blish nothing of this kind till all the unreasonable and ignorant people in a country, (and such there will be in all countries) are first agreed as to the propriety of it. Here, it is presupposed, as you will immediately perceive, that society has no rule to go by, in matters of conscience, but their own judgment: if there is any rule which lays a common obligation on all parties, then this reasoning falls to the ground: for, by the authority of that rule, society may proceed to establish whatever is thence necessary for the good of the whole, without suspending its judgment till individuals are satisfied.

Such are the claims of this redoutable champion called Private Judgment; which protests against all creeds, and would new-model all states; however, let us be of good courage, and take a nearer view of him.

The judgment of an individual will be weighty or insignificant, as it is the judgment of reason or the judgment of passion. Whatever judgment a man may have formed within himself on any particular question, it must have been formed either with the means of knowledge, or without them; if without them, it is the judgment of ignorance; and is in fact not judgment, but a rash and groundless decision of the imagination: if with the means of knowledge, then we must consider what those means are.

Knowledge is conveyed to the mind either through the bodily senses, or by conversation with men, or by reading of books. There are many great subjects in which a man's own apprehension and experience will carry him but a little way; and even where experience ought to guide us, few men have spirit and industry to gather up what they learn in that manner. As to books, the majority are ignorant of languages;

without which they cannot read some, nor judge critically of others. If they are engaged in secular business, they are not at leisure; and if they have not been brought up to literature, they are but ill prepared to take advantage of this source of information. It follows, therefore, that most of the private judgment which is found amongst mankind, is not original in themselves, though by its name it always affects to be so, but is borrowed from the persons by whom they have been educated, or with whom they have conversed. And this observation will teach you, by the way, that error in judgment is by no means confined to the illiterate. The common people have their mistakes, which we call vulgar errors: but many more monstrous and dangerous opinions are taken up by men of education than by the illiterate, in whom common sense retains that native power which art hath partly extinguished in the others, by introducing false, but specious rules of judgment, several of which I could produce.

It is the fate of scholars to fall early in life into the company of their elders or their equals, from whom they imbibe a set of principles to which they are soon attached, either because those principles flatter their pride, or encourage their idleness, or agree with their inclinations and appetites; and unless they are blessed with natural strength of mind and rectitude of intention, and favoured by some happy incidents, which bring new thoughts to their minds, their reading and conversation flow generally in the same channel throughout the whole course of their lives, they turn away with scorn from every thing that contradicts their favourite traditions; and thus they live and die the dupes of the first information they received, as do the Jews, Turks, and Gentoos. When they write books

(if they commence authors) they bend and distort matters of fact, and represent all men and all things as they are seen through the medium of their own preju dices. If you attempt to reconcile such persons to any truth, you must treat them as men treat a one-eyed horse, turn their blind side toward an object, that they may go forward without starting.

It is not my design to write a satire upon mankind; I have compassion for all men in the worst of their mistakes, because they themselves are generally the greatest sufferers; but it is necessary for your safety, that I should represent things as they are, without fear or favour; and I am not singular in my observations. Mankind are such now as they used to be formerly; and where their nature operates freely, it will act now as it did then. Cicero said, many ages ago, Plura enim multò homines judicant odio, aut amore, aut cupiditate, aut iracundia, aut dolore, aut lætitia, aut spe, aut timore, aut terrore,' aut alia aliqua PERMOTIONE MENTIS, quam VERITATE."Men are much more disposed to give their judgment of things out of hatred, or love, or inclination, or anger, or resentment, or joy, or hope, or fear, or cowardice, or any other emotion of the mind, than out of a regard to truth."-In virtue of this observation, he directs his young orator to trust the cause at last to an experiment upon the passions of his hearers. Though this is but a rule of oratory, it carries with it a reflection which bears very hard upon human nature. Hence it appears, that men are actuated, and often very violently, by a principle which has no regard to merit, truth, or justice. And now, I think, the question concerning the inherent rights of such a principle is very easily settled. Societies who have any concern for their own welfare and safety, have nothing to do but to guard

against it, and keep a jealous eye upon it; for it would confound all truth, and unhinge the world.

The grand motives on which men judge who do not. judge on principles of right reason, are custom, vanity, and self-interest. I knew a gentleman who was allowed to be a person of piety and benevolence, and yet his example afforded a striking instance of the weakness of private judgment. When he first took the sacred function upon him he went to reside in a city where Arianism had long been a fashionable doctrine: here he was touched with a pious indignation, like that of Paul at Athens, and his spirit was stirred within him when he saw the city wholly given to heterodoxy. In the execution of his office, he gave an unpopular proof of his zeal in the congregation, which at that time was much talked of. Some time afterwards he removed into another neighbourhood, where the clergy being generally addicted to the good old way, orthodoxy was no distinction: in this situation he became a zealous Arian: took up his pen in the cause; and I have been informed he was a considerable member among the gentlemen of the Feathers-Tavern. Dr. Young calls Pride the universal passion: and I think we may with equal propriety say of it, that whensoever we are surprised with strange anomalies in the words and actions. of men, otherwise good and virtuous, it is the universal explanation.

Custom is another principle which has a fatal effect in directing men's judgments, and keeping their minds in bondage. To account for their opinions nothing more is necessary than to ask where they have been, and what they have been doing? Trace them back to the places of their early education, and follow them from thence into their connections in life, and you will find how they fell into their present principles. You

have some knowledge of a right honourable gentleman who is regular in his morals, and serious in his behaviour, tender to his family, generous to his friends; and yet is perpetually struggling and raising disturbances, and perhaps would venture his head for the sake of. some fantastical ideas in politics, which would be pernicious to his country, and will probably never do any good to himself. You think all this utterly unaccountable in a man who wants nothing that the world can give him but I will explain the whole in a few words. When he was a boy his father sent him to a republican: seminary, by the advice of a certain bishop, who was. no great friend to the church of England.

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It is to be numbered among the many misfortunes. and miseries of human life, that men differ so widely in their judgments, and upon such slight grounds; but. you must have patience to see this, without being cor-. rupted or perplexed: their example is rather to be lamented than imitated; and their opinions afford no argument against the truth. They judge according to the circumstances of their birth, parentage, and education: men always have done so, and always will to the end of the world. If a monkey could write, and give his judgment of the constitution of the world, and the Histoire Generale of the animal creation, he would produce something to the following effect. He would begin with informing you, that the monkey is the original man, and man a clumsy imitation of the monkey. Then he would describe the monkey-nature by all its perfections; the human by its wants and weaknesses. He would appeal to the order of nature itself; which has ordained that men shall plough the ground, and plant maize, for monkies to come and eat it; which proves, by the plainest of all arguments, an undeniable fact, a stubborn sort of evidence, that nature inE e

VOL. V.