might cross the frontier. Sir George White proceeded at once to Maritzburg, and on 10th October discussed the military and political situation with the Governor of Natal. At this interview he expressed disapproval of the forward position which had been taken up near Glencoe, the force at his disposal, in his opinion, being too weak to admit of its defence, together with that of Ladysmith, against superior numbers, and the troops being liable to be cut off, should the Boers advance from the Orange Free State through the passes of the Drakensberg Range. The Governor deprecated a voluntary withdrawal from the position, as being almost certain to lead to a rising among the Dutch, and possibly the native population, not only in Natal, but in Cape Colony. In face of this objection, Sir George White resolved to postpone the concentration of his force at Ladysmith. On 11th October Sir George White proceeded to Ladysmith, Major-General Symons going on to Dundee. That evening the Boers crossed the frontier, but beyond a slight affair of outposts in the direction of the Drakensberg, no fighting took place until the 20tb. The interval was occupied by Sir George White in organising his troops and examining the Ladysmith position. On 20th October a Boer force, which had entered Natal from the Vryheid district of the Transvaal, and crossed the Buffalo River, was attacked near Glencoe by Sir A. P. Symons. The General was mortally wounded, and, though the enemy's advance was checked for a time, reinforcements came up which necessitated a retirement. Our troops fell back first in the direction of Helpmakaar to Beith, and thence to Ladysmith, which was reached on 27th October. On the 19th October the enemy, advancing from Newcastle, cut the railway line at Elandslaagte; on the 20th the ground was reconnoitred from Ladysmith, and the next day an action was fought in which the Boers were signally defeated. But here again no permanent advantage was gained, as the reported arrival of a strong column of the enemy from the Orange Free State at Bester's Station led to the immediate withdrawal of our troops to Ladysmith. On the 24th Sir George White moved out some seven miles to the north-east of Ladysmith in order to cover the march of the force returning from Glencoe, under the command of MajorGeneral Yule, and engaged the enemy at Rietfontein, returning to Ladysmith the same evening. He again attacked the Boers on the 30th at Lombard's Kop, the action being without decisive result. By the 2nd November Ladysmith had been invested, and railway communication between it and Colenso interrupted. From the foregoing narrative it is apparent that Sir George White was placed in an extremely difficult position in being called upon to decide, immediately after his arrival in Natal, whether he should concentrate his whole force at Ladysmith, and, subsequently, when the enemy had shown their strength, whether he should attempt to withdraw that force behind the Tugela. As regards the first question, I think that he would have done better had he ignored the political objections which were urged by the Governor of Natal and concentrated at Ladysmith. The retention of a portion of his force at Glencoe at once involved him in military complications which he foresaw and ought to have avoided. Nor, indeed, was the political situation improved by his being eventually compelled to order a retirement which could have been effected without risk or loss before the enemy had arrived within striking distance. A As regards the second question, I am of opinion that under the existing circumstances, and having regard to the information then available, Sir George White's decision to make a stand at Ladysmith was correct. position on the Tugela would to some extent have been more secure, as the country is more open, and the reinforcement of the troops holding the river alignment would have presented fewer difficulties. But, as Sir George White explains in his despatch, the Tugela, at the time of the year, was not a formidable defensive obstacle, and if Ladysmith had been evacuated, the Boers would have pressed on, enveloped the British force, and cut off its communication by rail with Maritzburg. The same process might have been repeated if Sir George White had fallen back on Maritzburg. Moreover, a withdrawal to the Tugela would have enabled the enemy to overrun a much larger portion of the Colony, and so encouraged the disloyal Dutch population throughout South Africa that a general rising might not improbably have taken place. Undoubtedly the protracted siege of Ladysmith caused grave anxiety, and the necessity for its relief diverted a large body of troops from Cape Colony, and thus delayed the concentration of a force sufficient to undertake offensive operations in the enemy's country. But for these consequences Sir George White cannot justly be held responsible, his main obligation being to defend Natal against a Boer invasion. They may be ascribed to several causes. First, the enemy greatly out-numbered the British force available in Natal when Ladysmith was invested. Secondly, the sharp salient angle formed by the frontier line along the north of Natal, and the convergence on Ladysmith of the railways from the Orange Free State and Transvaal, gave the invaders a decided strategical advantage. This advantage was increased by the general configuration of the country, consisting of a series of rocky terraces sloping gradually downwards from the Drakensberg to the sea. Thirdly, although Ladysmith had been selected as our advanced military station and depôt of supplies in Northern Natal, its liability to attack does not seem to have been recognised, and no steps had been taken before the war began to construct the works and provide the armament which would have materially facilitated its defence. The foregoing review of the situation, as it must have presented itself to Sir George White, shows that he had strong grounds for deciding not to withdraw behind the Tugela— his decision was approved by General Sir Redvers Buller-and though the relief of Ladysmith was an arduous operation which cost many lives, the presence of a strong British garrison at this point prevented the enemy from penetrating further south than Estcourt, and protected the capital and southern portion of the Colony, The behaviour of the Ladysmith garrison through the four months during which it was exposed to continual bombardment, as well as to the privations of a protracted siege, reflects the greatest credit on all ranks. I have much pleasure in bringing to the favourable notice of Her Majesty's Government the resolution and resource displayed by the General Officer in Chief Command, and the cheerful spirit which pervaded the troops, in spite of repeated failures to relieve the town from the south; and I cordially support Sir George White's recommendations on behalf of the Officers (naval and military), the Warrant, non-commissioned, and petty officers, and the men whose names he has brought forward as specially deserving of recognition. Praise is also due to the civilians and nursing sisters, who rendered valuable assist NAVAL EXPENDITURE. A Return issued by the Board of Trade on February 7th, 1901, shows the aggregate naval expenditure by various countries in the year 1899, and also gives the aggregate revenue of each country, aggregate tonnage of mercantile marine, value of imports and exports by sea, and other particulars designed to show in each case the proportion of naval expenditure to the commercial interests to The Russian Empire spent be protected. on sea-going force in 1899, £8,306,500; Germany (1899-1900), £6,672,788; the Netherlands (1899-1900), £1,133,664; France, £13,796,033; Portugal, £749,226; Spain, £1,133,684; Italy, £4,617,034 (being for year ending June 30th, 1900, in each of these cases); United States (1900), £9,840,912; Japan (1899-1900), £5,076,294. The following figures relate to the British Empire: *Of this total £24,935,358 was ordinary expenditure, and £1,210,241 was expenditure under the Naval Works Act, 1897 (outside Navy Votes). Includes a contribution of £100,000 for Her Majesty's ships in Indian Waters and £45,000 for Her Majesty's ships and vessels for the Naval Defence of India. The annual contribution for the latter service is £59,600. The balance represents expenditure on the Marine Department. Includes contributions towards the maintenance of Her Majesty's vessels for protection of floating trade in Australasian Waters, as follows, for 1898-99: £ 37,812 31,856 10,372 4,626 4,906 20,830 13,848 £124,250 British Central Africa Protectorate, Kiungchow Trade, 246 Mandate to Japan, 127 Naval Demonstration asked for, 122 Newchwang Trade, 248 Norman, Mr., Murder of, 125 Pakhoi Trade, 249 Paoting-fu Massacre, 123 Piracy, West River, 121 Pu Chun, Prince, Succession of, 143 Railways in China, 257-259 Robinson, Mr., Murder of, 125 Shantung Disturbances (1899), Siege of Legations, 121-144 "Situation Desperate," 129 "State of War" with China, 130 Taku Forts, Bombardment of, 127 Tientsin in Danger, 126 ("Open Door"), 148-150 Viceroys (Yang tsze Provinces), Yangtsze Valley (Boundaries, Hankow-Canton Railway Pro- Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 183 ject, 242 Hankow Concession, 148 Hart, Sir R., Message from, 129 Colvile, Sir H. (Sannah's Post Des- Couplings (Report of Commission), 209-214 F. Falkland Islands, 160 Financial Statement (Budget), 112, etc. Gambia, 160 G. H. |