The United States v. Samuel J. Tilden.

before it, whether plaintiff or defendant, until the contrary appears, that they are acting in good faith, and that their pleadings, which are in the proper and accustomed form, are not frivolous nor intentionally false, but are intended to bring to trial the claim or defence set forth therein. That presumption holds as to the parties to the present action; and, moreover, in respect to the plaintiff, the complaint being made on its behalf by a sworn officer of the Government, it must be further presumed that what he has done, he has done rightfully, in the due course of his official duty, and under the responsibility of his oath of office, upon the information presented to him. And while, of course, no deduction adverse to the truth of defendant's answer is to be drawn from this fact, yet this presumption in favor of the regularity of official conduct, would prevent the court from drawing the inference claimed by defendant's counsel from the alleged inability to furnish a bill of particulars, since such inability is not necessarily inconsistent with good faith in bringing and prosecuting the plaintiff's action.

I have not found it necessary to consider whether, if the defendant were otherwise entitled to a bill of particulars, the motion should be denied on the ground of delay in applying for it, or because at the last April term of the court the defendant's counsel, when the case was called for trial, answered that they were ready, and would prefer to go to trial, but yielded to the district-attorney's application for delay, that he might have the opportunity to file a bill of discovery in the Circuit Court, a fact within the knowledge of the court, though not stated in the affidavits. It would seem that the position then taken by counsel was inconsistent with the advice now given by them to the defendant, and in such a case perhaps it should be shown that since the case was declared to be ready, some further information received, or at

The Steamboat Minnie R. Childs.

least some new view taken by counsel, suggests a danger in going to trial, not before seen. But however this may be,-and this difficulty, if real, might be obviated by further affidavits, I prefer to put the decision of the motion on the grounds above stated.

I have also disregarded the alleged misconduct of one of defendant's counsel, which I do not think has any relevancy to this motion.

Motion denied.

For defendant, T. Harland and A. J. Vanderpoel. For the plaintiff, District-Attorney S. L. Woodford and Assistant District-Attorney S. B. Clarke.

OCTOBER, 1879.

THE STEAMBOAT MINNIE R. CHILDS.

LIEN. DOMESTIC VESSEL.-MATERIALS.-PRIORITIES.

Materials were furnished in the State of New York to a vessel owned in the state, by three parties, F., D. & M. Specifications of lien were filed, as required by the statute of New York, first by F., second by M., and third by D. A few days after D. had filed his specification of lien, he filed a libel against the vessel to enforce his lien and the vessel was seized under the process. F. next filed a libel against her, and lastly M. filed a libel also. The vessel being sold and the proceeds not being sufficient to pay all the claims, the question of priority was brought before the court:

The Steamboat Minnie R. Childs.

Held, That the order of the filing of the specifications did not determine the order of the attaching of the liens:

That the rule that claims should be paid in the order of the filing of the libels was too well settled to be disturbed in this District, notwithstanding the authorities elsewhere in favor of a payment pro rata.

CHOATE, J. The libellants in these three several suits have furnished supplies and materials to the steamboat Minnie R. Childs, a domestic vessel, and their libels were severally filed to enforce liens therefor under the statute of the State of New York. The first libel filed was that of Delamater, June 26, 1879, the second that of Fairbanks, June 28, 1879, and the third that of McCurdy, July 1, 1879. The processes were issued and attachments of the vessel thereupon were made in the same order of time. The vessel has been sold and the proceeds are not sufficient to pay in full the amounts found due to the several libellants by their decrees, and the question is how the proceeds shall be distributed.

The statute of New York (Act of April 24, 1862) provides that "whenever a debt amounting to fifty dollars or upwards as to a sea-going or ocean-bound vessel, or amounting to fifteen dollars or upwards, as to any other vessel, shall be contracted by the master, owner, &c., of any ship or vessel or the agent of either of them within this state for either of the following purposes, [enumerating them] such debt shall be a lien upon such ship or vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture, and shall be preferred to all other liens thereon, except mariners' wages." Section 2d provides that, “such debt shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of six months after the said debt was contracted, unless at the time when said six months shall expire, such ship or vessel shall be absent from the port at which such debt was contracted, in which case the said lien shall continue until the expiration

The Steamboat Minnie R. Childs.

of ten days after such ship or vessel shall next return to said port; and in all cases such debt shall cease to be a lien upon such ship or vessel, whenever such ship or vessel shall leave the port at which such debt was contracted, unless the person having such lien shall within twelve days after such departure cause to be drawn up and filed specifications of such lien," &c. The act directs that these specifications are to be filed in the clerk's office of the county in which the debt was contracted. It also provided machinery for the enforcement of the lien by the issue of a warrant to the sheriff of the county and subsequent proceedings in the state courts resulting in the sale of the vessel. By section 19 it was provided that " upon the distribution of such proceeds the various claims exhibited, which are found to be subsisting liens upon such vessel or the proceeds thereof, according to the provisions of this act, shall, with their respective costs, expenses and allowances, be ordered to be paid out of such proceeds, in the order of the delivery of the respective warrants to the sheriff."

It is insisted on behalf of the libellants Fairbanks and McCurdy that the claims should be paid in the order in which the specifications were filed; that the special provisions of the act relating to the order of distribution are not binding on this court; that they cannot be applied because there are no warrants issued to the sheriff; and that the liens are created by the filing of the specifications and the claims thereby become, in the order in which they are filed, liens against the vessel, each subsequent lienor taking an interest subject to such prior liens as have already attached by virtue of the act. It is further insisted by the libellant McCurdy, that if this is not the proper rule in this case, yet that the rule that has been followed in this district of distributing proceeds among libellants of the same class in

The Steamboat Minnie R. Childs.

the order in which their libels were filed is erroneous and that the true rule is that the proceeds should be distributed pro rata without regard to the time of filing the libels.

In this case the specifications were filed by Fairbanks, June 14, 1879, by McCurdy, June 16, 1879, and by Delamater, June 17, 1879.

I see no ground whatever for the claim that the filing of the specification creates the lien, or that it first attaches to the vessel upon such filing. On the contrary, the statute is explicit that the lien exists before the filing of the specification, and upon the contracting of the debt. The filing is made necessary simply to prevent the lien already existing from being discharged. It has been held that the lien given by such a statute is held subject to the limitations contained in the statute as to its duration. (The Edith, 94 U. S. 518, 522.)

In respect to those parts of the statute which provide a remedy in rem in the state court and direct the distribution of the proceeds with reference to the order in which the warrants issue to the sheriff, it seems to me that they are not to be regarded as limitations upon the duration of the lien or conditions of its enjoyment. They cannot be literally applied, since there are and can be no such warrants issued. It seems to me that they fail altogether, and can have no application since the entire remedial machinery provided has been held to be unconstitutional and void. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 580.) Nevertheless, the liens declared by the statute, with what may properly be regarded as the limitations and conditions attached thereto, remain and are enforceable in this court. It is argued on behalf of the libellant Delamater that the issue of the process of this court is so far analogous to the warrant to the sheriff provided for by the act, that this part of the act is still controlling and ap

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