were furnished to the bankrupt at a specified price and on definite terms of payment, and the agreement, in the face of this, that title should not pass until they were paid for, was a clumsy attempt to retain a lien for the price notwithstanding the delivery, which, as to creditors, was fraudulent and void. The decisions in Pennsylvania upon this subject. are numerous, an extended review of which may be found in Ott v. Sweatmann, 166 Pa. 217, 31 Atl. 102. The liability to creditors in any given case in this state turns on the question whether the transaction is a conditional sale or a bailment, with regard to which it is consistently. held that, to constitute the latter, by which the goods are exempt, they must have been delivered for a definite term and purpose, with a provision, express or implied, for their return at its end. But where, on the other hand, the transaction between the parties is essentially a sale, the superadded agreement that the ownership shall remain in the seller, notwithstanding a delivery, until the price is paid, is without avail as against creditors, and the property may be seized and sold. Stadtfelt v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. 53, 37 Am. Rep. 661; Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. 233, 21 Atl. 811, 24 Am. St. Rep. 497. The latter beyond question is the status here. That the transaction was understood to be a sale is unmistakably shown, not only by the original negotiations, but by the invoice, which assumes the form of a memorandum bill for the goods upon definite terms and prices. No doubt, as argued, the original intention could be modified while the contract was still in an executory stage (Stiles v. Seaton, 200 Pa. 114, 49 Atl. 774); but it would have to be changed radically from what here appears to enable these parties to maintain their claim. They have nothing but the bare agreement that title should not pass until the show cases had been paid for-a condition which did not in any respect change the character of the transaction as a sale.

The case was properly disposed of by the referee, and his action is affirmed.

THE SACRAMENTO.

(District Court, E. D. Wisconsin. July 5, 1904.)

1. ADMIRALTY-COLLISION-LIMITED LIABILITY PETITION-FAULT-CONTEST. Where a petition in admiralty to limit the liability of a vessel and cargo for collision, as authorized by Admiralty Rules 54-57, failed to state the facts and circumstances by reason of which exemption from liability was claimed, as required by rule 56, the petition was insufficient to entitle petitioner to contest the question of fault on the part of its vessel. 2. SAME-GENERAL MARITIME LAW.

Except as adopted by statute, the general maritime law is not the law of the United States.

On exception to the petition by Ohio Transportation Company, as owner of steamer Gladstone and bailee for cargo, and by the underwriters, as well, on such cargo, in respect of petitioner's allegations for leave to contest liability.

¶ 1. Limitation of shipowner's liability, see note to The Longfellow, 45 C. C. A. 387.

C. E. Kremer, for petitioner.

Goulder, Holding & Masten and Church, McMurdy & Sherman, for respondent.

SEAMAN, District Judge. These proceedings are instituted by the owner of the Sacramento to limit liability arising out of a collision whereby the steamer Gladstone and her cargo suffered damage, and in the absence of a libel or suit on behalf of the vessel or cargo so damaged. Leave is sought in the petition to contest therein the liability of the Sacramento, or owner, for such loss, and this twofold aspect of the petition is clearly authorized by the admiralty rules (54, 55, 56, and 57) adopted by the Supreme Court to carry out the provisions of the liability limitation act of 1851 (Rev. St. §§ 4283, 4285 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 2943, 2944]). But the exception is directed to the manifest noncompliance with rule 56, which requires the petitioner to "state the facts and circumstances by reason of which exemption from liability is claimed," if liberty is sought to contest the question of fault. The only contention in answer to this objection is that the rule was not intended for, and is not applicable to, the case of proceedings commenced by the owner to limit liability, when no libel or suit for recovery is pending. It is argued that the rules were formulated in reference alone to cases wherein the vessel is libeled or the owner sued; that the independent proceeding by the owner was not then contemplated, nor recognized until the decision of Judge Blodgett in the Alpena Case, 8 Fed. 280, affirmed in Ex parte Slayton, 105 U. S. 451, 26 L. Ed. 1066. I am satisfied that this contention is untenable, and that rule 56 plainly governs the petition under consideration. The meaning of these rules, if otherwise open to question, is settled by the terms of rule 57, which, in its original form (13 Wall. xiii), authorized the filing of the petition before the vessel was libeled, and, as amended in 1889 (130 U. S. Append. ii, 9 Sup. Ct. iii, 32 L. Ed. 1085), was applied to cases where the owners were not sued, or were sued in another district. In the Alpena Case, supra, the construction arose under the original rule, and was called for only by reason of the omission to mention suits in personam. The act of 1851, alike with the early English law, adopted the general maritime rule for limited liability of vessel owners, but, unlike the English law, imposed no requirement for confession of fault on the part of the vessel as a condition precedent. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 20 L. Ed. 585. Except as adopted by statute, the general maritime law is not the law of either country. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 28, 26 L. Ed. 1001. In recognition of the distinction thus appearing in the act of Congress, rule 56 was prepared "to relieve shipowners from the English rule of practice" above mentioned, which "was deemed to be a very onerous requirement." The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239, 243, 26 L. Ed. 351. The power of the Supreme Court to thus provide and establish the procedure and conditions for leave to contest liability of the vessel is unquestionable (Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578, 593, 3 Sup. Ct. 379, 617, 27 L. Ed. 1038), and I am of opinion that the rule in question not only intended to require the petitioner who initiated the proceedings to state the facts upon

which exemption was claimed before leave could be obtained to contest liability, but that the requirement is as reasonable in the one case as in the other. The applicability of rule 56 is expressly stated in Benedict's Admiralty, § 566, and recognized by Judge Hanford in The Trader (D. C.) 129 Fed. 462, 471.

The objection urged that the petitioner is thus "obliged to plead a negative" is without force, as the practice in the admiralty requires such statement of the facts in all pleadings, and in both libel and answer in collision cases the issues must be so stated. Whether the final issue of liability arises upon the allegations of the petition, or is made up independently upon the filing of claims, is a question not presented by the exception, though suggested upon the argument. The only question raised is the sufficiency of the petition to reserve to the owners the right to contest fault on the part of the Sacramento, and upon the view stated it is plainly insufficient, so that the exception is well taken. I deem it just, however, to indicate my impression of the bearing of the rule upon the final issue, namely, that the allegation to that end which the rule demands appears to be intended by way of full disclosure of the grounds of contest, as a prima facie test of bona fides, and not to frame the issue for such contest, wherein the affirmative may justly rest upon the party claiming recovery of damages for alleged fault. In other words, the purpose seems to be to preserve the right of contest, rather than to initiate the issue thereupon. As mentioned in the case of The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 241, 26 L. Ed. 351, the petitioners, who there filed their application to limit liability, after answering the libels, "restate the facts and circumstances on which they relied in their answers to the libels for exemption from all liability."

The exceptions to the petition are sustained accordingly, with leave to the petitioner to amend within 20 days.

THE LILLIAN.

(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. August 1, 1904.)

No. 14.

1. SHIPPING ARTICLES-STATUTES-APPLICATION.

Rev. St. § 4511 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3068], prescribing the provisions necessary to be inserted in shipping articles, applies to contracts for shipping of crews for American vessels engaged in coastwise trade, and in trade between ports of the United States and the Dominion of Canada. 2. SAME

SEAMEN'S WAGES-CONTRACTS.

A provision of a contract for seamen's services that "the crew shall make no claim for wages or provisions while the vessel is detained by ice prior to departure" was reasonable, and was not in violation of Rev. St. § 4511 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3068], specifying the provisions necessary to be inserted in such contracts, and declaring in subdivision 8 [page 3069] that "any stipulations in reference to advance and allotment of wages or other matter not contrary to law" may be inserted.

3. SAME.

Such stipulation was not void under Rev. St. § 4524 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3076], providing that a seaman's right to wages and provisions shall be taken to commence either at the time when he commenced his

work, or at the time specified in the agreement for his commencement of work or presence on board, whichever first happens.

In Admiralty.

E. William Pyle and Joseph Hill Brinton, for libelant.
W. H. G. Gould, for respondent.

HOLLAND, District Judge. The libelant claims wages from January 21 to February 10, 1904, at the rate of $10 per month, upon shipping articles signed by him on January 26, 1904. The respondent admits wages due at that rate from February 1 to February 10, 1901. The disagreement between the parties arises out of the following state of facts: The libelant agreed with Capt. Campbell, of the bark Lillian, to ship with him as mate for a voyage from Philadelphia to Charleston, S. C., for a term of time not exceeding three calendar months, at the rate of $10 per month. Subsequently the shipping articles were executed. The dates mentioned in the articles as of the time of execution by the parties are incorrect and irregular, but it is not necessary to consider this feature of the case, as it does not alter the rights of the parties; and, while some comment was made upon these irregularities at the argument, neither party seriously urged it as effecting the rights of either the libelant or respondent. It is conceded that the libelant, by the terms of the articles of shipment, was to be on board January 21st; and it is further conceded that he complied with this part of the contract, and remained on board up until the 10th day of February, when the vessel stranded and went aground on the Bermuda Islands, was a total loss, and was abandoned by her crew, and the voyage was broken up and terminated. The libelant returned to Philadelphia, and claimed wages from January 21 until February 10, 1904. The articles contained a clause that "the crew shall make no claim for wages or provision while the vessel is detained by ice prior to departure," and as the Lillian did not leave the port at Philadelphia until February 1st, by reason of ice in the Delaware river, the respondent. answers that wages cannot be claimed until February 1st. To avoid the effect of this clause, the libelant avers that the delay was not caused by ice in the river, and, even if it was, the clause above referred to is inserted in violation of section 4511, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3068], and that he is entitled to wages from the time he was required to be on board, in accordance with the provisions of Rev. St. § 4524 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3076].

An examination of the evidence convinces me that the Lillian was detained until the 1st of February by reason of ice in the river, and if the libelant is bound by his contract not to claim wages prior to the departure of the vessel, if detained by ice in the river, then this rule must be dismissed. The provisions of section 4511, Rev. St. by the acts of August 19, 1890, February 18, 1895, and March 3, 1897 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3069], have been extended and made applicable to contracts for shipping of crews for American vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, and in trade between ports of the United States and Dominion of Canada. The Occidental (D. C.) 87 Fed. 485. This section requires an agreement in writing to be executed by the master of a vessel and the seamen who ship with him before he starts on a voyage,

requiring certain matters to be specifically set forth for the purpose of protecting seamen against imposition, misunderstanding, and their own improvidence. These provisions necessary to be inserted in shipping articles are set forth in eight subdivisions of this section of the Revised Statutes, and are essential to a valid article of agreement. There is nothing, however, to indicate that other reasonable provisions cannot be entered into and inserted in the agreement. In fact, the eighth subdivision makes provision for this in the following language: "Any stipulations in reference to advance and allotment of wages, or other matter not contrary to law," may be inserted. The agreement not to claim wages if the vessel was detained by reason of ice is not unreasonable, and, if inserted with the knowledge and understanding of libelant, it is part of the contract as binding upon him as the other provisions therein contained. While seamen are the wards of the nation, and many provisions have been enacted for their protection, there is nothing to indicate that any reasonable contract, not contrary to law, into which they enter with full knowledge of its meaning and effect, can be afterward repudiated by them. The Samuel Ober (D. C.) 15 Fed. 621; The Zack Chandler (D. C.) 7 Fed. 684; The L. B. Snow (D. C.) 15 Fed. 282; Boulton v. Moore (C. C.) 14 Fed. 922.

There is nothing in the case of The Bark Shetland et al. v. Johnson, 31 Wash. Law Rep. 411, cited by libelant, in conflict with this view. There was no provision in the agreement in that case either like or similar to the one in this suit. The shipping articles were signed on the 29th day of January, 1902, by the seamen, to go on board the Shetland as seamen for the proposed voyage. The spaces where the time the seamen were to go on board should have been inserted were left blank. The master subsequently filled in "February 26, 1902." As the seamen had been detained for this voyage from January 29, 1902, until the vessel left Wilmington, on February 26th, the court held they were entitled to wages for that time, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement, as subsequently perfected by the master without their consent, showed a later date on which they were to be on board; nor do we think that section 4524, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3076], nullifies this provision in the agreement. It provides:

"A seaman's right to wages and provision shall be taken to commence either at the time at which he commences work, or at the time specified in the agreement for his commencement of work, or presence on board, whichever first happens."

This section fixes the time when the seamen's right to wages, specified in an agreement, shall be taken to commence, which is either at the "time at which he commences work," or "at the time specified in the agreement for the commencement of work," or "his presence on board," whichever happens first; but there is nothing to indicate it is different from any other right, and cannot be waived when it is deemed prudent to do so, by a reasonable stipulation between the captain and the seamen, and inserted in the shipping articles, that the wages agreed upon shall not begin until a certain date in the future. It is a guarantied right to every person that he shall be able to enter into such contracts as he may see fit, and any act of Congress or rule of law invoked in derogation of this right must be critically examined and strictly con