Mudirieh all Reports and Returns called for. He will, therefore, have no office staff, but will make himself acquainted with the work of the Mamurs of his district either in the central office or while inspecting the Mamuriehs.

He will be most careful to see that there is no oppression nor illegal taxation in his district.

He will report to the Mudir any official who fails to set a good example in the district by leading a moral and respectable life, or who shows negligence or incapacity in the performance of his duties.

Mamurs.-Instructions

for Mamurs

are as under. In addition to the duties specified it should be noted that they are responsible for the proper measurement of the land in their Mamuriehs and its correct registration. Instructions to Mamurs.-The new position you are about to take up is an important and responsible one. You should always bear in mind that you are the recognised agent in your district of a just and merciful Government, and as such you should do all in your power to gain the confidence and respect of the inhabitants, who should, in their turn, be made to look to and respect the Government of which you are the Representative. In order to acquire and hold this position, you should bear in mind the following points, which are essential to the good government of your district. You should recollect that this country has just been relieved from most oppressive and tyrannical rulers, who have plundered and enslaved the population, and engendered in them feelings of moral and physical fear, which it may take long to eradicate; your object should, therefore, be to make the government of your district as great a contrast as possible to that of the Dervishes. Every effort should be made to induce the inhabitants to feel that an era of justice and kindly treatment has come, with, at the same time, a vigorous repression of crime, and a determination to put down with a strong hand any attempt of evildoers to carry on the practices which, it is hoped, have disappeared with the flight of the Dervishes. No doubt the local people will offer bribes, in order to try and secure the good-will of their new rulers; these offers must be resolutely and absolutely refused, and the people made to understand that they can acquire no benefits by such means, but are more likely to be severely punished. In all their dealings with the Government they should be convinced of its unity of purpose and justice; nothing, therefore, should be taken from them without payment, in accordance with the fixed tariff, and every inducement should be given to them to bring their saleable articles and products to fixed market places, where it is most important the regulation price should be adhered to. You should also endeavour, by all means

in your power, to encourage the inhabitants to increase the amount of cultivation in the district. It is especially necessary that the women should be in no way molested, and that the Mamur of the district should be not only an example of fairness and justice, but also of morality, by doing all in his power to improve the moral tone of the inhabitants in his charge, and by instilling into their minds that it is to him they should turn for a redress of grievances, being fully convinced that he will act as is best for their interest and advantage consistently with justice. Every effort should be made to repress crime, and Mamurs have the power of sending offenders to prison for one day; but when, in their opinion, offences are committed which deserve more severe punishment, they should refer the case to the nearest commandant, who will either deal with it in accordance with the military powers delegated to him, or will refer it to higher authority. Should it be discovered that you or any of your employés have been the recipients of bakshish of any kind from the local people, you will be liable to be tried by court-martial, and dismissed the service. In any case of difficulty or doubt, you should at once refer to the nearest military commandant, under whose general direction and guidance you will act.(Signed) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM.

Then follow extracts from Reports of Mudirs in charge of districts in the Soudan. These are too long and full of detail to be given here, but it may be said generally that the recovery of the country is painfully slow, though not, perhaps, slower than, on a calm review of the conditions set out in Sir W. Garstin's Special Report (see POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK, Africa-Egypt and Soudan, 1900 issue), might reasonably have been expected.

Gold Coast [Cd. 354].-The Report for the year 1899 was not sent from Accra until October 6th-another instance of dilatoriness which is surely inexcusable. The revenue (exclusive of grant in aid of the Northern Territories, £100,000) was £322,796-£69,974 in excess of that of the previous year. The expenditure was £309,656. The total value of imports in 1899 was £1,152,478, and the value of exports £1,111,738, thus making the total value of the trade of the Colony for the year 1899 £2,264,216, an increase of £310,882 on the previous year. How far the financial and commercial situation has been affected by the recent war in Ashanti will not, of course, appear until the Report for 1900 is forthcoming. Gold exports showed "a further decrease of £12,538, which is diffi

cult to account for." The total of coin and bullion exported is given at £28,680. Affairs in Ashanti are described as "on the whole satisfactory," but this, of course, was written before the revolt. Mention is made of the breakdown of the scheme for putting the Northern Territories under an Administrator, by the death of Lieut.-Colonel Northcott in South Africa, he having been appointed to the post.

On

Gold Coast Colony-Ashanti Rising [London Gazette, December 4th, 1900].Despatches published in the London Gazette describe events subsequent to the investment of Kumasi by the Ashantis in May and June, 1900, the then Governor, Sir F. M. Hodgson, with Lady Hodgson, having gone to Kumasi on an official visit, and being there surrounded by rebels. June 23rd Major A. Morris, D.S.O., ActingCommissioner and Commandant of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, with a small force broke out of the invested town and succeeded in bringing the Governor and Lady Hodgson and others to the coast. Of Major Morris Sir F. M. Hodgson's Report to the Colonial Office says:

Major Morris carefully planned and carried out the arrangements for leaving Kumasi, and I do not hesitate to say that it was to his care, foresight, and presence that the column, consisting as it did of troops weakened by reduced and unaccustomed diet during the long and trying siege, and of carriers exhausted by insufficient food, succeeded in the hazardous task which had to be undertaken. He has written in very modest terms of the achievement, but that the task was not a light one is evident from the fact that among the 600 troops engaged in it the casualties amounted to nearly 20 per

cent.

Captain F. E. Bishop, Assistant Inspector Gold Coast Constabulary; Mr. J. C. Ralph, Assistant Inspector Lagos Constabulary; Dr. J. B. Hay, Assistant Colonial Surgeon; and Native Officer H. Zenuwa, Gold Coast Constabulary, were left in Kumasi with a detachment and provisions. Colonel J. Willcocks (who received the honour of Knighthood on his relief of this garrison) had arrived on the Gold Coast on May 26th for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion. His Despatch, dated Bekwai, August 14th (omitting the preliminary paragraph), is as follows:

2. When I landed the position was as follows:- Kumasi was closely invested by the rebels, reported to number some

40,000, and was cut off from all communication with the outer world. Relief columns had entered the place after severe fighting, but this had only added to the numbers to be fed, and the supply of food and ammunition was fast reducing. They were calling for help; but help then was impossible, for, whereas the force in Kumasi numbered 700 men and 300 levies, with many guns and Maxims, the total numbers of the relief column spread along 140 miles of lines of communications numbered but 700 men, also with three field-guns, the different units of which were continuously having to fight their way against heavy odds, depending for transport upon carriers, mostly marched by force across the Prah. Moreover, Sir Frederic Hodgson, in his telegram dated Kumasi, April 4th, to Secretary of State, had remarked as follows: "In any case active operations could not be carried out till after the rainy season ended-September." Nevertheless it was in this very rainy season that the force under my command was battling to reach the garrison at Kumasi.

Captain Hall (West Yorkshire Regiment), West African Frontier Force, with some 400 men, was at Bekwai and Esumeja, and it was his presence alone which kept the Bekwai King from fleeing south, as having once cast in his lot with us, his country would have been overrun by the Ashantis immediately our troops left his town. On May 23rd Captain Hall attacked Kokofu, but being opposed by vast numbers of the enemy was unable to capture it; his troops behaved well, but he was attempting a task which more than double the numbers were unable to effect later. On this occasion Lieutenant Edwards, Sierra Leone Frontier Police, Sergeant Griggs, R.A., West African Frontier Force, and six men were wounded. On the same day the Bekwai levies attacked and destroyed Abadom further south, and which was only held by a few of the enemy.

Kwissa was held by three Europeans under Lieutenant Slater, Gold Coast Constabulary, and twenty soldiers, and surrounded by the enemy; of this small garrison three were killed and one wounded. Two parties of carriers proceeding south under escort from Bekwai were attacked near Dompoassi on the 26th and 28th May, four soldiers and a carrier being killed and 15 wounded. Lieutenant Beamish, West African Frontier Force, in command, dispersed the enemy and burnt Dompoassi. This attack showed that the Adansis had now joined the rebellion, and this greatly added to our difficulties.

3. So far the operations had been conducted without any plan, each officer in command of a party simply hastening up towards the goal (Kumasi) with results anything but satisfactory, and my first object was to stop this, and collecting the

scattered detachments to advance on definite lines. On 2nd June, therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, C.M.G., 3rd (Southern Nigeria) West African Frontier Force, left Fumsu for Bekwai, with eleven Europeans, three Maxims, one sevenpounder gun, and 310 men. Beyond Sheramasi the column was suddenly attacked and lost four men killed and seven wounded; our fire was very wild on this occasion, causing an immense waste of ammunition; the men were then new to this kind of work; I am glad to say it is very different now.

On 6th June Lieutenant-Colonel Carter and Major (local Lieutenant-Colonel) Wilkinson, Gold Coast Constabulary, with 380 men, left Kwissa to join hands with Hall at Bekwai. I reached Prahsu on the 8th June, and the following day received a despatch from LieutenantColonel Carter, stating that he had been opposed by the Adansis at Dompoassi, and had been obliged to return to Kwissa. The enemy had built five stockades about 200 yards long and nearly parallel to the road at a distance of only 30 yards from it; lying perfectly still behind the ordinary thick bush, which remained untouched between the stockade and the path, they waited until the advance guard was just opposite, and then opened a terrific fire, which staggered our men, they also fired from the surrounding trees; the guns and Maxims came into action at once, and a regular duel took place, our men falling fast; no one knew then, as we do now, that the enemy were probably behind strong stockades, and there was no indication of it; the officers believed the enemy were firing from the thick bush, and thus swaying backwards and forwards the fight went on for two and a-half hours, by which time Lieutenant-Colonel Carter had received a severe wound, which incapacitated him from command. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson then took command, and was himself slightly wounded; Captain Roupell, 3rd West African Frontier Force, was dangerously wounded in several places; Lieutenant Edwards, R.A., West African Frontier Force, received two severe wounds, but continued to work the guns till the entire gun detachment were disabled. It was at this stage that it was found the enemy were posted behind breastworks, as the bush had become partially cut away by the fire. Lieutenant O'Malley, 2nd West African Frontier Force, was severely wounded while working the Maxim, nearly the whole detachment being disabled; Dr. Fletcher, Medical Officer, and ColourSergeant Mackenzie (Seaforth Highlanders), 1st West African Frontier Force, were also wounded, a total of seven Europeans hit out of eleven present; three men were killed and 89 wounded (some of whom have since died). LieutenantColonel Wilkinson, seeing that the gun and Maxims were by this time out of

action, that his ammunition was running short, and the enemy's fire did not slacken, determined to retire; but ColourSergeant Mackenzie came up to him and volunteered to carry the stockade with the bayonet, if his own company (Yoruba Company, 1st West African Frontier Force) was placed at his disposal. Wilkinson at once ordered up the company, which was in the rear of the column, and on the arrival of the first two sections, without hesitation, Mackenzie charged at their head, followed splendidly by his own men and all others in the vicinity, their officers of course leading them. The enemy did not wait the rush, but fled in confusion, and never rallied, and it is perhaps not too much to say a disaster to our arms was thus averted, for a retirement under the circumstances might have ended in a panic. For this act of distinguished bravery I consider Colour-Sergeant Mackenzie is deserving of the highest reward a soldier can receive, and am making a recommendation accordingly. It was only last year that Colour-Sergeant Mackenzie earned the medal for distinguished service in the field on the Niger.

The column then returned to Kwissa, being unable to advance owing to the numbers of wounded.

4. To assist Lieutenant-Colonel Carter I sent Captain (local Major) Melliss, 1st West African Frontier Force, with one hundred and fifty men from Prahsu, and followed this by another hundred, my last reserve. Melliss was attacked on 12th June, his bugler killed, and Corporal Philpot (West Yorkshire Regiment), 1st West African Frontier Force, and six men wounded. Kwissa was reached on 13th June, and Carter decided to retire with the combined column to Fumsu. This decision was contrary to my orders, but Carter had just seen a letter from the Governor in Kumasi (which did not reach me till 12th June) asking for urgent help, and he intended with my sanction to move from Fumsu, via Obuassi Gold Mines, to Bekwai. He therefore used his own discretion and evacuated Kwissa. Unfortunately this led to serious consequences later. It had now become evident to me that not only were our columns being repulsed in all directions, but that the tactics heretofore used were just what suited the enemy. I therefore gave orders that in future the enemy's fire was only to be replied to to such an extent as was absolutely necessary to give our men time to adopt some open formation, and that then the bugles would sound the charge, and the enemy be attacked with the bayonet. The results, I venture to say, have justified the orders on every occasion, when adopted, and have given our men immense confidence in themselves besides largely reducing ammunition carriers.

5. On 14th June about twenty of the

European miners from the Obuassi Gold Mines ran away to the coast, leaving their comrades to hold on as best they could. Fortunately for them they were careful to avoid the vicinity of posts where British officers were quartered; their conduct was most cowardly. Mr. Webster, the manager, with other gentlemen, behaved splendidly and refused to leave, and on the 16th June I was able to send them a reinforcement of fifty

men.

6. On 12th June I received a letter from Governor Hodgson, dated Kumasi, 4th June, in which he stated he had provisions on reduced scale to last until 11th June, and asking for help. This date was already passed, but still hoping that the statement re food supplies might not be exactly accurate, I sent LieutenantColonel Wilkinson at once from Fumsu, viâ Obuassi, with three hundred men and all the available reserve of ammunition to Bekwai, to hold out a helping hand to the garrison of Kumasi when it broke out; with the departure of this column I again found myself without a reserve, but the matter was most urgent.

Captain Hall, at Bekwai, had, in accordance with my orders, sent the Nupe Company, 1st West African Frontier Force, to help Lieutenant-Colonel Carter out of Kwissa, which neither Hall nor I were aware had in the meantime been evacuated. As soon as I heard it had, I sent urgent counter-orders to Hall, but they were too late; the Company under command of Captain Wilson (Royal Irish Fusiliers), 1st West African Frontier Force, left Bekwai on the 16th June, 112 strong; they were attacked near Dompoassi by large numbers of Ashantis and Adansis, and Captain Wilson and six soldiers were killed; Staff-Sergeant Payne, R.A.M.C., and twenty-five soldiers and sixteen carriers were wounded, many of them severely. The company moved on to Kwissa, and finding it unoccupied, marched on to Fumsu under ColourSergeant Humphries (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), 1st West African Frontier Force, a total distance of thirty-three miles. Wilson was a soldier quite beyond the average, brave and modest. The body was carried into Fumsu, where he is buried. Nupe soldiers behaved very well, and their losses testify to the difficulties of the march.

The

7. On 22nd June Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs, with four hundred men West African Regiment, reached Prahsu from Cape Coast, and on the 24th proceeded northward. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson had meanwhile reached Bekwai, and was thus as near to Kumasi as it was possible to be at that time.

Burroughs' column was engaged on the Moinsi Hills, and carried a stockade with the bayonet; casualties, one man killed, three wounded. The rains were now in full swing, the roads almost impassable,

the rivers in high flood, and the toil of moving even a mile is indescribable; it seemed at times, do what we would, it would soon become impossible to carry on further military operations. Nothing but discipline, combined with determination to save Kumasi, could have achieved success, and none but those who witnessed it can imagine the trials borne by all ranks, especially these excellent African soldiers who seemed impervious to all hardships.

I left Prahsu on the 1st July with a large number of carriers; the river took seven hours to cross. At Fumsu on the 4th July I received a letter from Sir Frederic Hodgson, dated 26th June, Ekwanta (some twenty miles south-west of Kumasi). He stated that he, with six hundred men under command of Major Morris, had left Kumasi on the 23rd June; the force had been attacked at the villages it passed through, and had taken a stockade at Patasi; two officers had been severely wounded. One hundred men had been left in the fort, with two British officers (we found three when we reached Kumasi), and that there were rations sufficient to last till "15th July at latest"; he added he hoped I would be able to relieve the fort by that date, and then, "should you fail to do so, the fort must surrender." In his last paragraph the Governor says, "I may add that I have made several attempts, ineffectual, I fear, to communicate with you in Bekwai, and to acquaint you with the condition of affairs in Kumasi." He must, therefore, have had very strong reasons for believing that a relieving force was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Bekwai, but as far as I am concerned, I heard nothing more of the Governor until he reached Cape Coast.

8. On 30th June Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs surprised the enemy's camp at Dompoassi on the main road, by marching into it just after dark; many guns, kegs of powder, etc., were captured, thirty of the enemy were killed before next morning, and many new stockades were destroyed. This was really the first lesson taught the enemy, and was most useful thereafter. This column reached Bekwai 2nd July, and none too soon, as many of the Bekwai Chiefs were wavering in their allegiance from fear of the Ashantis.

9. Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs, I regret to say, contrary to my instructions, decided to at once attack and destroy the enemy's large war camp at Kokofu, which he considered was a bar to our reaching Kumasi. As will be seen, however, my intention was to force the enemy to help me into Kumasi, by withdrawing part of his forces for the defence of Kokofu. Burroughs' column consisted of one 75 millimetre gun, four Maxims, and 500 men, also one Maxim and 150 men in reserve. The column was assailed on all

sides about 800 yards before reaching Kokofu, and although it is stated the men fired fairly steadily throughout, and the gun and Maxims several times literally swept the enemy back into cover, nevertheless our casualties increased until they reached over 60, and no progress was being made; the rearguard was also engaged. Burroughs therefore determined to retire on Bekwai, which was reached before dark. Twelve casualties occurred during the retirement, the losses amounted to one officer killed, Lieutenant Brounlie, 3rd West India Regiment, attached to West African Regiment, six officers and one noncommissioned officer, slightly wounded, viz., Lieutenant Colonel Burroughs; Captain Stallard, Bedfordshire Regiment; Captain St. Hill, West Riding Regiment; Lieutenant Ellis, West India Regiment; Lieutenant Tighe, D.S.O., West India Regiment; Lieutenant Gibson, West India Regiment; all West African Regiment. Sergeant Major Bosher, Royal Artillery, West African Frontier Force; also three men killed, 72 non-commissioned officers and men and gun-carriers wounded, namely, West African Regiment 40, West African Frontier Force 34, Sierra Leone Frontier Police one. The attack on Kokofu was a mistake; but even so I am of opinion that it would have been successful if the enemy had been charged. However, Lieutenant-Colonel Burroughs, himself a most cool and intrepid officer, does not share my opinion on this latter point.

10. I arrived at Bekwai on the 9th July, saw the king, and thanked him publicly for his loyalty, and made him a handsome present. On 11th July I visited Esumeja, and made a reconnaissance with 500 men under Captain Carleton, West India Regiment, towards Kokofu. The bush on each side of the road was cut to a distance of 50 yards, and two rough stockades were thrown up; all this was done to encourage the enemy to believe we intended an immediate advance on Kokofu, but were rather nervous about it, and it succeeded admirably. I have since learnt that a large number of Ashantis moved south from Kumasi to defend Kokofu. On the 13th July, leaving Bekwai to be held by 200 men, I marched for Kumasi by a westerly route, through Pekki, 15 miles north-west and 11 miles from Kumasi. The column consisted of every available man and gun, including the garrison of Kwissa, which I temporarily withdrew. Strength :

2 75-millimetre guns,

4 7-pounder guns,

6 Maxims.

700 West African Frontier Force, 200 West African Regiment,

50 Sierra Leone Frontier Police; total, 1,000 fighting men with 60 white men, including officers, British non-commissioned officers, and civilians attached for the occasion for duty with the trans

port; the carriers numbered 1,700 men, including hospitals, food and ammunition for Kumasi, as well as for the entire column. The cumbrous march through this country of such a large number of men is an experience one does not wish repeated.

We left Bekwai at 6 A.M., and after a day of marching in drenching rain the rearguard arrived at Pekki 1.30 midnight. Left Pekki at 8 A.M. next morning. One mile out the advanceguard was attacked at the fetish town of Treda, but after a quarter of an hour's firing Captain Eden, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, with a company of West African Frontier Force, and Lieutenant Edwards with half a company of Sierra Leone Frontier Police, rushed the place with the bayonet. Enemy were about six hundred strong, and had several of our 303 carbines, and evidently thought themselves safe, as we captured crowds of their household goods, sheep, goats, etc. Casualties: One soldier severely and three others wounded; many stains of blood showed the enemy had suffered from our fire. The column was fired upon several times during the day, but the Maxims played up well; one soldier wounded. Halted at a small village called Ekwanta. Neither this road nor any of the villages are shown on our maps, which are absolutely wrong in every detail away from the main road.

Left Ekwanta July 15th, 6 A.M., rearguard was attacked about 3 P.M., enemy repulsed by Captain (local Major) Beddoes, Royal Dublin Fusiliers. Amid the roar of Dane guns, the sound of Lee-Metfords, Martinis, and Sniders was at times plainly distinguishable. At 4.30 P.M. the advance scouts, half company Sierra Leone Frontier Police, an excellent body of men, ably commanded by Lieutenant Edwards, to which Major Melliss, West African Frontier Force, at his own request, was attached for duty this day, was fired on at short range, and both officers and four men wounded.

The enemy at once opened a heavy fire from our front and right, and also tried to get at the carriers on the left rear, but these were well guarded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson, officer commanding advance-guard, brought up all the guns and three Maxims, and opened fire in the direction of the enemy. I now came up and ordered the whole of the infantry of the fighting line to extend, as there was no longer any doubt that the enemy were posted behind stockades, or they could not have stood against the hail of shell and Maxim we poured in. Their fire was exceedingly heavy, but nearly all aimed high, as they hardly dare show above their breastworks.

After twenty minutes the infantry had cut sufficiently into the thick bush to give me a fair idea of their formation, three companies facing Kumasi, and three

C