came, therefore, necessary for the court of Palermo, either to abandon the fruit of all its intrigues and machinations, or to prevail on the commander of the English forces in Sicily to invade Calabria with part of his army. moment when sir Sidney came in sight of Naples, that city was illuminated on account of Joseph Bonaparte, being proclaimed king of the two Sicilies. It was in the power of the English admiral to have disturbed their festivity; but, as the sufferers from his interference After the evacuation of Naples, must have been the inhabitants of sir James Craig had retired with the Naples, and not the French troops, English army to Sicily, and estaor the new king, he wisely and hu- blished his head quarters at Messina, manely forbore, and made for the as the station best adapted for proisle of Capri; of which he took pos- tecting the island from invasion.session, after a slight resistance, and There he remained till April, when placed in it an English garrison. bad health compelled him to resign He then proceeded southward along his command to sir John Stuart, the coast, giving the greatest an- who was soon after entrusted by his noyance every where to the enemy, Sicilian majesty with the defence of obstructing by land, and intercept- the east coast of Sicily from Melazzo ing entirely by sea their communi- to Cape Passaro, and with the comcation along the shore, so as to re- mand of the Sicilian troops in that tard their operations against Gaeta, district. The army continued in its which was the chief purpose for un- position at Messina till the end of dertaking this expedition. On the June, without attempting offensive return of sir Sidney to Palermo, af operations against the enemy. ter the conclusion of this service, he was of the utmost importance to was led, from the active turn and England, that Sicily should not fall sanguine temper of his mind, to en- under the dominion of France; and, ter with eagerness into the projects therefore, sir John Stuart, when soof the court, and to second its views licited by the court of Palermo, to on Calabria, to the utmost of his assist in its schemes on Calabria, hesipower. Finding him favorably in- tated long, and deliberated maturely clined to their schemes, and anxious before he complied. He considered, to distinguish himself by some great that an expedition to Calabria, how.. exploit, their Sicilian majesties in- ever it might gratify their Sicilian vested the British admiral with the majesties, could not, on the most the most ample authority in Cala- favourable supposition, lead to their bria, and even constituted him their re-establishment at Naples, nor even viceroy in that province. But, secure to them the possession of any though active and indefatigable in part of their continental dominions ; the duties of his new department, whereas if it failed, it must weaken and successful in distributing money, the defence and endanger the safety arms, and ammunition among the Ca- of Sicily. He was, therefore averse labrians, he soon found, that, unless to such an expedition, and refused to an English army made its appear engage in it when first proposed to ance in the country, there was no him. But, overcome by the urchance of his producing an insurgent and repeated instances of the rection against the French, It be- Sicilian government, encouraged by It flattering flattering accounts of the disposition of the Calabrians, and foreseeing that, if success attended his first operations, he should be able at any rate to destroy the stores and ammunition, collected in Calabria for the invasion of Sicily, he consented at length to land with part of his army on the continent, and make trial of the loyalty and affection of the people to their former masters. The enterprize, which sir John Stuart thus reluctantly undertook, he conducted with singular judgment and ability, and brought to a fortunate conclusion, with infinite glory to the British arms, but without any of those advantages to the court of Palernio, which it had fondly anticipated from the experi ment. The troops destined to this expe`dition by sir John Stuart, amount ed to about 4800 effective men.With this small force he landed on the morning of the 1st of July, in a bay in the gulph of St. Eufemia, near the northern frontier of lower Calabria. Little opposition was made to his landing by the enemy, who had not yet collected their forces. A proclamation was immediately issued by the English general, inviting the Calabrians to join the standard of their lawful sovereign and offering them arms and ammunition for their defence. Few or none, however, obeyed the summons. Disappointed in his expectations from the inhabitants, sir John Stuart was hesitating whether to re-embark his troops, when intelligence was brought to him that general Regnier was encamped at Maida, about ten miles off, with an army nearly equal to his own. Understanding at the same time that the French general was in daily expectation of rein forcements he determined to advance next morning, (July 4th) and attack him before they arrived. The two armies were separated by a plain from four to six miles in breadth, extending from sea to sca, and bounded on the north and south by chains of mountains. The French occupied a strong position on the sloping side of a woody hill, below the village of Maida, having the ri ver Lamato in front, and their flanks strengthened by a thick, impervious underwood. In uumbers they were greatly superior to the English, having received the expected reinforcement before the battle. Their force is supposed to have been about 7000 men, while that of the English did not amount to 4,800. Had Regnier remained upon the heights, the English must have attacked him with great disadvantage, and though the event of the engagement would have been probably the same, the loss on their part must have been more considerable. But, fortunately, blinded by an excess of confidence in his own troops, and an undue and unbounded contempt of the enemy, he quitted his strong position, and drew up his army on the plain. The English, surprised at the number of his troops, which was greater than they expected, but in no wise dismayed by their appearance, advanced with undiminished alacrity to the attack. The action began on the right of the English army. After some firing, both sides prepared to charge with the bayonet, and advanced with apparently equal resolution; but the French, who had probably imbibed from their general his contemptuous opinion of the enemy, were so astonished at the firmness with which the English advanced to the charge, that that struck with a sudden panic, they gave way after the bayonets of the two armies had began to cross, and endeavoured to save themselves by flight. It was too late, however, to escape. They were overtaken with immense slaughter, and in a short time the whole of the left wing of their army was totally routed and dispersed. The enemy being thus completely discomfited on their left, made an effort with their right, to retrieve the honour of the day; but they were resisted with great steadiness by the English left, and their cavalry being thrown into disorder, in an attempt to turn the English flank, by an unexpected fire from the twentieth regiment, which landed during the action, and came up at this critical juncture, they abandoned the field of battle with precipitation, and left an undisputed victory to their opponents. About 700 French were buried on the ground, and 1000 prisoners taken, among whom were general Compere and several other officers of rank; but their total loss from this conflict is estimated by sir John Stuart, at not less than 4000 men. The English had only 45 men killed and 282 wounded in the action. the panic terrors, which had seized them at Maida. The villages, which declared against them, were' plundered and burned to the ground, and the inhabitants massacred without distinction of age or sex. This usage still farther inflamed the Calabrians, whose attacks on their posts were incessant and furious, till with the assistance of the English, they drove them entirely out of their country. Unable to contend with their numerous and exasperated assailants, the French were compelled at length to evacuate both Calabrias, and to abandon all the cannon, stores, and ammunition, which they had collected in these provinces for the invasion of Sicily. Not a single place along the coast was left in their possession, from Coohne to Sicosa. Of 9000 men, which was the amount of their force in lower Calabria, before the battle of Maida, not above 3000 made. good their retreat; and in upper Calabria their loss from the insurgents, for the English did not penetrate into that province, was by their own confession very consider. This glorious victory which was gained on the 6th of July, was the signal of a general insurrection in both the Calabrias. The peasants, already prepared to take up arms, rose in every direction against the French, cut off their stragglers, pursued their flying parties, and attacked their posts. The French, provoked by their defeat, and exasperated by the cruelty of the insurgents, who gave no quarter to such as fell into their hands, retaliated with a savageness and ferocity, more disgraceful to their character than able. But glorious and successful as this expedition had been, it soon appeared, how far it was from having opened to the king of Sicily any prospect of regaining his kingdom of Naples. So sensible was sir John Stuart of his inability to maintain the ground he had won in Calabria, that from the plain of Maida he announced his intention of returning without loss of time to Sicily. the 18th of July his head-quarters were at Bagnara near Reggio; and on the 23d, the fort of Scylla, opposite to Messina, a place of great importance for the secure navigation of the straits, surrendered to one of On his officers. The whole of the British army was now withdrawn from Calabria, except the garrison of Scylla, and a detachment of the 78th regiment, under col. M'Leod; which had been sent in the Amphion frigate to the coast near Catanzaro, in order to countenance and assist the insurgents in that quarter. This service was effectually performed by col. M'Leod and captain Hoste of the Amphion. The French under Regnier were severely harass. ed in their retreat along the shore from Catanzaro to Cotrone, and the latter place, with all its magazines and stores, fell into the hands of the English. General Acland was also dispatched to the bay of Naples with the 58th and 81st regiments, to make demonstrations in that direction, which might alarm the enemy, and deter him from sending reinforcements to Calabria. General Acland was not absolutely prohibited from landing his troops, but he was directed not to expose his soldiers to that danger, unless he had a prospect of effecting some object of real and permanent utility. Sir Sidney Smith was in the mean time actively, if not judiciously, employed along the coast, assisting the insurgents with arms and ammunition, supplying them with provisions, and conveying them from one place to another, in the vessels under his command. By these ex/ertions he contributed materially to extend the insurrection along the coast, and to expel the enemy from the watch-towers and castles, which they occupied upon the shore. These operations were, in some instances, of use, by securing a safer and better anchorage for his ships; but in others, the blood and treasure which they cost, exceeded the value of his acquisitions. In one of these adventures, two officers and five scamen were killed and thirty-four seamen wounded, in the attack of an insignificant fort at point Licosa, which he destroyed when it fell into his hands. No British troops were stationed any where to maintain his conquests, except in the isle of Capri, which was kept as a place of refreshment for the navy: but a number of posts were occupied and garrisoned, by the insurgents, such as Amantoa, Scalea and the isle of Dino on the coast of upper Cala. bria, and Maratea, Sapei, Camerota, Palinuro and other places in the bay of Policastro. The chief, or rather sole use of these posts consisted in the protection which they afforded to the anchorage upon the coast, and facilities thereby given to the British and Neapolitan small craft, of intercepting the coasting communications of the enemy, so as to prevent the supply of his army in Calabria with cannon, which, from the badness of the roads, it was impossible for him to convey by land. The loss of Gaeta, which surrendered to the French soon after the battle of Maida, more than counterbalanced these trifling successes in other parts of the coast. While the prince of Hesse continued to have the command of Gaeta, that place was gallantly defended; and sallies were repeatedly made with the greatest success, by which the operations of the enemy were impeded, their cannon spiked, and their batterics taken and destroyed. But the prince of Hesse having been wounded by a splinter, and removed for his recovery to Palermo, and the French having at length brought their artillery to act upon the place, the lieut. governor, cólonel Hotz, saw himself forced to capitulate. The surrender of Gaeta cut off the communication with the northern parts of the kingdom of Naples, where the spirit of disaffection was as strong as in the south; and set at liberty a force of 16,000 men, previ. ously employed in that siege, to act against the Calabrians. A decree was issued at Naples on the 31st of July, declaring the two Calabrias in a state of war, and subjecting them to all the rigours of military law. Massena, invested with despotic authority, was placed at the head of a powerful army, and sent to reduce them to obedience. The insurgents were not in sufficient force to meet him in the field, and were too much divided among themselves, to attempt any enterprize of importance, even against his outposts. The difficulty, of transporting artillery over the mountains retarded his operations; but his progress, though slow, was uninterrupted, and his successes, though often dearly bought, were not checked by any reverse. On the 16th of August, the advanced guard of the French army entered Cosenza, the capital of upper Cala bria, and before the beginning of September they had recovered possession of the whole of that province, excepting Amantea, Scalea, and some other places upon the coast. But it was some time before they penetrated in force into the lower Calabria. Their head-quarters, in December, were still at Cosenza and Fiume Freddo, in upper Calabria, though their advanced posts had long before been at Monteleone and Mileto, about 30 miles distant from Scylla. Cotrone did not fall VOL. XLVIIL into their hands till the end of the year, nor Amantea, the last place held by the insurgents upon the coast, till the beginning of the ensu ing spring. or The Calabrian insurgents massé were composed of the lowest, worst and most miserable of the country people and villagers. Attracted by pay or the hope of plunder to the standard under which they fought, no confidence could be reposed in their fidelity; and though individually brave, when assembled in bodies no dependence could be placed on their steadiness. While the French were still at a distance, a report was brought to the massé in lower Calabria, that the enemy was advancing to attack them, on which the capi, or chiefs of the massé fled in the most shameful manner, and the massé, abandoned by their leaders, after recovering from their first panic, broke out in such acts of murder, cruelty and rapine, that it became necessary for sir John Stuart to cross over to Scylla, and send detachments of British troops into the interior of the country, to put a stop to their excesses. * On a subsequent occasion, intelligence having been sent to the Neapolitan generals, that the French, who were lying at Nicastro to the number of 4000 men, were afraid to cross the river Lamato, lest the English should land and attack them in the rear, it was resolved to attempt to surprise them in that situation, by advancing from Monteleone and Filadelfia, with 1600 of the *This happened in the latter part of August. |