eternal logos. Descanting on John i. 9, he "enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world," he says, "Whoever is endued with reason (oyix) partakes of the true light. But every man is endued with reason; all men, therefore, have the logos. In some the power of the logos is great, but in some it is little. If you see a soul given to passion, and sinful, you see the power of the logos failing; but if you see a soul holy and righteous, you see the power of the logos bringing forth fruit daily." This very much resembles the language of the Quakers, who speak of Christ being in all men. Origen likewise seems to have supposed that the ancient prophets might have had the logos so imparted to them, as that they themselves might have been called logoi, as well as Christ. "If Elias," says he, "be a logos, he must be a logos inferior to him that was in the beginning with God."+

*

It will be seen in the preceding passages that the logos was considered as being more properly the wisdom or reason of God; though, in some of them, mention is made of his being the same with other attributes of God, and especially his power. In the following passages this is more particuJarly expressed: "God, by his own omnipotence, that is, by his Son, (for all things were made by him, and without him nothing was made,) before all things created the heavens and the earth."± "The energy of the Lord has respect to the Almighty; for the Son may be said to be the Father's energy." §

At other times the logos, or the Son, is represented as being the will of the Father. Clemens Alexandrinus calls the logos the will of the Father; and, under the idea of an attribute of God, as giving him to men, he represents him as addressing them in the following manner: "I give you the logos, the knowledge of God; I give my whole self. This I am, this is what God wills, this is symphony, this is the harmony of the Father, this is the Son, this the

Και ός εςι λογικος, μετεχει το αληθινα φωτος λογικος δε εςι πας ανθρώπος των αν μετεχονίων λογο πανίων ανθρώπων, εν τισι μεν ή ισχυς το λόγο ηύξησεν, εν τισι δε εκλείπει εαν δε ίδης ψυχην εμπαθή, και αμαρίωλον, οψει εκεί την ισχύν το λογο εκλείπεσαν εαν δε της ψυχην άγιαν και δικαιαν, οψει την ισχυν το λόγο όσημέραι καρποφορεσαν. In Jer. Comment. I. p. 138. (P.)

1. Ει δε και λογο τις εςιν ο Ηλίας, ὑποδέεςερος λογω το εν αρχή προς τον Θεον Θεο λόγο. In Matt. Comment. I. p. 507. (P.)

"Ergo Deus omnium creator optimus, per summam suam potentiam, id est, filium suum, (omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil,) cœlum terramque ante omnia creavit." Cyril. Alex. Opera, I. p. 17. (P.)

§ Πάσα δε ή το Κυριο ενεργεια, επι τον παντοκράτορα την αναφοραν εχει, και έσιν, ως zimeir, walpinŋ Tiç everytia vios. Clemen. Alex. Strom. L. vii. Opera, p. 709. (P.)

Christ, this the logos of God, the arm of the Lord, almighty power, the will of the Father."

Cyril of Alexandria expresses the same idea with greater precision. "How," says he, "was he" (Christ) "made by the will of the Father, if the will of the Father be in him? For you must either suppose another wisdom by which he deliberated and made the Son, as you say," (speaking to the Arians,) "or if there be no other, but the Son alone is the wisdom of the Father, he is also his will; for the will of God consists in his wisdom."† Gregory Nyssen also says, "The Son, who is in the Father, knows the will of the Father; but rather he is the will of the Father." + "What," says Victorinus, "is the will of the Father, but his silent word?" §

As these writers said, that though the Father emitted the logos, he did not deprive himself of logos, so some of them likewise supposed, that though the Son was the will of the Father, the latter had another will like that of man.

This

is particularly allowed by Manuel Caleca, because, “volitions," as he says, "have a beginning and an end; whereas neither the essence of God, nor the image of God, can begin or end." ||

Instances occur in which Christ is considered as being the very soul of God. Indeed, this idea may have been perceived in some of the former quotations. Eusebius says, there is "one logos in God, which is almighty, and which

* Και λόγον χαριζομαι ύμιν, την γνωσιν το Θες, τελειον εμαυτον χαρίζομαι. Τελο ειμι εγω, τεῖο βελεῖαι ὁ Θεος, τελο συμφωνια εςι, τείο ἁρμονια παέρος, τείο υιος, τολο Χρισος, τεῖο ὁ λόγος το Θες, βραχιων Κύριο, δυναμις των ὅλων, το θέλημα το πατρος. Ad Gentes, Opera, p. 75. (P.)

+"Quomodo igitur per voluntatem patris factus est, si in eo patris voluntas est? Nam aut alteram sapientiam fingere necesse est, in qua deliberavit et fecit filium, ut vos dicitis: aut si altera non est, sed solus filius sapientia patris est, ipse quoque voluntas ejus est: in sapientia enim Dei velle ipsius est." Thesaurus, L. i. C. viii. Opera. II. p. 230. (P.)

† Ηθέλησε τι ὁ πατηρ, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ παίρι ων ύιος, είδε το θέλημα το πατρος μαλλον δε AUTOS TO Walpos εyevelo Deλnua. Contra Eunomium, Or. xii. Opera, II. p. 345. (P.) "Quid etiam est voluntas patris, nisi silens verbum?" Ad Arium, L. iii. Bib. Pat. V. p. 332. (P.)

Η λεγεται δε και αλλη βέλησις έξω της εσίας το Θεό κατ' ανθρωπινην επιβολην νούμενη - Η μεν έσια το Θεο ετε ήρξατο εδε πανείαι· ετε γαρ ήρξατο ή είκων ετε επαύσατο ή δε θελησις και αρχείαι και πανείαι. Manuel Caleca De Principiis. Auctuariam Combefis, II. p. 222. (P.)

More exactly the one word of God, or one the word of God, E15 ô TOU ✪EOU Aoy. I have some doubt about the sufficiency of this passage from Eusebius to prove the Doctor's point. Eusebius is here shewing, that, as there is but one Father, so there ought to be but one logos, and auimadverting upon the unreasonableness of those who might complain that there were not more; and to shew this, he remarks that they might as well complain that there were not more suns, more moons, and more worlds, or systems, created. To evince the weakness of such objections as these, he says, that as one sun, in visible things, enlightened the whole

enlightens all things, as there is one soul, and one rational power in man.'

Origen, after speaking of the soul as a middle principle between the body and the spirit, says, "What then is the soul of God?" and he replies, that "as every thing that is ascribed to God, as hands, fingers, eyes, feet, &c., means his attributes or powers, perhaps by the soul of God we are to understand his only-begotten Son; for, as the soul, being diffused through the whole body, animates every thing, and does every thing, so the only-begotten Son of God, which is his word, and his wisdom, extends to all the attributes of God, and is diffused through him."† M. Victorinus represents Christ as "the very being and action of the Father," and says in his answer to the Arians, that "God cannot be without action." In another passage of the same work, he calls Christ the form of the Father, defining form, if I understand him right, to be that which explains the being of a thing; or, as he elsewhere says, that by which God is seen." §

At length the absurdity of making Christ to be the proper reason, power, or will of God, seems to have struck some of the orthodox Christians; and then, having no other resource, they made the doctrine of the divinity of Christ to be a mystery, thinking, by that means, to cut off all inquiry and

sensible world, so, in intelligible things, the one logos of God enlighteneth all things тa σνμпAYTA. And, as an illustration of this, he adds, that one soul, and one rational power in man, was the performer of many different works at the same time. From this view of Eusebius's subject and reasoning, it does not seem to have been at all necessary to his subject, or indeed at all his business, directly to draw a parallel between the relation of the soul to man, and of the logos to God; but to shew the relation of each to the several objects under their direction, and to evince by the sufficiency of one soul to preside over various employments, the ample sufficiency of one logos to direct and controul all things in the universe; and to explain and confirm his argument by this comparison, appears to me to be the sole intent of this passage. But the quotation from Origen, which follows this, contains in it all for which the Doctor produces it." (X.)

Εις ὁ του Θεου λογο παντοδύναμος τα σύμπαντα καταυγάζει· επει και εν ανθρωπῳ μια ψυχή και μια λογικη δυναμις. De Laudibus Const. C. xii. p. 758. (Ρ.)

"Et si fas est audere nos in tali re amplius aliquid dicere, potest fortasse anima Dei intelligi unigenitus filius ejus. Sicut enim anima, per omne corpus inserta, movet omnia, et agitat quæ operatur universa: ita et unigenitus filius Dei, qui et verbum et sapientia ejus, pertingit et pervenit ad omnem virtutem Dei, et insertus est ei." De Principiis, Opera, I. p. 703. (P.)

"Hoc enim quod Ayos est: ipse enim λoyos Deus est, unum ergo et que, non enim sine actione Deus, sed intus operatur Deus, sicuti dictum. Substantia autem Dei imago est, actio, filiusque est, per quam intelligitur, et quod sit declaratur." Ad Arium, L. i. Bib. Pat. V. p. 298. (P.)

§ "Quoniam filius forma est patris: non autem nunc forma esse foris extra substantiam intelligitur, neque ut in nobis adjacens substantiæ facies, sed substantia quædam subsistens, in qua apparet et demonstratur quod occultatum et velatum est in alio. Deus autem ut velatum quiddam est: nemo enim videt Deum; forma gitur filius, in quo videtur Deus." Ibid. pp. 311, S20. (P.)

objection. Ruffinus says, "It is to be believed, that God is the Father of his own Son our Lord, and not to be discussed. For slaves must not dispute about the birth of their

masters.

Theophylact says, that "Christ is the logos of God, but neither the inward logos," (meaning reason,) "nor the external logos," (meaning speech,) "nor any thing that can be explained by any property of man, being something peculiar to God." In this state the doctrine of the generation of the Son now rests, equally incapable of being understood or defended.

We shall the less wonder at the extreme absurdity of the above quotations from the fathers, when we consider what wretched metaphysicians both they and the Platonists before them, and indeed all the philosophers of antiquity, were; and that the idea of a proper personification was not difficult, after it had been agreed that essence and power were the same thing, which I have shewn to be the language of the Platonists; and the same occurs in some of the Christian fathers. Thus Cyril of Alexandria says, that "the Father is a simple act of energy." Maxentius also says, that "with respect to God, who is of an impassible and incorruptible nature, nature and will are the same thing."§ M. Victorinus says, that "power and substance are the same things in God."||

The difference, however, between these things was perceived by Eunomius; for M. Caleca says, that he made the Divine essence and operation to be different things, and that he blamed the orthodox for confounding them." Palamas

* "Credendus est ergo Deus esse pater unici filii sui domini nostri, non discutiendus. Neque enim fas est servo de natalibus domini disputare." In Symbol. p. 172. (P.)

* Λόγος εςιν, εκ ἔργον, εδε κτισμα· διτίε δε οντος τε λόγε, ὁ μεν γαρ εςιν ενδιαθεῖος, ὃν και μη λεγοντες εχομεν, φημι δη την τε λεγειν δυναμιν και κοιμωμενος γαρ τις και μη λεγων, όμως έχει τον λόγον εν αυτῷ κειμενον, και την δυναμιν εκ απεβαλεν ὁ μεν εν εςιν ενδιάθετος, ὁ δε προφορικος, ὃν και δια των χειλέων προφερομεν, την τε λεγειν δύναμιν το ενδιαθείς, και ενίος κείμενα, εις ενεργειαν προαγονίες• διτίε τοινυν οντος το λογο, εδετερος τείων άρμοζει επι τε ύις το Θε8, ετε γαρ προφορικός, ετε ενδιαθείος εςιν ὁ λόγος το Θεο εκείνοι μεν γαρ των φυσικων και καθ' ἡμας, ὁ δε τε παῖρος λογος ὑπερ φυσιν ων, εχ ὑποβαλ.Melaι Tois nalw Texvodoyquaσ. In Johan. C. i. Opera, I. p. 557. (P.)

↑ "Actus vel efficacia Pater." De Trinitate, L. ii. Opera, II. p. 386. (P.)

"Hæc quæ dicis compositæ et passibili naturæ sunt propria, impassibili autem et incompositæ non est aliud naturaliter aliud voluntariè quidpiam facere, sed prorsus unum atque idipsum est, quia ibi non aliud est natura, aliud voluntas, sed natura voluntas est, et voluntas natura." Bib. Pat. V. p. 527. (P.)

|| "Simul enim et filius, et in patre, et pater in filio: una ergo potentia, hoc est, una substantia existit, ibi euim potentia, substantia: non enim aliud potentia, aliud substantia. Idem ergo ipsum est et patri et filio." Ad Arium, L. i. Bib. Pat. V. p. 300. (P.)

Η Επιζήναι εν ενταυθα χρη, πως Ευνόμιος διηρει μεν απο της εσίας την ενέργειαν, ὡς έγκλημα δε, την ταυλο/ηλα τοις ορθοδοξοις προέφερε. Combefis, II. p. 34. (Ρ.)

also asserted, that the Divine essence and operation were different things; but on this account his antagonist, M. Caleca, calls him a polytheist.*

REMARKS on Eusebius.

(See supra, p. 215.).

["Whether Eusebius was properly an Arian or not, is a question which has long been debated, and appears to me not very easy to be absolutely decided; and while it remains undetermined, it may perhaps be doubtful what construction † is to be put upon several of those passages of Eusebius, in which he seems to coincide with the sentiments of the antenicene orthodox. However, that he often speaks the same language with them, or approaches very nearly to it, is certain. Two of the passages here quoted are evident instances of this. But I am not quite certain whether the last passage which Dr. Priestley produces as an example of this, I mean that from Eusebius's Epistle Ad Cæsarienses, (Theodoriti Hist. Eccles.,) is the most full to the Doctor's purpose; for, immediately after the words here quoted, it follows not only ονος πάρος αει πατρος, but ως και βασιλεως αεί, και σκληρος δυναμει παντα οντος, αει τε κατα τα αυτα και ώσαυτως EXOVTOS. In the same sense in which the Father, according

* Εκ τέτων δηλον, ότι την ενέργειαν, ἣν διακρίνεσθαι της εσίας λέγεσι, ταυλην και θερInla naı anlıqov duoλoyer. Combefis, II. p. 3.

Ως ει τις πολλας θεότητας παραδεξαιτο, τετον αναγκη και πολλές θεες ὁμολογεῖν. Ibid. p. 40. (P.)

"What construction,' &c. To explain my meaning by an instance: Eusebius, (Dem. Evang. L. iv. C. ii.,) styles the Son Ty wрoToTenor σopiar, dλny de óλe voɛpar και λογικήν, και πανσοφον, μαλλον δε αυτονεν, και αυτολογον, και αυτοσοφίαν. But then he adds, with the appearance at least of a qualification of the application he had just been making of these terms to the Son, και ειτι δε αυτοκαλόν και αυταγαθον επινοείν εν ταις γενητοις θεμις, which may leave some room to question whether he understood these epithets in the same sense with the uncontrovertibly_orthodox. In the oration on the dedication of the churches, (Euseb. Hist. Eccles. L. x. C. iv. addressed to Paulinus, Bishop of Tyre, and ascribed by many to Eusebius himself,) p. 384 of the Mentz edition, the speaker, mentioning the soul of man, calls it αυτονοεραν εσίαν, produced by the Son ὁ θεοπαις εκ τε μη οντο, certainly not meaning that the intelligence was underived, or the intelligence of the Son who formed it; but rather that intelligence is its essential quality, its proper characteristic, inseparable from its being; or, to come nearer, if possible, to the force of the Greek word, that pure intelligence is its definition, that which constitutes it what it is. And, in like manner, I have sometimes been ready to think Eusebius might intend no more by several of these expressions than to give his very high sense of the person to whom he applies them. The Son is avroveS, AUTOλOY, AUTOoopia, that is, intelligence, reason, and wisdom itself, according to the same figure of speech, (though in a much more exalted meaning,) by which some persons, intending to display the excellence of a wise and good man, would say, he is wisdom and goodness itself. But all this is to be considered merely as a query." (X)