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by the antient law, be at any time defeated by a common recovery suffered by the tenant of the freehold (f); which annihilated all leases for years then subsisting, unless afterwards renewed by the recoveror, whose title was supposed superior to his by whom those leases were granted (5).

While estates for years were thus precarious, it is no wonder that they were usually very short, like our modern leases upon rack rent; and indeed we are told (g) that by the antient law no leases for more than forty years were allowable, because any longer possession (especially when given without any livery declaring the nature and duration of the estate) might tend to defeat the inheritance. Yet this law, if ever it existed, was soon antiquated; for we may observe in Madox's collection of antient instruments, some leases for years of a pretty early date, which considerably exceed that period (h): and long terms, for three hundred years or a thousand, were certainly in use in the time of Edward III. and probably of Edward I. (k).

(f) Co. Litt. 46.

(g) Mirror. c. 2, s. 27. Co. Litt. 45, 46.

(h) Madox Formulare Anglican. No. 239, fol. 140. Demise for eighty years, 21 Rich. II. ..... Ibid. No. 245, fol.

(i),

But certainly, when by the

146, for the like term. A. D. 1429.
Ibid. No. 248, fol. 148, for fifty
years, 7 Edw. IV.

....

(i) 32 Ass. pl. 6. Bro. Abr. t. Mor-
dauncestor, 42. Spoliation, 6.
(k) Stat. of Mortmain, 7 Edw. I.

Being precarious, estates for years were usually short.

(5) At this day, the same just rule prevails in every case of recovery by bond fide suit, where the title of the recoveror is prior to that of the tenant for years, and the principle of the old doctrine went no further. (Flower v. Rigden, Cro. Eliz. 284. Pledgard v. Lake, Cro. Eliz. 718). In practice, however, if a termor was not permitted to falsify the proceedings, his estate might have been wrongfully defeated by the fraud and covin of the tenant of the freehold, in not properly defending a feigned action brought against him. For this evil some remedy, but not an adequate

one, was provided by the statute of
Gloucester, (6 Edw. 1), and more com-
plete protection was at length given, as
mentioned in the text, by the act of 21
Hen. 8. (Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P. Wms. 574.
Theobalds v. Duffoy, 9 Mod. 102. As-
cough's case, 9 Rep. 135. Brediman's
case, 6 Rep. 57). From this slight
consideration, originally attached to the
interests of termors for years, that
principle of law was very naturally
deduced, which holds that the posses-
sion of the tenant is the possession of
the reversioner.

statute 21 Hen. VIII. c. 15, the termor (that is, he who is entitled to the term of years) was protected against these fictitious recoveries, and his interest rendered secure and permanent, long terms began to be more frequent than before; and were afterwards extensively introduced, being found extremely convenient for family settlements and mortgages: continuing subject, however, to the same rules of [*143] succession, and with the same inferiority to freeholds, as when they were little better than tenancies at the will of the landlord.

What constitutes an estate

for years.

Every estate which must expire at a period certain and prefixed, by whatever words created, is an estate for years (6). And therefore this estate is frequently called a term, terminus, because its duration or continuance is bounded, limited, and determined: for every such estate must have a certain beginning, and certain end (1). But id certum est, quod certum reddi potest: therefore, if a man make a lease to another, for so many years as J. S. shall name, it is a good lease for years (m); for though it is at present uncertain, yet when J. S. hath named the years, it is then reduced to a certainty. If no day of commencement is named in the creation of this estate, it bgins from the making, or delivery, of the lease (n). A lease for so many years as J. S. shall live, is void from the beginning (0); for it is neither certain, nor can ever be reduced to a certainty, during the continuance of the lease. And the same doc. trine holds, if a parson make a lease of his glebe for so many years as he shall continue parson of Dale; for this is still more uncertain. But a lease for twenty or more years, if J. S. shall so long live, or if he should so long continue parson, is good (p): for there is a certain period fixed, beyond which it cannot last; though it may determine

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sooner, on the death of J. S., or his ceasing to be parson there.

A lease for years may be made to commence in futuro; not so,

a lease for life.

We have before remarked, and endeavoured to assign the reason of, the inferiority in which the law places an estate for years, when compared with an estate for life, or an inheritance: observing, that an estate for life, even if it be pur auter vie (7), is a freehold; but that an estate for a thousand years is only a chattel, and reckoned part of the personal estate (q). Hence it follows, that a lease for years may be made to commence in futuro, though a lease for life cannot (8). As, if I grant lands to Titius to hold from Michaelmas next for *twenty years, this is good; but to [*144 ] hold from Michaelmas next for the term of his natural life, is void. For no estate of freehold can commence in futuro; because it cannot be created at common law without livery of seisin, or corporal possession of the land; and corporal possession cannot be given of an estate now, which is not to commence now, but hereafter (r). And, because no livery of seisin is necessary to a lease for years, such lessee is not said to be seised, or to have true legal seisin of the lands. Nor indeed does the bare lease vest any estate in the lessee;

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(7) See ante, note (1) to the eighth such cases, a freehold interest may be chapter.

(8) For, a chattel interest for years concerns the occupation only; but a lease for life, if made by a common law conveyance, requires livery of seisin, provided the estate leased consist of a corporeal hereditament, of which the lessor has the possession as well as the seisin. Where the estate consists of incorporeal hereditaments, seisin, of course, cannot be given; and where the freehold interest is granted by bargain and sale, or other assurance taking effect by virtue of the statute of uses, livery of seisin is not required: in

effectually limited to commence in
futuro; but the seisin will remain in the
grantor, till it can vest according to the
form of the limitation, so that it will
never be in abeyance: therefore, there
will always be an immediate tenant
of the freehold, to answer any præcipe
at the suit of strangers, and to render
to the lord the returns of the feud;
which considerations were the founda-
tion of the rule of the common law,
that a freehold cannot be created to
commence in futuro. (Watk. on Con-
vey., ch. 3, Prest. ed.).

Tenant for years

same estovers as

tenant for life.

but only gives him a right of entry on the tenement, which right is called his interest in the term, or, interesse termini: but when he has actually so entered, and thereby accepted the grant, the estate is then, and not before, vested in him, and he is possessed, not properly of the land, but of the term of years (s); the possession or seisin of the land remaining still in him who hath the freehold. Thus the word, term, does not merely signify the time specified in the lease, but the estate also and interest that passes by that lease; and therefore the term may expire, during the continuance of the time; as by surrender, forfeiture, and the like. For which reason, if I grant a lease to A. for the term of three years, and after the expiration of the said term to B. for six years, and A. surrenders or forfeits his lease at the end of one year, B's. interest shall immediately take effect: but if the remainder had been to B. from and after the expiration of the said three years, or from and after the expiration of the said time, in this case B's. interest will not commence till the time is fully elapsed, whatever may become of A's. term (t).

Tenant for term of years hath incident to and inseparable is entitled to the from his estate, unless by special agreement, the same estovers (9) which we formerly observed (u) that tenant for life was entitled to; that is to say, house-bote, fire-bote, ploughbote, and hay-bote (w); terms which have been already ex[145] plained (x).

Where a lease for years is cer

tain, the tenant is not entitled to emblements; otherwise, where it depends upon an uncertainty.

*With regard to emblements (10), or the profits of lands sowed by tenant for years, there is this difference between him and tenant for life: that where the term of tenant for years depends upon a certainty, as if he holds from midsummer for ten years, and in the last year he sows a crop of

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corn, and it is not ripe and cut before midsummer, the end
of his term, the landlord shall have it (11); for the tenant
knew the expiration of his term, and therefore it was his
own folly to sow what he never could reap the profits of (y).
But where the lease for years depends upon an uncertainty:
as, upon the death of the lessor, being himself only tenant
for life, or being a husband seised in right of his wife; or if
the term of years be determinable upon a life or lives; in all
these cases the estate for years not being certainly to expire
at a time foreknown, but merely by the act of God, the
tenant, or his executors, shall have the emblements in the
same manner that a tenant for life or his executors shall be
entitled thereto (2). Not so, if it determine by the act of
the party himself: as if tenant for years does any thing that
amounts to a forfeiture: in which case the emblements shall
go to the lessor and not to the lessee, who hath determined
his estate by his own default (a) (12).
II. The second species of estates not freehold, are estates
at will. An estate at will is where lands and tenements are
let by one man to another, to have and to hold at the will
of the lessor; and the tenant by force of this lease obtains
possession (b). Such tenant hath no certain indefeasible
estate, nothing that can be assigned by him to any other;

(y) Litt. s. 68. (*) Co. Litt. 56.

(11) Unless a custom prevails in the district where the land is situated, that the tenant shall be entitled to an outgoing crop.

(12) When a woman, who is entitled to tenancy durante viduitate only, sows corn, and marries before it is cut, she is clearly not entitled to the emblements, if the land be in her own occupation: but if she had let the land before her marriage, and her lessee had sown it, some doubt may exist whether he would, or would not, be allowed to enjoy the benefit of his industry and ma

(a) Ibid. 55. (b) Litt. s. 68.

nurance. In the report of Oland's
case, by Lord Coke, (5 Rep. 116), he
says,
"the lessee shall not have the
emblements; for, although his estate is
determined by the act of a stranger,
yet he shall not be in a better condi-
tion than his lessor was." But, in the
reports of what appears to be the same
case, in Goldsborough, (p. 189), and in
Cro. Eliz. (p. 460), a different doctrine
is stated.

A parson who resigns his living is
not entitled to emblements. (Bulwer
v. Bulwer, 2 Barn. & Ald. 471).

II. Estates at lands, &c. are let to one, to

will-where

hold at the will

of the lessor.

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