ticable. We cannot assume it without becoming responsible for the government of the Islands, and we should not become responsible for the government unless we can exercise a control in its creation and management. We must either annex the Islands or leave them free to make such other alliance as they may choose or as destiny may determine.

As a rule, I do not believe in the extension of our territory beyond our present ocean limits. I think we should develop within our own domain a great English-speaking nation, controlled by the principles marked out for us by the fathers of the Republic. But it is precisely because I want to see a great and powerful nation - much greater and more powerful than the one we now have developed on this continent that I hail the opportunity now offered of securing this outpost of our Pacific frontier, and thus protecting for all time our future mighty commerce and rapidly growing interests on that coast from the encroachments of the Great Powers striving for ascendency in that quarter of the globe.

I have already stated that upon the advent of President McKinley I had been commissioned by him to go to London and St. Petersburg on a mission connected with the protection of the seals. Before sailing I was asked by the Assistant Secretary of State, William R. Day, afterwards Secretary of State and Justice of the Supreme Court, to draft a form of treaty of annexation of Hawaii, as, he said, it was the intention of President McKinley to make such a treaty and send it to the Senate as soon as the pressure of business would allow. The draft which I prepared followed the terms of the unratified treaty of 1893, with the omission of the provision for annuities to the ex-Queen and the heir apparent, and such other amendments as the lapse of time had made necessary.

Judge Day at that time had had little experience in diplomatic matters, and in handing to him the draft of treaty rolled up in a small compass with a rubber band, he held it up and

said to me: "And that little roll can change the destiny of a nation." Later in my career a similar incident occurred. As related in another chapter I was engaged with Mr. Elihu Root and other attorneys in arranging the terms of transfer of a railroad concession in China. Some preliminary consultation had taken place, but a meeting was fixed for a definite settlement of the only remaining question in dispute, the price to be paid. The Chinese Minister accompanied me, and we soon reached an agreement. As we came away, the Minister, who was a young man and little experienced in financial matters, impressed with the celerity of our action, half-soliloquizing, said to me: "Seven millions of dollars in five minutes!"

A few weeks after my departure, on June 16, 1897, the new treaty of annexation of Hawaii was signed and sent to the Senate.

Owing to the impaired health and defective memory of Secretary Sherman, to which I shall revert again, the negotiation of this second treaty was put into the hands of Assistant Secretary Day, and the Secretary was called into the negotiations only when the treaty was ready for signature. This fact led to an unfortunate incident. Only a few days before the signing the Japanese Minister, having noticed the press report that a treaty was being negotiated, called upon Secretary Sherman and asked him as to the truth of the report. He was assured by the Secretary that there was no foundation for it, and the Minister cabled his Government accordingly. The signing of the treaty was followed by a strong protest from the Japanese Government.

No action upon the treaty was had by the Senate before its adjournment, and when it reassembled in the winter of 189798, the Spanish imbroglio was uppermost in the minds of Senators, and it was difficult to secure attention to any other question. But after the declaration of war, the contest had not progressed far before it became apparent that the possession of Hawaii was a military necessity. The occupation of

the Philippine Islands and the dispatch of a considerable part of the army to Manila made imperative the use of the port of Honolulu as a coaling-station and harbor for our fleet.

Being at that time in the service of the Department of State, I was honored by the President with the duty of informing the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Relations of the situation of the Hawaiian question created by the war and of aiding as far as I could in securing prompt legislation. In this connection I desire to speak of Senator Cushman K. Davis, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, with whom I had frequent and intimate relations while chairman. He was born in Henderson, New York, in the vicinity of which place I had my summer home and where I heard stories of his boyhood before he removed to Minnesota. He was a gallant soldier in the Civil War, an able lawyer, a fine classical scholar, and one of the most useful of Senators. His untimely death was a great loss to the country.

Owing to the opposition of many of the Democratic Senators to the Hawaiian Treaty and the facility of obstruction and delay in that body, it was decided to attempt to bring about the annexation by joint resolution, following the precedent of the annexation of Texas. Such a course was repugnant to Senator Davis and Congressman Hitt, the chairmen of the two committees, as well as myself, because of its evasion of the constitutional provision and the creation of a bad precedent; but it was felt that the exigencies of the war justified this extreme measure. We were greatly relieved, however, that upon the passage of the joint resolutions they received a vote of two thirds of both houses, which practically met the constitutional requirement as to treaties.

I think that subsequent events have fully justified the wisdom of our action in bringing about the annexation of Hawaii. We could not allow any other Power to occupy the Islands so long as we held the Philippines. Neither could we with safety to our Pacific Coast territory permit their occu

pation by any great military Power; nor is it probable that the Islands could long have maintained their existence as an independent nation. I count it an honor and a useful service to my country to have borne some part in their annexation to the United States.

CHAPTER XXXV

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

FOR a period of twelve years, from 1891 to 1903, I participated in a series of negotiations with the British Government on a variety of questions growing out of the intercourse of the United States and Canada, which in a greater or less degree were threatening the friendly relations of the two neighboring countries.

The foresight of Benjamin Franklin led him to the conviction that the separation of Canada from the other American colonies, when the partition of the British Empire came to be considered in the negotiations of 1782-83, would be a serious menace to the peace of America; and he sought in vain to avoid that danger by the inclusion of Canada in the United States in the treaty of peace. From that day forward there has hardly been a time when Franklin's apprehension has not been a reality. Our relations with our southern neighbor have not proved so continuously threatening and complicated. The annexation of Texas brought on the war of 1846-48, but aside from that the frontier intercourse with Mexico has not been so irritating or difficult of regulation as that with Canada.

This largely grows out of the fact that Canada is a dependency of a powerful government; that no direct negotiations can be carried on with its authorities, but must be conducted with a government beyond the sea, imperfectly impressed with its spirit and wants; and that Canada is disposed to take undue advantage of its dependent position to shield itself from responsibility to its neighbor.

The two subjects which have given occasion to most dis