&c. which have all their respective objects, either in the qualities of matter or the qualities of human actions.

The mind has as natural a tendency to form to itself a first principle in reasoning or in morals— as any of the outward senses has to convey agreeable or disagreeable impressions to the seat of thought. We must however except, that it is a later and higher work,-in as much as sensitive operations in nature precede mental;-the vegetative, in order of time, going before the animal, and the animal before the intellectual. Truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and evil, have their abstract, (may I not say,) their immutable relations, as well as sweet and bitter, harmony and discord, beauty and its opposite in form and colour, and what is delicious and offensive in odours.

These things are all independent of the will of man, or of any arbitrary customs or decisions. It was said formerly, and the denunciation has immutable truth for its basis: "Wo unto them that call Evil Good, and Good Evil; that put Darkness for Light, and light for darkness; that put biller for sweet, and sweet for bitter." Isa. v. 20. The nature of things, whether in physics or ethics, cannot be changed without doing violence to the whole scheme of God's institutions appointed for the natural and moral goverment of the world. For, in their existing state, natural and moral relations maintain a beautiful harmony. But he who would confound

orginal distinctions, which are as widely separated as light from darkness, would make variable human enactments the rules of his conduct; and would put the uncertain opinions of man before the ordinances of his Maker.

It is scarcely necessary for me to point out the connection of the following quotation, from the writings of Dr. Samuel Clarke, with the subject under our notice. This author judiciously states that "It was a very wise observation of Plato, received from Socrates: that if you take a young man, impartial and unprejudiced, one that never had any learning, nor any experience in the world; and examine him about the natural relations and proportions of things, (or the moral differences of Good and Evil,) you may, only by asking him questions, without teaching him any thing at all directly, cause him to express in his answers just and adequate notions of Geometrical Truths, (and true and exact determinations concerning matters of right and wrong.) From whence He thought it was to be concluded, that all knowledge and learning is nothing but memory, or only a recollecting upon every new occasion, what had been before known in a state of pre-existence. And some others, both ancient and moderns, have concluded that the Ideas of all first and simple Truths, either natural or moral, are Innate and originally impressed or stampt upon the mind. In their inference from the observation, the authors of both these opinions seem to be mistaken. But thus much it proves un

avoidably that the differences, relations, and proportions of things both natural and moral, in which all unprejudiced minds thus naturally agree, are certain, unalterable and real in the things themselves ; and do not at all depend on the variable opinions, fancies or imaginations of men prejudiced by education, laws, customs, or evil practices and also, that the mind of man naturally and unavoidably gives its assent, as to natural and geometrical truth, so also to the moral differences of things, and to the fitness and reasonableness of the obligation of the everlasting Law of Righteousness, whenever fairly and plainly proposed."-Clarke's Evidence of Nat. and Rev. Relig. p. 44.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE SEEDS OF VICE AND VIRTUE, AND OF BENEVOLENCE AND SELF-LOVE.

SECT. I.

Of the Seeds of Vice.

If Man has the seeds of good and evil in himself, it may be asked what are the native propensities or original principles from which vice and virtue proceed, and in what order are they developed?

As we argue on the presumption that he is not wholly a factitious being, we are bound to show that it is not necessary to look to any other source than his own heart, for the roots or fountains from which good and evil, in their various shapes and appearances, have their ramifications. It is rather too much for any one to assume, that, while man evidently displays the seeds of vice (or those principles which may lead to vice) original and inherent in his nature; he is indebted to his fellow-creature or to the deductions of his own reason, and not to the free bounty of Providence or nature for his incitements to virtue:

in other words, it is going far to say, that while he has evil propensities within, his good propensities must come by observation or from without.-Yet this is plainly the sum of the argument we are opposing. When we take a review of the Natural Appetites, Desires and Affections, we may easily discover that these classes of Active Principles have in themselves the germs of vice ;-illustrating that sacred Truth, that when man is tempted, he is not tempted of God, but of the lusts and desires of his own heart. For in all these things the Benevolent Parent of the Universe is fully justified.

I shall treat of the Appetites, Desires, and Affections, in order.

I. APPETITES. The Appetites were implanted for especial use in the physical economy; and all philosophers agree that without these natural impulses, reason would be incompetent to provide for the preservation of the individual and the continuance of the species. But, by their abuse, these very appetites give rise to gluttony, drunkenness, and sensual indulgence in all its various modifications. In consequence of this, notwithstanding his higher endowments, man is brought down to a level with the brute: nay, he is sunk still lower; for he even uses his higher endowments as means to stimulate his appetites to unnatural excess, and prostitutes that which is noble to the vilest ends.

One of the Appetites does not indeed show itself at birth, nor for a long period afterwards. But it is