where a general but indistinct relation is observed to some interesting or affecting qualities, and where, in consequence of this relation, such scenes naturally tend to excite or to encourage a correspondent emotion; but they are insensible to that greater delight, which, as has already been shown, every man of a good ear feels, both from the variety of this expression, and from the continued and increasing interest which it awakens. If the sublimity or beauty of music arose from the discernment of such relations as constitute the laws of composition, it is obvious that they, who are incapable of discerning such relations, would be incapable, at the same time, of discovering either its sublimity or beauty.

In the preceding observations, I have considered only the permanent associations we have with musical composition, or the expressions which are every where felt, both in the tone and the time of such successions of sound, from their analogy to the character and progress of sound in the human voice. With music, however, we have often many accidental associations, both individual and national; and the influence of such associations upon our opinions of the beauty or sublimity of music might be shown from many considerations. On the one hand, from the dependence of the beauty of music upon the temporary or habitual dispositions of our minds-from the different effect which is produced by the same composition, according to the associations we happen to connect with it—and from the tendency which all national music has to render those who are accustomed to it, insensible to the beauty of any foreign music, from their association of particular sentiments with peculiar characters or modes of composition: And, on the other hand, from the influence of individual or national associations, in increasing the sublimity or beauty of music, both by increasing its natural expressions, and by rendering these expressions more definite and precise. I am unwilling, how

of delight have they, therefore, for it; but to what are they insensible? If the sublimity or beauty of music arose from the discernment of such relations as constitute the laws of composition, what would follow? In the preceding observations, what only has our author considered? With music, however, what associations have we; and of their influence, what is observed? From what, on the one hand, might this influence be shown? On the other, from

ever, to swell these very imperfect remarks, by illustrations, which every one can so easily prosecute for himself.

From the whole, I am induced to conclude, that music is productive to us of two distinct and separate pleasures

1. Of that mechanical pleasure, which, by the constitution of our nature, accompanies the perception of a regular succession of related sounds

2. Of that pleasure which such compositions of sound may produce, either by the expression of some pathetic or interesting affection, or by being the sign of some pleasing or valuable quality, either in the composition or the performance.

That it is to this last source the beauty or sublimity of music is to be ascribed, or that it is beautiful or sublime only when it is expressive of some pleasing or interesting quality, I hope is evident from the preceding observations.

what? To do what is our author unwilling? From the whole, what is he induced to conclude? What is the first? What is the second? What, is it hoped, is evident, from the preceding observations?

CHAPTER III.

OF THE OBJECTS OF SIGHT.

THE greater part of the external objects, in which we discover sublimity or beauty, are such as are perceived by the sense of sight. It has even been imagined by some philosophers, that it is to such objects only that the name of beauty is properly applied, and that it is only from analogy that the same term is applied to the objects of our other senses. This opinion however, seems at first sight ill founded. The terms beauty and sublimity are applied by all men to sounds, and even sometimes to smells. In our own experience, we very often find, that the same emotion is produced by sounds, which is produced by forms or colors; and the nature of language sufficiently shows, that this is conformable also to general experiThere seems no reason, therefore, for limiting the objects of sublimity or beauty, to the sole class of visible objects.

ence.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that by far the greatest number of these objects are such as we discover by means of this sense; nor does it seem difficult to assign the reason of this superiority. By the rest of our senses, we discover single qualities of objects only; but by the sense of seeing, we dis. cover all that assemblage of qualities which constitute, in our imaginations, the peculiar nature of such objects. By our other senses, we discover, in general, such qualities, only when the bodies are in contact with us; but the sense of sight affords us a very wide field of observation, and enables us to

By what sense are the greater part of external objects in which we discover sublimity or beauty, perceived? What has, by some philosophers, been imagined? Why does this opinion seem ill-founded? In our own experience, what do we often find; and what does the nature of language sufficiently show? For what, therefore, does there seem no reason? What may, however, be acknowledged? Why is it not difficult to assign the reason of this

make them the objects of attention, when they are at very considerable distances from ourselves. It is natural, therefore, that the greater power of this sense should dispose us to greater confidence in it, and that the qualities of bodies which we discover by means of it, should more powerfully impress themselves upon our imagination and memory, than those single qualities which we discover by the means of our other senses. The visible qualities of objects, accordingly, become, to us, not only the distinguished characteristics of external bodies, but they become also, in a great measure, the signs of all their other qualities; and by recalling to our minds the qualities signified, affect us, in some degree, with the same emotion which the objects themselves can excite. Not only the smell of the rose, or the violet, is expressed, to us, by their colors and forms; but the utility of a machine, the elegance of a design, the proportion of a column, the speed of the horse, the ferocity of the lion-even all the qualities of the human mind are naturally expressed to us by certain visible appearances; because our experience has taught us, that such qualities are connected with such appearances, and the presence of the one immediately suggests, to us, the idea of the other. Such visible qualities, therefore, are gradually considered as the signs of other qualities, and are productive, to us, of the same emotions with the qualities they signify.

But, besides this, it is also to be observed, that by this sense we not only discover the nature of individual objects, and therefore naturally associate their qualities with their visible appearance; but that by it also we discover the relation of objects to each other; and that hence a great variety of objects in nature become expressive of qualities which do not immediately belong to themselves, but to the object with which we have found them connected. Thus, for instance, it is by this sense we discover that the eagle inhabits rocks and mountains; that the red-breast leaves the woods in winter, to

superiority? What is, therefore, natural? Of the visible qualities of objects, accordingly, what is observed? How is this remark illustrated; and why is this the case? How are such visible qualities gradually considered; and of what are they productive? But besides this, what also is to be observed; and hence what follows? How is this illustrated from the eagle-the red-breast—

seek shelter and food among the dwellings of men; that the song of the nightingale is peculiar to the evening and the night, &c. In consequence of this permanent connexion, these animals acquire a character from the scenes they inhabit, or the seasons in which they appear, and are expressive, to us, in some measure of the character of these seasons and scenes. It is hence that so many objects become expressive, which, perhaps, in themselves, would never have been so; that the curfew is so solemn from accompanying the close of day, the twitter of the swallow so cheerful, from its being heard in the morning, the bleating of sheep, the call of the goat, the lowing of kine, so beautiful from their occurring in pastoral or romantic situations; in short, that the greatest number of natural objects acquire their expression from their connexion with particular or affecting scenes.

As, in this way, the visible qualities of objects become expressive to us of all the qualities which they possess; and besides, in so many cases receive expression from their connexion with other objects, it is extremely natural, that such qualities should form the greatest and most numerous class of the objects of material beauty.

I proceed to a more particular investigation of the sublimity and beauty of some of the most remarkable classes of these qualities.

SECTION I.

OF THE BEAUTY OF COLORS.

THE greater part of colors are connected with a kind of established imagery in our minds, and are considered expressive of many very pleasing and affecting qualities.

and the nightingale? What is the consequence of this permanent connexion? Hence what follows? Why should such qualities form the greatest and most numerous class of the objects of material beauty? To what does our author now proceed?

With what are the greater part of colors connected; and how are they considered? In what may these associations be included? When we have been