an unlawful act upon a common quarrel, as forcibly breaking down fences upon a right claimed of common or of way; and make some advances towards it. (g) A riot is where three or more actually do an unlawful act of violence, either with or without a common

(b) 1 Hawk. P. C. 134.
(g) Bro. Abr. t. Riot, 4, 5.

(c) 1bid. 136.

(d) Ibid. 137. (e) Ibid. 138.

(f) 3 Inst. 176.

(7) A clergyman may be guilty of brawling who addresses a public reproof to a parish during his sermon, without any just cause or provocation, and with great warmth of passion, and

a loud voice. Cox v. Goodday, 2 Hagg. Cons. 133. On this subject, see statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 32.

The statute 5 Edw. VI, c. 4, so far as relates to the punishment of persons convicted of striking with any weapon, or drawing any weapon with intent to strike, as therein mentioned, was repealed by 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 1. And so far as relates to persons not in holy orders, it was repealed by statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 32, s. 5.

(8) [An assembly of a man's friends for the defence of his person against those who threater to beat him if he go to such a market, &c., is unlawful, for he who is in fear of such insults must provide for his safety by demanding the surety of the peace against the persons by whom he is threatened, and not make use of such violent methods which cannot but be attended with the danger of raising tumults and disorders, to the disturbance of the public peace. But an assembly of a man's friends at his own house for the defence of the possession of it against such as threaten to make an unlawful entry, or for the defence of his person against such as threaten to beat him in his house, is permitted by law, for a man's house is looked upon as his castle. He is not, however, to arm himself and assemble his friends in defence of his close. 1 Russ. 362.]

cause or quarrel: (h) as if they beat a man; or hunt and kill game in another's park, chase, warren, or liberty; or do any other unlawful act with force and violence; or even do a lawful act, as removing a nuisance, in a violent and tumultuous manner. (9) The punishment of unlawful assemblies, if to the number of twelve, we have just now seen, may be capital, according to the circumstances that attend it; but, from the number of three to eleven, is by fine and imprisonment only. The same is the case in riots and routs by the common law; to *which the pillory (10) in very enormous cases has been sometimes superadded. (i) And by the statute 13 Hen. IV, c. 7, any [*147] two justices, together with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, may come with the posse comitatus, if need be, and suppress any such riot, assembly, or rout, arrest the rioters, and record upon the spot the nature and circumstances of the whole transaction; which record alone shall be a sufficient conviction of the offenders. In the interpretation of which statute it hath been holden, that all persons, noblemen and others, except women, clergymen, persons decrepit, and infants under fifteen, are bound to attend the justices in suppressing a riot, upon pain of fine and imprisonment; and that any battery, wounding, or killing the rioters, that may happen in suppressing the riot, is justifiable. (j) So that our ancient law, previous to the modern riot act, seems pretty well to have guarded against any violent breach of the public peace; especially as any riotous assembly on a public or general account, as to redress grievances or pull down all enclosures, and also resisting the king's forces if sent to keep the peace, may amount to overt acts of high treason, by levying war against the king.

7. Nearly related to this head of riots is the offence of tumultuous petition. ing; which was carried to an enormous height in the times preceding the grand rebellion. Wherefore by statute 13 Car. II, st. 1, c. 5, it is enacted, that not more than twenty names shall be signed to any petition to the king or either house of parliament, for any alteration of matters established by law in church or state; unless the contents thereof be previously approved, in the country, by three justices, or the majority of the grand jury at the assizes or quarter sessions; and, in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen and common council, (k) and that no petition shall be delivered by a company of more than ten persons; on pain *in either case of incurring a penalty not exceeding 1007. and three months' imprisonment. (11)

(i) 1 Hawk, P. C. 159.

[*148 ]

(h) 3 Inst. 176. (j) 1 Hal. P. C. 495. 1 Hawk. P. C. 161. (4) This may be one reason (among others why the corporation of London has, since the Restoration, usually taken the lead in petitions to parliament for the alteration of any established law.

(9) [To constitute a riot, the parties must act without any authority to give color to their proceedings, for a sheriff, constable, or even a private individual, are not only permitted, but enjoined, to raise a number of people to suppress riots, &c. 2 Hawk. c. 65, s. 2. The intention also with which the parties assemble, or at least act, must be unlawful, for if a sudden disturbance arise among persons met together for an innocent purpose, they will be guilty of a mere affray, though if they form parties, and engage in any violent proceedings, with promises of mutual assistance; or if they are impelled with a sudden disposition to demolish a house or other building, there can be no doubt they are rioters, and will not be excused by the propriety of their original design. 2 Hawk. c. 65. s. 3. But though there must be an evil intention, whether premeditated or otherwise, the object of the riot itself may be perfectly lawful; as to obtain entry into lands to which one of the parties has a rightful claim, for the law will not, as we have before seen, (ante, book 3, 5 n. 4), suffer private individuals to disturb the peace, by obtaining that redress by force which the law would regularly award them. 2 Hawk. c. 65, 3. 7; 8 T. R. 357, 364.

Women are punishable as rioters, but infants under the age of discretion are not. 1 Hawk. 3. 65, s. 44. In a riot all are principals, and therefore if any person encourages or promotes, or takes part in a riot, whether by words, signs, or gestures, or by wearing the badge or ensign of the rioters, he is himself to be considered a rioter. 2 Camp. 370.]

For a discussion of the general nature of this offence, see 2 Bish. Cr. L. § 954, et seq.; 1 Russ. on Crimes, 266.

(10) Since abolished. And for the statutes for the punishment of riots, routs, &c., see 24 and 25 Vic. cc. 96, 97 and 100.

(11) See Rex v. Lord George Gordon, Doug. 592.

VOL. II.-49


8. An eighth offence against the public peace is that of a forcible entry or detainer; which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands and tenements, with menaces, force and arms, and without the authority of law. This was formerly allowable to every person disseised, or turned out of possession, unless his entry was taken away or barred by his own neglect, or other circumstances; which were explained more at large in a former book. (1) But this being found very prejudicial to the public peace, it was thought necessary by several statutes to restrain all persons from the use of such violent methods, even of doing themselves justice; and much more if they have no justice in their claim. (m) So that the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one; that forbidden is such as is carried on and maintained with force, with violence, and unusual weapons. By the statute 5 Ric. II, st. 1, c. 8, all forcible entries are punished with imprisonment and ransom at the king's will. And by the several statutes of 15 Ric. II, c. 2, 8 Hen. VI, c. 9, 31 Eliz. c. 11, and 21 Jac. I, c. 15, upon any forcible entry, or forcible detainer after peaceable entry, into any lands, or benefices of the church, one or more justices of the peace, taking sufficient power of the county, may go to the place, and there record the force upon his own view, as in case of riots; and upon such conviction may commit the offender to gaol, till he makes fine and ransom to the king. And moreover the justice or justices have power to summon a jury to try the forcible entry or detainer complained of: and if the same be found by that jury, then, besides the fine on the offender, the justices shall make restitution by the sheriff of the possession, without inquiring into the merits of the title: for the force is the only thing to be tried, punished, and remedied by them: and the same may be done by indictment at the general sessions. But this provision does not extend to such as endeavour to maintain possession by force, where they themselves, or [*149] their ancestors, have been in the peaceable enjoyment of the lands and tenements for three years immediately preceding. (n) (12)

9. The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land; and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. III, c. 3, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the king's pleasure in like manner, as by the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked about the city in armour. (0)

10. Spreading false news, to make discord between the king and nobility, or concerning any great man of the realm, is punishable by common law (p) with fine and imprisonment; which is confirmed by statutes Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 34, 2 Ric. II, st. 1, c. 5, and 12 Ric. II, c. 11.

11. False and pretended prophecies, with intent to disturb the peace, are equally unlawful, and more penal; as they raise enthusiastic jealousies in the people, and terrify them with imaginary fears. They are therefore punished by our law, upon the same principle that spreading of public news of any kind, without communicating it first to the magistrate, was prohibited by the ancient Gauls. (q) Such false and pretended prophecies were punished capitally by statute 1 Edw. IV, c. 12, which was repealed in the reign of Queen Mary. And now by the statute 5 Eliz. c. 15, the penalty for the first offence is a fine of ten pounds and one year's imprisonment; for the second, forfeiture of all goods and chattels and imprisonment during life.


*12. Besides actual breaches of the peace, any thing that tends to provoke or excite others to break it, is an offence of the same denomina(1) See book III, page 174, &c.

(m) 1 Hawk. P. C. 141.

(n) Holding over by force, where the tenant's title was under a lease, now expired, is said to be a forci. ble detainer. (Cro. Jac. 199.)

(0) Pott. Antiq. b. 1. c. 26.

(p) 2 Inst. 226. 3 Inst. 198.

(q) Habent legibus sanctum, si quis quid de republica a finitimis rumore aut fama acceperit. uti ad magis tratum deferat, nere cum alio communicet: quod sæpe homines temerarios atque imperitos falsis rumoribus terreri, et ad facinus impelli. et de summis rebus consilium capere cognitum est,” Cas, de bell. Gall. lib. 6, cap. 19.

(12) [ A forcible entry and detainer is indictable at common law.

R. v. Wilson, 8 T. R. 357.

per Parke, B.; Harvey r. Brydges. 14 M. and W. 442; R. v. Smyth, 5 C. and P. 201.] See, also, State v. Wilson, 3 Mo. 125; Com. v. Shattuck, 4 Cush. 141; Henderson's Case, 8 Grat. 789

tion. Therefore, challenges to fight, either by word or letter, or to be the bearer of such a challenge, are punishable by fine and imprisonment, according to the circumstances of the offence. (r) (13) If this challenge arises on account of any money won at gaming, or if any assault or affray happens upon such account, the offender, by statute 9 Ann. c. 14, shall forfeit all his goods to the crown, and suffer two years' imprisonment.

13. Of a nature very similar to challenges are libels, libelli famosi, which, taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in the sense under which we are now to consider them, are malicious defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. (s) (14) The direct tendency of these libels is the breach of the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed. The communication of a libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the law: (t) and therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man is as much a libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally tends to a breach of the peace.(u) For the same reason it is immaterial with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or false; (v) since the provocation, and not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally: though doubtless, the falsehood of it may aggravate its guilt and enhance its punishment. In a civil action, we may remember, a libel must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; (w) for, if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground te demand a compensation for himself, whatever *offence it may be against the public peace; and therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the ac[*151] cusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit. But, in a criminal prosecution, the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public peace, is the whole that the law considers. And, therefore, in such prosecutions, the only points to be inquired into are, first, the making or publishing of the book or writing: and, secondly, whether the matter be criminal: and, if both these points are against the defendant, the offence against the public is complete. The punishment of such libellers, for either making, repeating, printing, or publishing the libel, is fine, and such corporal punishment as the court in its discretion shall inflict: regarding the quantity of the offence, and the quality of the offender. (x) By the law of the twelve tables at Rome, libels, which affected the reputation of another, were made a capital offence: but, before the reign of Augustus, the punishment became corporal only. (y) Under the emperor Valentinian (2) it was again made capital, not only to write, but to publish, or even to omit destroying them. Our law, in this and many other respects, corresponds rather with the middle age of Roman jurisprudence, when liberty, learning and humanity were in their full vigour, than with the cruel edicts that were established in the dark and tyrannical ages of the ancient decemviri, or the later emperors.

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(13) [The offences of fighting duels, and sending or provoking challenges, were fully considered by Mr. J. Grose, in passing sentence on Rice, convicted on a criminal information for a misdemeanor of the latter kind (3 East, 581), where the opinions of the earlier writers are collected. It is an offence, though the provocation to fight do not succeed. 6 East, 464; 2 Smith, 550; and it is a misdemeanor merely to endeavor to provoke another to send a challenge. 6 East, 461. But mere words which, though they may produce a challenge, do not directly tend to that issue, as calling a man a liar, or knave, are not necessarily criminal: 2 Lord Raym. 1031; 6 East 471; though it is probable they would be so if it could be shown that they were meant to pro voke a challenge.]

(14) [Though it has been held, at least for these two centuries, that the truth of a libel is no justification in a criminal prosecution, yet in many instances it is considered an extenuation of

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