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itself, when that idea is said to be in it: by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I say, should be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses.

I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain bis are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas way of speaking less liable to mistakes, than clear and distinct: and where men have got such 'determined leas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the inind bas in itself, and knows, and sees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of ibe disputes and wranglings they have with others.

Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the association of ideas, the other of enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves, after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this essay had the second impression.

In the sixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21st chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, trane scribe into the margin of ihe former edition.






The Introduction.


1. An enquiry into the un.

derstanding, pleasant and

useful. 2. Design. 3. Method. 4. Useful to know the extent

of our comprehension. 5. Our capacity proportioned

to our stateand concerns, to discover things useful

to us. 6. Knowing the extent of

our capacities, will hin.
der us from useless curi-
osity, scepticism, and

7. Occasion of this essay.
8. What idea stands for.

CHAP. II. No innate principles in the

3. Universal consent proves

nothing innate. 4. What is, is; and, it is im.

possible for the same thing to be, and not to be not universally assented

to. 5. Not on the mind natu.

rally imprinted, because not known to children,

idiots, &c. 6, 7. That men know them

when they come to the

use of reason, answered. 8. If reason discovered

them, that would not

prove them innate. 9--11. It is false that reason

discovers them. 12. The coming to the use

of reason, not the time we come to know these

maxims. 13. By this they are not dis

tinguished from other

knowable truths. 14. If coming to the use of

reason were the time of their discovery, it would

not prove them innate. 15, 16. The steps hy which the

mind attains several truths, 17. Assenting as soon as pro

posed and understood

proves them not innate. 18. If such an assert be a

mark of innate, then that one and two are equal to three; that sweetness

mind, and particularly no innate speculative principles.


1. The way shown how we

come by any knowledge,
suficient to prove it not

2. General assent, the great

argument. VOL. 1.



is not bitterness; and a
thousand the like, must

be innate.
19. Such less general propo.

tions known before these

universal maxims.
20. One and one equal to

two, &c. not general, nor

useful, answered.
21. These maxims not being

known sometimes till
proposed, proves them

not innate.
22. Implicitly known before

proposing, signifi s, that
the mind is capable of
understanding them, or

else signifiez nothing.
23. The argument of assent-

ing on is first hearing,
upon a false supposition

of no precedent teacher.
24. Not innate, because not

universally assented to.
25. These maxims not the

first known
26. And so not innate.
27. Not innate, because they

appear least, where what
is innate, shows itself

28. Recapitulation.

No innate practical princi-


1. No moral principles so

clear and so generally re-
ceived as the forementi.

oped speculative maxims.
2. Faith and justice not

owned as priociples by

all men.
3. Obj. Though men deny

them in their practice,
yet they admit them in

their thoughts, answered.
4. Moral rules need a proof,

ergo, not innate.
5. Instance in keeping com-

6. Virtue generally approv-

ed, not because innate,

but because profitable.
7. Men's actions convince
us, that the rule of vir.
tue is not their internal

8. Conscience no proof of

any innate moral rule.
9. Instances of enormities

practised without
10. Men have contrary prac.

tical principles.
11-13. Whole nations reject se-

veral moral rules
14. Those who maintain in-

nate practical principles,

tell us not what they are.
15-19. Lord Herbert's innate

principles examined.
20 Obj. Ionate principles

may be corrupted, an-

21. Contrary principles in

the world.
22-26. How men commonly

come by their principles
27. Principles must be exa-


Other considerations about

innate principles, both spe-
culative and practical.

1. Principles not innate, un-

less their ideas be innate,
2, 3. Ideas, especially those

belonging to principles,

not born with children.
4, 5. Identity an idea not in-

6. Whole and part, not in.

nate ideas.

7. Idea of worship not innate.
8-11. Idea of God, not ionate-
12, Suitable to God's good.

ness, that all men should
have an idea of him,
therefore naturally im-
printed by him,

13-16. Ideas of God various

in different men,


17. If the idea of God be

not innate, no other can

be supposed innate.
18. Idea of substance not in.

19. No propositions can be

innate, since no ideas are

20. No ideas are remember.

ed, till after they have
been introduced.




Of ideas in general.

21. Principles not innate, be

cause of little use or lite

tle certainty.
22. Difference of men's dis.

coveries depends upon
the different applications

of their faculties.
23. Men must thiok and

know for themselves.
24. Whence the opinion of

innate principles.
25. Conclusion.

1. Idea is the object of

2. All ideas come from sen-

sation or reflection.
3. The objects of sensation

one source of ideas.
4. The operations of our

minds, the other source

of them.
5. All our ideas are of the

one or the other of these.
6. Observable in children.
7. Men are differently fur.

nished with these, accord.
ing to the different ob.

jects they converse with.
8. Ideas of reflection later,

because they need at-

9. The soul begins to have

ideas, wben it begins to

10. The soul thinks not al-

ways; for this wants

11. It is not always conscious

of it.
12. If a sleeping man thinks

without knowing it, the
sleeping andwaking man

are two persons.
19, Impossible to convince

those that sleep without

dreaming that theythink.
14. That men dream without

remembering it, in vain

15. Upon this hypothesis the

thoughts ofa sleeping man

ought to be most rational.
16. On this hypothesis the

soul must have ideas not
derived from sensation or
reflection, of which there

is no appearance.
17. If I think when I know

it not, nobody else can

know it
18. How knows any one that

the soul always thinks?
For if it be not a self-evi.
dent proposition, it needs

19. 'That a man should be busy

in thinking, and yet not
retain it the next mo.

ment, very improbable.
20-23. No ideas but from sensa.

liop, or reflection, evi.
dent, if we observe chile

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