THE STATE PAPERS-A REVIEW.

Neglected Warnings in China-Germany on the Alert-Beginnings of the Boxer Movement-Piracy on the West River-Murder of Mr. Brooks—Ministers ask for a Naval Demonstration-Lord Salisbury's Inaction, and its Probable Consequences-Attitude of the Chinese Government-The Massacre at Paotingfu-The Optimism of Russia-M. Pichon's Clear-headedness-The Murders of Messrs. Robinson and Norman-Admiral Seymour's Relief March-Complicity of the Chinese Government-The Yangtsze Valley-Unity of the Powers-Lord Salisbury's Diplomatic Triumph-The War in South Africa-The Governments' Documentary Indictment of Themselves Imports of Arms and Ammunition-The Question of Cape Colony Neutrality-Attitude of the Cape Ministry The "Defence" of Natal-Value of Military Advice—The Colonial Contingents-" Infantry most, Cavalry least Serviceable "-The Military Despatches" What I have written I have written"-The Hospitals Commission-Seizure of German Vessels-The Controversy with Count von Bülow— Military and other Proclamations-Minor Questions.

CRITICS who assert that Lord Salisbury's policy in the Far East has been spiritless and lacking in foresight will find some justification for the complaint in the official literature summarised in the present issue of the POLITICIAN'S HANDBOOK. The disturbances in North China which culminated in the Boxer Rising and the siege of the Legations in the summer of 1900 did not spring into being in a single night. They began-if exhibitions of antiforeign feeling in China can be said to have any recent beginning-as far back as the early part of 1899. Nor is it surprising that they should have become so noticeable at this time, seeing what the events of the two preceding years were. There was abundant warning of the coming storm in them alone, and especially in the warning appeals of the Tsung-li-Yamên for freedom from any further interference on the part of the Powers. Neither in London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, or Paris does the least apprehension seem to have been felt. Though the southern part of the Province of Shantung was known towards the end of 1898 to be a hot-bed of anti-foreign hatred, it was not until Germans were openly attacked in the streets of Tientsin that the German Government showed any uneasiness.

Internal complications are ever present in one part of China or another, and the beginnings of a new movement against Europeans were regarded merely as a symptom of the weakness of the Peking Government rather than as having any serious import for Foreign interests. Count von Bülow, it

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is true, ordered that the Chinese Government should be informed that unless it maintained order the consequences would be very serious; but the other Powers, including England, did not see-or did not act as though they sawanything alarming in the condition of things in the German Sphere. They sat quietly by and watched the agitation against the "foreign devil" grow in North China and in the less accessible provinces, and most of the Powers seem to have left the matter in the hands of their local agents with that optimistic indifference or excess of caution which has been so striking a feature of English statesmanship in the distant East.

Now, if there is one lesson which the Documents dealt with in this book bring clearly home to the mind, it is that throughout 1899 the British Government had no lack of information of the kind that should have led to earlier and more energetic action either by itself or in concert with the other Powers. The remarkable growth of piratical outrages in the West River, to which Sir Henry Blake called urgent attention from Hong Kong, the attacks on mission stations in Central Ssuchuan, the murders of native Christians in that province, the anti-foreign rioting at Kienning, the circulation of placards inciting to the murder of foreigners in Foochow and elsewhere, were events that carried a special significance.

They were not, of course, ignored by the Foreign Office. Gunboats were sent to patrol the West River, the Chinese Government were pressed to give satisfaction for the Kienning riots, and representations were made on the subject of piracy; but the evils covered an ever extending area and continued to show an increasing intensity. Meanwhile the Boxer movement was taking formal shape, and from various quarters in North China there came to the Courts of Europe detailed and alarming descriptions of this new organisation.

The attitude of the statesmen of Europe was one of timorous expectancy. Early in 1900 they were given a foretaste of what was to come by the atrocious murder of Mr. Brooks, an English missionary in Shantung. The Chinese Government expressed a becoming horror at this outrage, and took steps, under serious warnings that international complications would follow if their measures were not effective, to dispel the armed bands which then held Southern Chihli in their keeping. So far from putting an end to the anti-foreign movement, the presence of Imperial troops in the disturbed regions seems to have favoured its growth. At any rate, the phenomena presented in the spring of 1900 were of such a nature that the Representatives of the Powers at Peking concluded that there was bad faith at the Court, and asked for the issue of an Imperial Decree formally suppressing the Boxer Societies. This was flatly refused. The Ministers then asked their respective Governments to make a naval demonstration in North China waters. In their opinion the psychological moment had arrived for some show of compulsion to be made to the Chinese Government.

Lord Salisbury, however, hesitated. Why he should have done so, seeing

that serious difficulties with Russia had been ended, and that no obstacle existed to concerted action by the Powers, is not apparent. But there is the fact that reluctance to act overcame the reasons which seemed good to Ministers on the spot. "It will be desirable," telegraphed Lord Salisbury, "only to resort to naval action when other means of pressure are exhausted." The golden opportunity for bringing matters to an early crisis was lost. Criticism after the event is an easy task. It does not follow that if there had been a joint naval demonstration early in March, when the Ministers wanted it and when Lord Salisbury threw cold water upon their wishes, that the subsequent massacres and the siege of the Legations would not have taken place. The argument that such a demonstration would merely have precipitated the events of May and June is at least tenable. On the other hand, the contention that a display of force would have brought the Chinese Government to its bearings and would have compelled it to take an offensive attitude against the Boxers, and not only to call, but also to enforce a halt, cannot lightly be dismissed. It was exactly because the Ministers at Peking knew that the Chinese Government were coquetting with the Boxers that they demanded a formal Decree of suppression. By doing that they had brought the question of the conduct of the Government to an issue. If the refusal of the Court did not show that the means of diplomatic pressure were exhausted, and if the shuffling Decrees that were issued and the hourly growing ferocity of the Boxers did not prove that resort to naval action was necessary, what sort of evidence would have satisfied the English Foreign Office?

China took due advantage of the nervelessness of European policy, so neatly epitomised in Lord Salisbury's telegram to Sir C. MacDonald. She said persuasive nothings to the Boxer Societies, and the Tsung-li-Yamên made eloquent protestations of sincerity to Ministers who complained of the worthlessness of such Decrees as were sent out. Thus matters dragged on during April and the early part of May, the anti-foreign movement ever sweeping onward until it became so great a menace, even to the Throne, that influential Manchus leapt into the stream and found themselves borne along by an irresistible current.

How far the instinct of self-preservation furnishes an explanation of Imperial connivance or alliance with the Boxer movement is not a point upon which the Diplomatic Papers furnish much evidence, though a good deal is available from other sources, with which, however, this Review has nothing to do. But it is clear that from the time the proposal for a naval demonstration was made, and rejected on Lord Salisbury's initiative-whether with or without the agreement of the other Powers is not known-less pains were taken to conceal the association of the Court with the Boxers, and the boldness of the "Red Fists" became more marked. The frightful massacre at Paoting-fu occurred in the middle of May, and Ministers in Peking again discussed the question of a naval demonstration. Whether Sir Claude

MacDonald's alarm in March had or had not been checked by the cold douche to which Lord Salisbury had then treated him, it seems clear that the Paoting-fu massacre did not lead him at the moment to urge strenuous and immediate action beyond that of verbal protest to the Court. He appears to have been impressed with the sincerity of the Tsung-li-Yamên, who professed to be horrified-and, as the Board was then constituted, doubtless was horrified at the excesses of the Boxers and the magnitude of their organisation. His mind was lulled into optimism for the time being.

Nor were the assurances of the Board the only contributory causes of this mood. M. de Giers, the Russian Minister, whose judgment was influenced by instructions from Count Mouravieff rather than by the series of local events of which the massacre was but a fresh development, acquainted Sir Claude with the view of Russia, to the effect that both landing guards for the Legations and naval demonstrations were to be discouraged because they "gave rise to unknown eventualities." These words provide the key to the situation. It was, no doubt, fear of "unknown eventualities" which had prevented Lord Salisbury from permitting a naval demonstration in March, when good might or might not have come of it. A like fear or was it cynical indifference to the murder of Europeans outside the Russian sphere?— influenced Count Mouravieff in St. Petersburg in May. Be that as it may, a fatal optimism prevailed. The Chinese Government had succeeded in persuading Russia that naval action was needless. Count Mouravieff told our Ambassador that he thought further pressure would be rendered unnecessary by the fact that the Chinese Government would at last take sufficiently energetic measures.

The only Minister who does not seem to have been soothed by the Chinese assurances that something effective would now be done was M. Pichon, the French representative; and he was certainly possessed of better information than his colleagues as to the state of things in and around Peking. The fact of the Paoting-fu massacre had shaken Lord Salisbury out of his belief in the efficacy of further diplomatic pressure upon the Chinese Government and he had given Sir Claude MacDonald a free hand. With M. Pichon's information before him, Sir Claude, in common with the other Ministers, decided that immediate action was necessary for the defence of the Legations. Marine guards were therefore called for-M. Pichon having already sent for his. But the situation had even then become unmanageable. "The people are very excited," telegraphed Sir Claude on May 30th, "and the soldiers mutinous. Without doubt it is now a question of European life and property being in danger here." Yet so strangely did the late Count Mouravieff misread the facts that on the 31st he "gathered" that "the danger was less acute." His optimism was incurable. The want of judgment shown by him did not, however, have any material ill-effect upon the situation. With the other Powers Russia sent whatever guards were called for, and, as the Ministers in Peking were united in a common peril, the Russian hope that the