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this time in close alliance with the Russians, and, therefore, the occupation of Ragusa by the French, instead of protecting that republic from their violence, afforded them a pretext for invading and laying it waste. Several skirmishes ensued, in which both sides claim the victory. The French, however, were in the end compelled by the Russians and Montenegrins to shut themselves up in Ragusa, where they stood a siege of several weeks, while the Montenegrins ravaged the country, and committed horrible excesses on the inhabitants. General Lauriston who commanded in Ragusa, was at length relieved* from this embarrassing situation, by the arrival of general Molitor from Dalmatia, with a French army collected in that province. It was now

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the turn of the Russians and Montenegrins to retreat, which, after the loss of their artillery and plunder, the former effected to their ships, the latter to their mountains, and in a few days the territory of Ragusa was cleared of these barbarians. No event of importance followed till the end of September, when the Russians and Montenegrins, having assembled in great force near Castel-Nuovo, general Marmont marched against them from Ragusa, and having enticed them by a military stratagem to quit their entrenchments, attacked and defeated them with great loss +. But, notwithstanding this defeat the Russians continued in possession of Cattaro and Castel-Nuovo at the end of the year.

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CHAP. VIII.

The German Empire the natural Barrier of Europe against France.-Consequences of the Elevation of the House of Brandenburg.—Prussia the natural Ally of France.-Policy pursued by Prussia since the French Revolution.-Consequences of that Policy.-Conduct of her Cabinet in 1805.Her Determination to remain neutral in the impending War.-Violation of Anspach.-Convention of Potzdam. -Marks of the Displeasure of Prussia at the Conduct of France.-Mission of Haugwitz to the French HeadQuarters.-Treaty of Vienna between France and Prussia.-Occupation of Hanover by the Prussians.-France refuses to confirm the Alterations mude by Prussia in the Treaty of Vienna.-Mission of Haugwitz to Paris. -Treaty of Paris-Surrender of Anspach, Neufchatel, and Cleves.-Annexation of Hanover to Prussia.-Exclusion of the English Flag from Ports of the German Ocean under the Controul of Prussia.-Remonstrances of the English Ministry.—Embargo on Prussian Vessels.-Blockade of the Prussian Ports.-His Majesty's Message on the War with Prussia. Hanoverian Declaration.-Letters of Marque issued against Prussian Vessels.-War between Prussia and Sweden.Causes that led to a Rupture between France and Prussia.—The Investiture of Murat in the Duchies of Berg and Cleres.-The Offer to restore Hanover to the King of England. The Continuance of the French Army in Germany.-The Indignation universally felt and expressed at the Conduct of Prussia.-Confederation of the Rhine.-Dissolution of the German Empire, and Abdication of the Emperor.-Opposition of the French to the Formation of a Confederacy in the North of Germany.-Recall of Lucchesini, and Mission of Knobelsdorf to Paris.-Prussian Ultimatum.-Delay of Prussia in announcing to Russia and England her Intention of going to War with France.-Mission of Lord Morpeth to Prussia.-His Reception by the Prussian Ministers.— Blockade of the Prussian Ports and Rivers discontinued.

GERMANY, by the position inviolate, the complex form of its

and extent of its territory, and the number and valour of its inhabitants, is the natural rival of France on the continent, and has been for ages the strongest bulwark of Europe against the encroachments of that restless and ambitious power: While its ancient constitution was

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government, and the slowness of its public deliberations, unfitted it for conquest or aggrandizement; at the same time that the greatness and solidity of its resources, when brought into action, enabled it successfully to resist, and effectually to check, the progress of any

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power that threatened the general France was gratuitously raising the most effectual obstacle to her own ambition, when she concluded a treaty, the effect of which was to increase the power of the Austrian monarchy, and consolidate its authority over Germany. In Prussia she had an ally too weak to be a rival, too powerful to be a burthen, and too dependent on her protection to become an enemy. For, if Prussia was useful to France, by keeping up a permanent division of interests in Germany, and preventing its states and princes from ever uniting cordially in any common cause, it was still more necessary for Prussia to preserve the friendship, and obtain the protection of France. Such was her inferiority to Austria in real power and substantial resources, that without an ally like France, she was unable to maintain her newly acquired rank and importance among the states of Europe; nor could she be relieved from the necessity of this dependence, but by an increase of territory and addition of subjects, which it was, therefore, the constant object of her policy to attain.

safety, or endangered the individual members of the European commonwealth.-Germany was the only state that inspired at once the ambitious with awe, and the weak with confidence. Placed in the centre of the political world, the weight and stability of its power, maintained an order and regularity in the surrounding system, which slight and transitory causes could not disturb. But this security to the liberties of Europe, derived in some measure from the very faults and imperfections of the Germanic constitution, was sacrificed to the ambition, and destroyed by the rise of the house of Brandenburg. From the moment that Germany was virtually divided into two separate states, with opposite views, inclinations, and interests, France was sure of an ally in the heart of the empire, Germany was balanced by itself, and no general or effectual combination could be formed, to resist the only power from which the independence of Europe has been ever seriously in danger.

The same political views which had led France to support the Protestants of Germany against the ambition and bigotry of the emperors, induced her to favour the elevation, and abet the usurpations of Prussia. She formed, it is true, at one time, a temporary connection with Austria*, which had nearly proved fatal to the Prussian monarchy; but that alliance was the work of a court intrigue, and was condemned by her wisest statesmen, as no less contrary to her interest than it proved derogatory to her glory. It required, indeed, little argument to shew that

The part which the king of Prus sia took against France, in 1792, arose from a false persuasion that the revolution was unpopular in that kingdom, and that the re-establishment of the ancient monarchy was necessary to restore the ancient power and influence of France in foreign countries. Undeceived in these particulars, and discovering in the conduct of his allies, their design to dismember France, and reduce her to a subordinate state, he abandoned their cause, and con. cluded at Basle a separate peace

* In 1756.

with the new republic. From that era to the period of which we treat, the policy of Prussia, pursued with equal assiduity and success, had been to maintain peace with all her neighbours, to cultivate her alliance with France, and to extend her influence and dominions in Germany. Her acquisitions of territory in that country were not, indeed, of much importance, when compared with her share of the spoils of Poland, which she had gained by her alliance with the opposite party; but her weight and influence in the empire were greatly increased during her connexion with republican France. One half of the states of the empire were detached from their lawful obedience to her rival, and united in a formal confederation under her protection. Her influence in the electoral college was so much greater than that of Austria, that she might reasonably aspire, on the first vacancy of the empire, to place her sovereign on the throne of the Cæsars. Her dominions were rich and prosperous, and had flourished in peace, while other states were exposed to the desolations or exhausted by the burthens of war.

But, notwithstanding, these advantages, which Prussia had derived from her pacific system, it may be questioned, whether she had acted upon it in a manner conducive to her reputation and permanent advantage, or with due regard to the peculiar circumstances of her situation. To a military power, like Prussia, whose consequence and even existence depended on her army, the long continuance of peace, while her neigh. bours were engaged in hostilities, could not but in the end be dangerous if not destructive. The numbers and outward show of her army

might be maintained in peace, but its strength and spirit could be preserved only in actual service. When accordingly the unfortunate day ar. rived for making trial of the Prussian army against the veterans, who had fought and conquered Austria, it was found, that the Prussian sol. diers were unprepared for the dangers and fatigues of war, their offi their generals, enfeebled by age, ́ cers were without experience, and miliar to their opponents. were confounded by the tacties fa

cline of her military system alone, a It was not, however, in the dedecline the more dangerous because the less suspected, that Prussia had prepared in peace the causes of her sudden eclipse in war. nistration at home and consideration Her admi abroad had been equally impaired during this interval. Her sovereign, no bad passions to mislead him, was with excellent intentions, and with` diffident of his own abilities, incapable of acting from himself, and surrounded by ministers, unworthy of his confidence, and unfit for the high situations to which they were raised. The greater part of them had been clerks of office under the

Great Frederick, and were not only incapable of advising any generous, bold, or magnanimous resolution, but destitute of capacity, vigour and decision for the most ordinary business, to a degree hardly credible. To such counsellors it was owing, that the weight and consideration, which Prussia had gained as a state of the empire, she had lost throughbeen narrow, crooked, and ambiout Europe; that her policy had guous; that her ambition had appeared mean and sordid, restrained by fear, but never under the control of principle; that she had obliged

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no party, and offended all, the French by the coldness of her friendship, the allies by her desertion of their cause; that she was at last compelled to go to war, without an urgent motive, or attainable object or adequate preparation, by the universal hatred and contempt into which she had fallen; and, that when ruined by the contest so foolishly begun, the spectacle of her overthrow softened the regrets of those, who most lamented the success, and feared the progress of her conquerors.

The ill-advised and disastrous coalition of 1805 was the touchstone to try the capacity, conduct, and decision of the Prussian cabinet. It was clearly the interest of Prussia to have preserved, if possible, the peace of the continent; and such was the respect entertained for her military power, that an early and unequivocal declaration from her might have prevented the revival of hostilities. But, hat opportunity being neglected, when the intentions of Austria and Russia to risk their last stake against France could no longer be doubted, it became a matter of serious import to Prussia to adopt some determinate system in the approaching war, and to adhere to it steadily. It suited the inde. cision of her sovereign and the incapacity of his ministers, to prefer a system of neutrality, because it led to procrastination and called for no immediate exertions, while it sufficiently gratified their self importance, to emit threats and declarations against any power, that should dare to violate the integrity of the Prussian territory. It may be questioned, whether, supposing it possible for Prussia to have maintained her neutrality, it was her interest to remain neutral, when so great a con

test was impending, the event of which must determine, who were to be in future the masters of the continent, the French or the allies. For, whichever party prevailed, it was easy to foresee, that Prussia would be soon reduced to the neces sity of fighting with, or receiving laws from the conqueror. If France was near attaining universal empire, was it not the interest of Prussia to have taken part against her, in the last effort of the powers of Europe, to set bounds to her ambition, though she might disapprove of the attempt as premature, and doubt of its success? or, if she thought the enterprize utterly hopeless and desperate, was it not a preferable policy, with a view to her own interest and selfish poli tics, to join with France in the war, approve herself an active and efficient ally, merit the consideration and respect of her associate, and share in her conquests? But, having determined on neutrality, the greatest error that Prussia could afterwards commit, was to be diverted from her resolution. If it was impolitic to quarrel with France before the violation of Auspach, it was more impolitic still to quarrel with her after the surrender of Ulm. Yet, such was the fantastic importance annexed to the court of Berlin, to the inviolability of its territory, that Prussia, which, some weeks before, had been arming to oppose the passage of the Russian troops through her dominions in Poland, was induced to enter into negociations and take measures for a war with France, because a body of French troops, by passing through the Prussian territory of Anspach, had surrounded the Austrian army at Ulm, and compelled it to capitulate. As far as her honour was concerned in exacting reparation

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