THE

NEW JERUSALEM MAGAZINE,

AND

Theological Inspector.

MAY, 1826.

ON INSTINCT AND REASON.

[Continued from page 121.]

HAVING in a former number of your useful Magazine endeavoured to offer a very concise analysis of that principle of instinct, which is the grand governing law or rule by which all created existences are regulated, as well in man as in brutes; whether acting according to chemical or mechanical laws, or in obedience to an impulse peculiar to living organs; agreeable with my original design, I proceed to enter on a brief inquiry into the properties and powers of that principle of the human mind called reason; which though frequently applied to the designation of man's superiority over the lower animals, is, there is room to suspect, but imperfectly understood in its operation and effects.

It has already been remarked, that the term reason in itself embraces a very comprehensive signification, as including in it the various rational and moral powers which distinguish man from the brutes. In the most perfect degrees of instinct, we are compelled to admit, that the actions of the different species of animals frequently exhibit a degree of sagacity approaching very closely to an appearance of reason; nevertheless on a more intimate acquaintance with the subject, we shall not fail to perceive, that they are invariably restricted within the circumscribed boundaries of the laws of instinct. Man on the contrary, may properly be said to be distinguished by education, by moral improvement, and by devotion, rather than by reason, leaving at an immense distance the lower creation, which with every exertion of their extraordinary powers, are utterly incapable of any one act, which has the remotest affinity with devotion. Assuming as a general axiom, that reason is an exalted gift bestowed on man by the Creator, which VOL. 1.-No 5.

K

by cultivation is intended for the improvement of his moral and intellectual powers, constituting a medium of qualification for the fruition of an immortal existence. I shall arrange my observations as follows; first, I shall glance at the extremes of opinion entertained by different persons on the subject; secondly, I shall attempt to prove the imperfection of reason, as contrasted with the perfection of instinct, on account of its obvious limitation, in conducting man to a knowledge both of God and himself; and thirdly, shall exhibit some of the important uses, to which, exclusively it is intended to be subservient.

In commencing my first proposition, we cannot, I conceive, come to a more decisive conclusion, as to the extent of this faculty of reason, than by inquiring, positively, what, in its fair legitimate acceptation, it is really capable of doing; and negatively, what it is that it is incapable of doing; which will conduct us to a more distinct notion, both as it respects its value and its insufficiency. It is a fact too notorious to elude common observation, that whilst the assertors of the dignity of the faculty called reason, have ascribed to it all power and supremacy, in the direction of the human mind, others, on the contrary, have advocated the necessity of extinguishing its light, in order that a better might be substituted in its room. Thus among the disciples of a wild enthusiasm, we discover an earnest desire of depreciating the exercise of reason, insisting on its entire submission to some phantom of the imagination most erroneously called faith; and others again as strenuously contending that reason in itself is fully adequate to conduct man through all the various intricacies of this life to the possession and enjoyment of a better; discarding all systems of religion which exceed the limits of its rules. But how self evident is it, that both these extremes must equally lead to error; for be it recollected, reason alone can never elevate the mind of man to a due acquaintance with the divine laws, order and economy of the heavenly world; neither can it be supposed, that a divine principle, governing our eternal interests, was ever intended to supersede the exertion of our distinguished faculties, for the supply of our various wants and necessities, and which moreover is intended by the Almighty, for the highest spiritual offices of an immortal soul or spirit.7

In forming our judgment, how requisite is it, in this as in most other cases, that we adopt that happy medium, which will preserve us from fanaticism on the one hand, and on the other, from those dark counsels of philosphy, which lead to the desolating abyss of scepticism and infidelity, Whoever may have prevailed upon himself to imagine, that he is capable in all respects of guiding

himself independant of Providence, is in danger of adding to his arrogance a practical impiety; and whosoever refuses to bring into lively exercise the rational powers implanted by infinite wisdom, and with passive indifference, is waiting for some supernatural impulse, irresistible in its operation, is absolutely guilty of tempting Providence; for resting implicitly on divine protection in the neglect of his own powers, frequently tends to engender a supercilious pride, and excite in the mind the vain notion that he is even already an inhabitant of heaven.

After all that can be advanced in defence of this principle of reason; after all the discursive range it may be allowed to take in the circuit of natural science, we know full well that it cannot approach a single step nearer to the knowledge of nature's God; that it cannot reach that hidden power, which gives energy, life and motion to the whole: neither as a mere external medium, can it impart a knowledge of the divine attributes of God. A view of the outward works of creation may propel a man to the cold, heartless acknowledgment of an ultimate First Cause; but the knowledge of his works does not necessarily produce a warm internal evidence of the divine love: for how much soever reason may know, it can have no pretensions to feeling.

Again, by the restricted power of reason, no human being could anticipate that he was an object of a benevolent Creator, nor can the external observation deducible from it ever discover that the soul of man, as a spiritual substance, has a near affinity with the supreme governor of the universe. For if reason be supposed paramount to every other species of intelligence; if it be esteemed sufficient for every moral and physical want; upon such principles, there can be no immediate intercourse between God and the soul; and if such are its high prerogatives, in supplying the place of a divine intelligence, then assuredly the fruits of so distinguished a guide must be conspicuous in the order, rectitude and harof human conduct. mony

But let me ask, do we in general find that the government of reason is conducted with this wise and consistent economy? In the natural world, under the guidance of instinct, we see every thing maintained and regulated with consummate wisdom; there is no want of harmony, no disorder; but in the moral world, so far as it is under the jurisdiction of reason, it is obvious that human affairs are not commonly administered according to the strict rules of harmony, peace, and wisdom; for take men, professing to submit themselves altogether to its direction, among different sects and nations, and their moral conduct will be found to indicate the same general results: the turbulent principles of

human nature, unless restrained by the strong arm of law: and Jews, Mahometans, Pagans and Christians all exhibit one uniform aspect of moral deformity; and the position is strengthened by the fact, that a rational being will too often degrade himself below the brute, which is the mere creature of instinct.

If man were intended for the limited duration of this life only, then indeed, the knowledge of his Creator would be of no more essential use to him, than to the animals over which he rules: but as he alone is gifted with such knowledge, alone accountable for his actions, alone capable of gratitude and devotion, and alone susceptible of divine love; it may fairly be presumed, that he possesses a higher principle for his guidance, than a fluctuating, weak and fallible reason, by which the knowledge of God and his will is capable of being obtained. Is reason, let us inquire, this faithful counsellor? alas! the most assiduous cultivation of it will fall infinitely short of such expectation; for after all its boasted energies, it can never lead the human mind to a knowledge of supernatural truths; it can never reach the source of infinite purity; and the sublime mysteries of the invisible world are still beyond its reach; for an unassisted, unsanctified reason, is as ill suited to feel "the love of God shed abroad in the heart," as the ear to relish sweets, or the tongue to judge of melody. Upon the whole it must be certain, that independant of the relations of the present transitory scene of things, reason can know nothing. It cannot feel the evidence and operation of a divine Spirit, though it may prove the probability of its existence. It can neither partake of the fountain from which all good springs, nor supply one draught of vital consolation to the soul in affliction; and with the whole world's possessions at its command, in the unceasing pursuit of earthly enjoyments, reason alone, can never satisfy the capacious desires of an immortal mind.

As then the soul or spirit of man, immersed in the love of pleasure, of fame or ambition, however ardent in its search after knowledge refuses to be satisfied, and reason, though actively engaged in the pursuit is incapable of satisfying it, by means of these sublunary gratifications, it must of necessity have an affinity to something above sense, which is immortal; but its immortal nature having other desires than those which spring from earth, other appetites than those of sense, is incapable of being nourished but by spiritual food, and of being instructed but by a spiritual principle.

Having thus briefly noticed the diversity of opinion prevailing amongst men, as to the powers and incapacities of reason, and having shewn that whilst one man would exalt it to omnipotence,

another will allow it no manner of efficacy in things relating to his moral conduct; I proceed lastly to exhibit what are the uses to which reason is intended to be subservient. First, then, I think it warrantable to premise, that we may, with propriety, place reason at the head of all those intellectual powers which take cognizance of outward events, with their co-operation, as perception, attention, association, &c.;

"For know that in the soul

"Are many lesser faculties that serve
"Reason as chief."

Milton.

According to the exercise we give it, we may assume that it is this noble faculty which determines our stations and destinies in life, and by which, we are enabled to treasure up a knowledge of the past, and to profit by the lights of experience. In the exercise of this faculty, man is enabled to combine means for the attainment of certain ends; to provide with precision and sagacious foresight for the future, by observation of the past, and to adapt his conduct to the ever varying circumstances of his outward situation. It enables him to bring even the elements to his use; to discover the various properties and relations of the animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms; and moreover, to ascertain with mathematical certainty the laws and complicated movements of the heavenly bodies. By the native strength and light of reason, man may arrive at a capability of discovering the rules of a wise and consistent conduct, because experience proves that a life of vice and immorality ends in disgrace and misery; degrading the devoted slave of appetite and passion below the brute; in short, it may be truly considered as the foundation and builder of human knowledge; nay, as Mr. Locke observes, reason is natural revelation, whereby the Eternal Father of light communicates to mankind that portion of truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties, whilst Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God himself."

But further, in its enlarged acceptation of the term Reason, it may be contended, comprehends in it three powers or principles very necessary to be distinguished. First, as has been already observed, it includes in it that power of the mind, which qualifies it for the exploration of truth, as standing connected with the science and common business of life. Secondly, it comprehends those elements of reason properly denominated rational instincts, which are the rudiments, or principles, from which all natural