that the hands of government are at least sufficiently strengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The instruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections, but they are not the weaker upon that account. In short, our national debt and taxes (besides the inconveniences before mentioned) have also in their natural consequences thrown such a weight of power into the executive scale of government as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors, who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and, by an unaccountable want of foresight, established this system in their stead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to such a multitude of new officers created by and removable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witness the commissioners and the multitude of dependants on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commissioners of excise, and their numerous subalterns, in every inland district; the post-masters, and their servants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commissioners of the stamps, and their distributors, which are full as scattered, and full as numerous; the officers of the salt duty, which, though a species of excise, and conducted in the same manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the surveyors of houses and win

dows; the receivers of the land-tax; the managers of lotteries (63), [*336] and the commissioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removable at pleasure, without any reason assigned: these, it requires but little penetration to see, must give that power on which they depend for subsistence an influence most amazingly extensive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, subscriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money transactions, which will greatly increase this influence; and that over those persons whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen, consequence of erecting our funds of credit, and, to support them, establishing our present perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new since the restoration in 1660, and by far the greatest part since the revolution in 1688. And the same may be said with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together give the executive power so persuasive an energy with respect to the persons themselves, and so prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the loss of external prerogative.

But, though this profusion of offices should have no effect on individuals, there is still another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown: raised by the crown, oflicered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot, it is true, only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they must, by the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the absolute disposal of the crown. And there need but few

(6) Lotteries have very recently been abolished.

words to demonstrate how great a trust is thereby reposed in the prince by his people a trust that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.

Add to all this, that, besides the civil list, the immense revenue of almost seven millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of

the public, or carried to the sinking *fund, is first deposited in the [*337] royal exchequer, and thence issued out to the respective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by Act of parliament: which also, when well considered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high importance.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think it is clear, that whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any transactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is also acquired. The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence: the slavish and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has given way to a military establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments has succeeded a parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by the free operation of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be lessened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal introduction of a well-planned and national militia, will suffer our formidale army to be thinned and regulated; and when, in consequence of all, our taxes shall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will slowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it slowly and imperceptibly rose. But till that shall happen, it will be our especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influence from those who are intrusted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a sovereign, who, in all those public acts that have personally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the free constitution of Britain; hath already in more than one instance remarkably strengthened its outworks; and will, therefore, never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty

CHAPTER IX.

OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

In a former chapter of these Commentaries (a) we distinguished magistrates into two kinds : supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; and subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere. We have hitherto considered the former kind only; namely, the supreme legislative power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate magistrates.

And herein we are not to investigate the powers and duties of his ma

jesty's great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the prin cipal secretaries, or the like; because I do not know that they are in that capacity in any considerable degree the objects of our laws, or have any very important share of magistracy conferred upon them: except that the secretaries of state are allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial (b). Neither shall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or the other judges of the superior courts of justice; because they will find a more proper place in the third part of these Commentaries. Nor shall I enter into any minute disquisi[*339] tions, with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and *aldermen, or other magistrates of particular corporations; because these are mere private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises. But the magistrates and officers, whose rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to consider, are such as are generally in use, and have a jurisdiction and authority dispersedly throughout the kingdom: which are, principally, sheriffs; coroners; justices of the peace; constables; surveyors of highways; and overseers of the poor. In treating of all which I shall inquire into, first, their antiquity and original; next, the manner in which they are appointed and may be removed; and, lastly, their rights and duties. first of sheriffs.

And

I. The sheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom, his name being derived from two Saxon words, reine genera, the reeve, bailiff, or officer of the shire. He is called in Latin vice-comes, as being the deputy of the earl or comes; to whom the custody of the shire is said to have been committed at the first division of this kingdom into counties. But the earls in process of time, by reason of their high employments and attendance on the king's person, not being able to transact the business of the county, were delivered of that burden (c): reserving to themselves the honour, but the labour was laid on the sheriff. So that now the sheriff does all the king's business in the county; and though he be still called vice-comes, yet he is entirely independent of, and not subject to, the earl; the king by his letters patent committing custodiam comitatus to the sheriff, and him alone.

Sheriff's were formerly chosen by the inhabitants of the several counties (1). In confirmation of which it was ordained by statute 28 Edw. I

(b) 1 Leon. 73. 2 Leon. 175. Comb. 143. 5 Mod. $84. Salk. 347. Carth. 291.

(1) The 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 21. s. 7. enacts, that no person shall be assigned to be sheriff of any county unless he have lands within the same sufficient to answer the king and his people; and no steward or bailiff to a great lord shall be made sheriff. 9 Edw. II. st. 2. 2 Edw. II. s. 2. 4 Edw. III. c. 9. 5 Edw. III. c. 4. No person is exempt from the office of sheriff, unless by act of parliament or letters patent, Sav. 43. 9. Co. 46. b. 1. Lord Raym. 29. 2 Mod. 299; but militia officers are exempt by 42 Geo. III. c. 90. s. 172; so are pro4estant dissenters, Harrison v. Evans, 2 Burn Eccl. Law, Dissenter. Bro. P. C. 181; barristers and attornies, 4 Burr. 2109; and prisoners for debt, 2 Mod. 299; persons disabled by judgment in law, as outlawry, &c. 1 Salk. 168. 4 Mod. 273. 2 Mod. 299. are not to be

appointed. But a person cannot avail himself

(c) Dalton of Sheriffs, c. 1.

of his own misconduct, as an excuse for not serving; and therefore an information may be supported against an excommunicated person for refusing to act. 2 Mod. 299. Persons having served the office are exempt for three years, if there be other sufficient persons in the county. 1 Rich. II. c. 11.

But the payment of the fine fixed by 9 Geo. I. c. 9. s. 3. to be discharged from serving the office of sheriff of Norwich, does not exempt the person paying it for more than one year, unles the corporation agree that he shall be discharged for a longer time. 2 T. R 731.

In New-York, sheriffs are chosen by the electors of the respective counties once in every three years, and as often as vacancies happen. They can hold r.o other office, and are ineligible for the next three years after the termination of their offices. They may be re