the coalition, of having betrayed his master into a system which they consider fatal to the interests and derogatory from the honour of his crown, for so trivial a considerationas the prospect of removing the pressure of war from his own pri. vate estates in Moravia. But, however selfish the motives of the adviser, it is clear from all the events which have since occurred, that the advice was most salutary and judicious; and, that to the promptitude with which this treaty was concluded, and to the fidelity with which it has been observed, Austria owes the privilege of being still an independent state.

The terms however of the peace of Presburg were much less favourable to the emperor of Germany than those, which, in similar extremities, he had formerly obtained from the ruler of France. By the present treaty he was compelled to renounce his share of the Venetian territories, which, at the peace of Luneville, had been reckoned no inadequate compensation for his loss of the Low Countries, and to consent, that these valuable provinces should be annexed to the kingdom of Italy. He was also forced to cede the county of Tyral and lordships of Voralberg to the king of Bavaria, the hereditary enemy of his family; and to abandon his possessions in Franconia, Suabia, and Bavaria, to be divided among the kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and the elector of Baden. The only territory bestowed upon him in compensation for so many losses, was the county of Saltzburgh and Berchstolgaden, which was taken from his brother the archduke Ferdinand, and formally incorporated with the empire

of Austria; while the archduke in return received the territory of Wurtzburg from the king of Bavaria, accompanied by a promise of the emperor Napoleon's good offices, to obtain for him a full and entire indemnity in Germany. The grand-mastership of the Teutonic order, with all the rights, domains, and revenues belonging to it, was also transferred in perpetuity to the house of Austria, to be held as an hereditary dignity in the family of any one of its princes, whom the emperor of Germany and Austria should appoint. The total cessions of Austria have been estimated in extent of territory at 1297 square miles; in number of subjects at 2,716,000 souls ; and in loss of revenue at 16,060,000 florins, or about L. 1,600,000. But these arithmetical details give but a faint idea of the loss of power and influence, which Austria has sustained, in con sequence of the part she took in the disastrous coalition. By the cession of her Venetian territories, she is excluded entirely from Italy, and reduced from being the natural mistress of the Adriatic, to be the humble possessor of her antient, solitary port of Trieste. By her loss of the Tyrol and resignation of her remaining possessions on the Rhine and upper Danube, she is cut off from all connexion with Swisserland, and removed one step farther to the eastward, from her antient and natural allies. She is become less formidable for offensive war, and by the loss of a frontier, which covered a great part of her dominións, she is more exposed to the attacks of her enemies. The foreign trade of her territories is at the mercy of others, and in the only K 2

quarter,

treaty of neutrality between France and Naples had been concluded at Paris on the 21st of September, by Talleyrand and the marquis di Gallo; and ratified at Portici by the king of Naples on the 8th of October. By this treaty, the French agreed to withdraw their troops from the Neapolitan territory, where they had been stationed, without any justifiable pretence, since the commencement of the war with England; and the king of Naples engaged, in return, to remain neutral in the war between France and the allies, and to repel by force, every encroachment on his neutrality. He more particularly became bound not to permit the troops of any belligerent power to enter his territories; not to confide the command of his armies or defence of his strong places to any Russian or Austrian officer, or French emigrant, or subject of any belligerent; and not to admit any belligerent squadron into his ports. But hardly had six weeks elapsed after the ratification of this treaty, when every one of its stipulations was violated by the court of Naples. On the 20th of November a squadron of English and Russian ships of war appeared in the bay of Naples, and landed a body of forces in that city and its vicinity. It is still doubtful, whether this expedition was undertaken by the allies in concert with the Neapolitan government; but, whether previously consulted or not, by not opposing the landing of the troops, nor even remonstrating against it, the latter made itself a party to the transaction, and forfeited the neutrality secured to it by the treaty recently concluded. Such at least

was the interpretation of its conduct by the French ambassador at Na. ples, who instantly took down the arms of France from over the gate of his hotel, and demanded pass. ports, to enable him to leave the kingdom. Had the court of Naples been able to justify itself from a participation in the counsels that led to these proceedings, or been still desirous of maintaining its neutrality in the war between France and the allies, this was the moment for explanation. But, instead of keeping open the door for accommodation, it suffered the French ambassador to depart, without even attempting a vindication of its conduct; and contented itself with issuing a decree, in which, after slightly alluding to the late transactions, but without even condescending to say, that the neutrality of its territory had been violated against its will, it promised to foreign merchants, subjects of the allies of France, and resident in the Neapolitan dominions, who might otherwise be alarmed at the departure of the French ambassador, protection for their property, and permission to pursue their commerce.-The appearance of such a decree, at such a juncture, was regarded by France as an unequivocal declaration, that the late proceedings of the allies at Naples, if not undertaken at the request of the Neapolitan government, were a greeable to its wishes; and if any doubts had remained of its intention to disregard the treaty of Portici, and connect itself with the allies, its subsequent conduct would have soon removed them.

The Russians, who were in num. ber about 14,000 men, under ge K 3 neral

neral Lasey, landed at Naples, and were quartered in that city and its neighbourhood. The English, amounting to about 10,000, disembarked at Castell-a-mare, and were cantoned at that place, at Torre del Greco and in the vicinity. Sir James Craig was commander in chief of the English forces, and sir John Stuart second in command. No sooner were the troops on shore, than preparations for active hostilities were begun by the government of Naples. vies of Neapolitans were ordered. Horses and waggons, necessary for the advance of the army, were provided. Magazines were collected, and every demonstration was given by the court of Naples, that, if not consulted before the expedition was undertaken, the plan of operations, whatever it was, had now its hearty approbation and support.

Le

It is impossible in reviewing these transactions, not to be struck with the blindness of the Neapolitan government, as well as with the want of any rational or intelligible object in the measures of the allies.For what purpose, we naturally ask, were troops landed at Naples? Were the English and Russians so ill-informed of what was passing in that kingdom, as not to know, that the French garrisons were already withdrawn from it? Is it true, as the Russians have asserted*, that this, expedition was undertaken with the aim of producing a diversion in favour of the Austrians in Lombardy? But is it credible, that the authors of the expedition could seriously believe, that by landing an army at Naples, they would check

the operations of Massena on the Adige? Was it not probable, that the fate of the campaign in Lombardy would be decided, before the allied army would advance from Naples to the Po, though it should experience no opposition or obstacle in its march? If the purpose of the expedition had been to serve the Austrians and promote the common cause of the alliance, would not that object have been more effectually accomplished by sending troops to Venice, than by landing them at Naples? Were the allies so intoxicated with dreams of success, when the court of Petersburg gave orders for this expedition, that it was thought necessary, thus early in the war, to take measures for securing to Russia a preponderating influence in the south of Italy? Was it not distrust in the modera tion of Austria, should her armies prove successful in Lombardy, rather than the project of assisting her, while contending for victory, that suggested this step to her asso. ciate? But, if the views of the allies are difficult of explanation, the conduct of the court of Naples could proceed only from the violence and imprudence of passion. Naples was already freed from the burthen of supporting a French army. If the allies were successful, she was secure from its return. Any assistance she could render the general cause, was so utterly insignificant, that if she had not been bound by treaty to be neutral, her inability to give any effectual aid to the allies, ought to have been a sufficient reason for their wishing her to remain so. But, while Na

ples