Attention of the Reader to what I have written. I am ready to own, that in this Matter I depend on the Reader's Courtesy. But only thus far I may have some Colour for putting in a Claim ; that if the Reader be disposed to pass his Censure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. However, this is what I would humbly ask of my Readers, together with the Prayers of all sincere Lovers of Truth, that I may have much of that Spirit which Christ promised his Disciples, which guides into all Truth ; and that the blessed and powerful Influences of this Spirit would make Truth victorious in the World.

A Ge

Wherein are explain’d various Terms and Things belong-

ing to the Subject of the ensuing Discourse.

Sect.

ECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the Will.

Pag. 1, &c.
SECT. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. 6
Sect. III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Necef-

fity, Imposibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence. 18
Sect. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Ne-
ceffity and Inability.

28
Sect. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of

moral Agency

38

PART

PART II.

Whercin it is considered, Whether there is, or can be

any such Sort of FREEDOM OF Will, as that wherein
Arminians place the Essence of the Liberty of all moral
Agents; and whether any such Thing ever was, or can
be conceived of.

ECT. I. Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the

Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in
the Will's self-determining Power.

Pag. 44
Sect. II. Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing
Reasoning considered.

50
Sect. III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition

in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its
Existence,

57
Sect. IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Caule,

thro' the Activity of the Nature of the Soul. 66
SECT. V. Shewing that if the Things afferted in these

Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are alto-
gether Impertinent, and can't help the Caule of Armi-
nian Liberty; and how this being the State of the Cafe,

Arminian Writers are obliged to talk inconsistently. 72
Sect. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things

which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the
Mind.

78
Sect. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will
consisting in Indifference.

88
Sect. VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will,

as opposite to all Necesity.
Sect. IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will
with the Dictates of the Understanding.

102

And infers a Necessity of Volition, as much as an abso-
lute Decree.

171
SECT. XI!I. Whether we suppose the Volitions of moral

Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or
not, yec they must be necessary, in such a Sente, as to
overthrow Arminian Liberty.

183

PART III.

Wherein is inquired, Whether any such Liberty of Will

as Arminians hold, be neceffary to moral Agency, Vir-
tue and Vice, Praise and Difpraise, &c.
ECT. I. God's moral Excellency necesary, yet vir-
tuous and Praiseworthy.

Pag. 188
SECT. II. The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of

Jesus CHRIST necessarily holy, yet virtuous, praise-worthy,
rewardable, &c.

194
Sect. III. The Case of such as are given up of God to Sin,

and of fallen Men in general, proves moral Necessity

and Inability to be confiffent with Blame-worthiness. 213
SECT. IV. Command, and Obligation to Obedience, con-
sistent with moral Inability to obey.

222
Sect. V. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours,

which is supposed to excuse in the Non-performance of

'Things in themselves good, particularly considered. 237
Sect. VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necesary to

Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it ; and all, either
virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent
with Arminian Notions of Liberty, and moral Agency.

249
SECT. VII. Arminian Notions of moral Agency incon-

fiftent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in
either virtuous or vicious Actions.

260

PART IV,

Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Armi-

nians, in Support and Defence of their Notions of Li-
berty, moral Agency, &c. and against the opposite
Doctrine, are considered.
ECT, I. The Elence of the Virtue and Vice of the

Se

SECT. II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphy-

fical Notion of Action and Agency, which seems to be
generally entertain'd by the Defenders of the foremen-

tion'd Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c. 278
SECT. III. The Reasons why some think it contrary to

common Sense, to suppose Things which are necessary, to
be worthy of either Praise or Blame.

288
Sect. IV. It is agreeable to common Sense, and the natural

Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be
confiftent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punish-
ment.

297
Sect, V. Concerning those Objections, That this Scheme

of Neceflity renders all Meuns and Endeavours for the
avoiding of Sin or the obtaining Virtue and Holiness,
vain and to no Purpose ; and that it makes Men no
more than mere Machines, in Affairs of Morality and
Religion.

309
Sect. VI. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine

which has been maintain'd, That it agrees with the
Stoical Doctrine of Fåte, and the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes.

319
Sect. VII. Concerning the Necessity of the divine Will.

323
SECT. VIII. Some further Objections against the moral
Necessity of God's Volitions, considered.

335
ŞECȚ. IX. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine

which has been maintain'd, That it makes God the
Author of Sino

354
SEÇT. X. Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.

376
Sect. XI. Of a supposed Inconsistence of these Principles
with God's moral Chara&ter.

379
Sect. XII. Of a luppoled 'Tendency of the!c Principles
to Atheism, and Licenticusness.

385
Sect. XIII. Concerning that Objetlion against the Rea-

foning by which the Calvinistic Doctrine is supported,
That it is metaphysical and abftrufe.

399

The CONCLUSION.

WH

HAT Treatment this Discourse may probably meet
with from fome Persons.