Ministers financial rality had fallen short of his demands.1 But not once since the Revolution, have the demands of the Crown for the public service, been refused. Whatever suins ministers have stated to be necessary, for all the essential services of the state, the Commons have freely granted. Not a soldier has been struck from the rank and file of the army; not a sailor or a ship from the fleet, by any vote of the Commons. So far from opposing the demands of the Crown, they have rather laid themselves open to the charge of too facile an acquiescence in a constantly increasing expenditure. Since they have assumed the control of the finances, the expenditure has increased about fiftyfold; and a stupendous national debt has been created. Doubtless their control has been a check upon ministers. The fear of their remonstrances, has restrained the prodigality of the executive; but parsimony cannot be justly laid to their charge. The people may have some grounds for complaining of their stewardship; but assuredly the Crown and its ministers have none. While voting the estimates, however, the Commons defeated on have sometimes dissented from the financial arrangements proposed by ministers. Responding to the pecuniary demands of the Crown, they have disapproved measures. 1 In 1625, the Commons postponed the supplies demanded by Charles I. for carrying on the war with Spain. - Parl. Hist., ii. 35. In 1675, they refused a supply to Charles II., to take off the anticipations upon his revenue.-Ibid., iv. 757. In 1677, they declined a further supply till his Majesty's alliances were made known.-Ibid., 879. And in the next year they refused him an additional revenue. -Ibid., 1000. In 1685, James II. required 1,400,000l.; the Com the policy, by which it was sought to meet them. In 1767 Mr. Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed to continue for one year, the land tax of four shillings in the pound; but on the motion. of Mr. Grenville, the tax was reduced to three shillings, by which the budget sustained a loss of half a million. This was the first occasion, since the Revolution, on which a minister had been defeated upon any financial measure.1 Throughout the French war, the Commons agreed to every grant of money, and to every new tax and loan, proposed by successive administrations. But on the termination of the war, when the ministers desired to continue one half of the war property tax, amounting to about seven millions and a half,-such was the national repugnance to that tax, that they sustained a signal defeat. Again in 1852, Lord Derby's ministry were out-voted on their proposal for doubling the house tax.3 But when the Commons have thus differed from the ministry, the questions at issue have involved the form and incidence of taxation, and not the necessities of the state; and their votes have neither diminished the public expenditure, nor reduced the ultimate burthens upon the people. plies. Nor have the Commons, by postponing grants, or in Stopping other words, by "stopping the supplies," endeavoured the supto coerce the other powers in the state. No more formidable instrument could have been placed in the hands of a popular assembly, for bending the executive to its will. It had been wielded with effect, when the prerogative of kings was high, and the influence of the Com 1 Parl. Hist., xvi. 362. 2 Ayes 201, Noes 238; Hansard's Deb., 1st Ser., xxxiii. 451; Lord Brougham's Speeches, i. 495; Lord Dudley's Letters, 136; Horner's 3 Hansard's Deb., 3rd Ser., cxxiii. 1693. Restraints upon the the Com mons low; but now the weapon lies rusty in the ar- The precedent of 1784, is the solitary instance in which the Commons have exercised their power of delaying the supplies. They were provoked to use it, by the unconstitutional exercise of the influence of the Crown; but it failed them at their utmost need3,— and the experiment has not been repeated. Their responsibility, indeed, has become too great for so perilous a proceeding. The establishments and public credit of the country are dependent on their votes; and are not to be lightly thrown into disorder. Nor are they driven to this expedient for coercing the executive; as they have other means, not less effectual, for directing the policy of the state. While the Commons have promptly responded to the liberality of demands of the Crown, they have endeavoured to guard themselves against importunities from other quarters, and from the unwise liberality of their own members. They will not listen to any petition or motion which mons. 1 Nov. 30, 1781; Parl. Hist., xxii. 751; Ayes 172, Noes 77. Mr. T. Pitt had merely opposed the motion for the Speaker to leave the Chair. 2 Nov. 19; Parl. Hist., xxii, 855. 3 See supra, p. 64. involves a grant of public money, until it has received the recommendation of the Crown'; and they have further protected the public purse, by delays and other forms, against hasty and inconsiderate resolutions.2 Such precautions have been the more necessary, as there are no checks upon the liberality of the Commons, but such as they impose upon themselves. The Lords have no voice in questions of expenditure, save that of a formal assent to the Appropriation Acts. They are excluded from it by the spirit, and by the forms of the constitution. cerning Not less exclusive has been the right of the Commons Exclusive These the Comrights of to grant taxes, to meet the public expenditure. These rights are indeed inseparable; and are founded on the mons consame principles. "Taxation," said Lord Chatham, "is taxation. no part of the governing, or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence of the peers and the Crown to a tax, is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the Commons alone."3 On these principles, the Commons had declared that a money bill was sacred from amendment. In their gifts and grants, they would brook no meddling. Such a position was not established without hot controversies. Nor was it ever expressly admitted by the Lords; but as they 1 Standing Order, Dec. 11th, 1706. 2 See May's Law and Usage of Parliament, 4th ed., 512. 3 Parl. Hist., xvi. 99. The Reports of the conferences between the two Houses (16401703), containing many able arguments on either side, are collected in the Appendix to the third volume of Hatsell's Precedents, and in the 5 To the claim, as very broadly as- Power of the Lords were unable to shake the strong determination of the Commons, they tacitly acquiesced, and submitted. For one hundred and fifty years, there was scarcely a dispute upon this privilege. The Lords, knowing how any amendment affecting a charge upon the people, would be received by the Commons, either abstained from making it, or averted misunderstanding, by not returning the amended bill. And when an amendment was made, to which the Commons could not agree, on the ground of privilege alone, it was their custom to save their privilege, by sending up a new bill, embracing the Lords' amendment. But if the Lords might not amend money bills, could to reject a they not reject them? This very question was dis money bill. cussed in 1671. The Commons had then denied the right of amendment, on the broadest grounds. In reply, they said, "have a negative to the whole." 1 Hatsell, iii. 405, 422, 423. |