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minister at London, who was returning in that capacity to England, he arrived at Hamburgh on the 6th, and reached the head quarters of the Prussian army at Weimar on the 12th. This promptitude did not suit the views of the Prussian ministry. They were on the eve of a great battle, which might decide the fate of the campaign; and they were unwilling, while the event was uncertain, to pledge themselves to an act of justice, or entangle themselves in connections of no immediate utility. If victory remained to the Prussians, Hanover might still be theirs. If defeated, they were afraid, lest their having contracted engagements with England might be prejudicial to them, should they be compelled to solicit peace from France. Persisting to the last in his duplicity and irresolution, Haugwitz, who had been named to negotiate with the English minister, contrived by breaking his word and by other disingenuous shifts, to avoid seeing him at Weimar and Erfurt; and subsequently to the battle of Auerstadt, but while the result of it was unknown, Lord Morpeth having asked Lucchesini, whether the court of Prussia was ready to enter on immediate negotiation, the Italian unguardedly replied, "that it would depend on the issue of the battle which had just been fought."

The English ministry, when they appointed Lord Morpeth to negotiate with Prussia, gave further proof of the sincerity of their disposition to reconciliation, by removing the blockade of her ports and rivers, which had hitherto sub

sisted with great inconvenience to the north of Germany.

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After this review of the conduct of Prussia and of the causes that led her to engage in hostilities with France, we must admit, that her provocations were great, numerous and galling; but we look in vain for such open insult or impending injury, as leave states, against which they are directed, no alternative but an immediate appeal to arms. If the indulgence of her resentment was her object in commencing hostilities, prudence should have restrained her anger, till means of gratifying it had been secured. If her motive was ap honourable desire of asserting the liberties of Europe, and setting bounds to the encroachments of France, greater caution might have been expected from her government, than to have embarked with such inadequate means, in so arduous an enterprize. But if Hanover was the cause of her quarrel, nothing could be more absurd than to make war, in order to maintain her pretensions to a country, which she must begin by ceding to its lawful owner, for his assistance to enable her to carry on the contest.

Having brought the affairs of France and Prussia to the breaking out of the war, it is necessary to revert to the transactions between. France and England, and to give an account of the negotiations for peace, in

which these two powers and Russia were during a great part of the present summer unsuccessfully engaged. We shall afterwards return to the short but disastrous history of the Prussian campaign.

* Sept. 25.

CHAP.

CHAPTER IX.

Negotiations for Peace between England and France-Circumstances which led to the first Overture from France-Mr. Fox proposes that Russia should be a Party to the Negotiation-Objections of M. Talleyrand to the Intervention of Russia-Discussions on this Subject, and Failure of the Negotiation-Second Overture from the French Government through Lord Yarmouth Favourable Nature of the Terms proposed-Minute of Lord Yarmouth, containing the Particulars of his Conversation with M. Tat leyrand-Return of Lord Yarmouth to Paris-French retract their former Offers-Impression which their shuffling Conduct makes on the English Ministry, and particularly on Mr. Fox-His Unwillingness to give up Sicily-Instructions to Lord Yarmouth-M. D'Oubril signs a separate Peace for Russia--Lord Yarmouth produces his full Powers-Resolution to send. Lord Lauderdale to Paris-Joint Representation to the French Negotiators from Lord Lauderdale and Lord Yarmouth-Delays created by the French Negociators-Emperor of Russia refuses to ratify D'Oubril's Treaty Whereupon the French are ready to give more favourable Terms to England-But the English Minister refuses to sign any but a provisional Treaty without the Concurrence of Russia-Violence and Impatience of Bonaparte moderated by his Ministers-Final Conference of Lord Lauderdale with M. Champagny-Mistake of supposing that the Negotiation broke off on Account of the Refusal of the French to cede Dalmatia to the Russians-Review and Justification of the Conduct of the English Cabinet throughout the Negotiation-Reception of the News of the Failure of the Negotiation in England-Account of D'Oubrils' Treaty-Favourable Disposition of the new Russian Cabinet towards England.

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of the respective parties, and to as certain the causes, which led to the unfavourable termination of these important discussions. The sentiments of Mr. Fox on the subject of the war, were generally known throughout his own country and Europe; and it was supposed, that he had selected the office of secretary of state for foreign affairs, with

the hopes of being able to accom- lead him to measures, that would. plish with greater facility the fa- impair the stability of the connecvourite object of his heart-a ge-, tion between Russia and England, neral and permanent peace. The availed itself of the first opportu period, however, at which he was nity of making direct overtures for at length called to his majesty's a negotiation. The circumstances councils, was peculiarly unfavour. from which they arose, are too sinable to such an immediate overture gular in themselves, and too honourto the French government as in any able to the English minister and naother circumstances he would no tion, to be passed over in silence. doubt have wished to resort to.The recent successes of the French had been so signal and decisive, that an overture would have appeared an acknowledgment of weakness rather than a desire of pacification. Sufficient time had scarcely elapsed since the battle of Austerlitz and treaty of Presburg, to ascertain the feelings of the Russian government; and in addition to the difficulty of speculating upon the impressions which the late calamities might have produced on that distant court, a change of administration was expected in that capital; any decided step, therefore, without previous concert with the new ministers at Petersburg, might become the cause or the prétext for some estrangement of that cabinet. In this predicament Mr. Fox seems to have determined on making no direct overture to France, till some event might give rise to it, or at least till the views and wishes of the court of Petersburg had been fully ascertained, and the form, object, and nature of any negociation previously concerted with that cabinet. But the French government, perhaps, sincerely desirous of putting an end to hostilities, or possibly deluded by an idle hope that Mr. Fox's strong inclination to peace would betray his prudence, and

About ten days after Mr. Fox came into office,* he received a letter from a person calling himself Guillet de la Gevrillière, stating that he was arrived at Gravesend without a passport, and requesting Mr. Fox to send him one, as he had very lately left Paris, and had something to communicate, which would give Mr. Fox satisfaction. On receiving this letter, Mr. Fox gave orders through sir Francis Vincent, under secretary of state, to Mr. Brooke of the alien office, to send for the man from Gravesend, and a private interview having been solicited, to bring him on his arrival in London to Mr. Fox's house in Arlingtonstreet, instead of taking him to the foreign office. In consequence of these orders, the Frenchman was next morning carried to Mr. Fox's house, and there admitted by him alone into his closet; when after some unimportant conversation, he proceeded to the object of his journey, which was to inform Mr. Fox that a plan had been entered into for the assassination of Bonaparte, and a house hired at Passy, from which it could be carried into effect with certainty, and without risk. Surprized and confounded with the audacity of the villain, in making him the confident of so execrable a de sign, Mr. Fox, without enquiring

* Feb. 14.

further

further into the particulars of the plot, instantly dismissed the French. man from his presence, and desired Mr. Brooke to send him as soon as possible out of the kingdom. But on reflection he ordered him after wards to be detained, till such information could be given to the French government, as might prevent the perpetration of his crime, if really projected; and with that view he transmitted to M. Talleyrand,* a short and simple statement of the occurrence, and of what he had done thereupon. The answer to this communication was a natural and well turned compliment to the honour and generosity of Mr. Fox's character, and was accompanied by an extract from the emperor's speech to the legislative body, I in order, as M. Talleyrand observed, "that Mr. Fox might know, if the advantages of peace were duly appreciated, on what terms it might be discussed." The extract was a simple offer "to conclude peace, taking for its basis the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens."

Mr. Fox considered this communication as a distinct overture, and proceeded to answer it in that frank and direct style, which is the characteristic of all his public dispatches. He objected to the uncertainty of the basis of Amiens; the variety of modes in which it had been interpreted; and the delay,

*Feb. 20.

which the explanations on the mean. ing of it would unavoidably occa. sion, even if no other objection should exist. "The true basis of such a negotiation, he observed, between two great powers, equally despising every idea of chicane, would be the reciprocal recognition of the following principle; viz. that the object of both parties should be a peace, honourable for both and for their respective allies; and at the same time, of a nature to se cure, as far as in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe."– He then proceeded to state the impossibility of treating, much less of concluding any thing unless in concert with Russia, but suggested the practicability of some previous discussion of the principal points, and some provisional arrangements, while they were waiting for the actual intervention of that power; and he forestalled an objection, which might be made to his statement, founded on the few material points in issue between Russia and France, by insisting upon, and extolling the interest taken by that power in all that concerns the greater or less degree of independence enjoyed by the different princes and states of Europe. He ended this letter with an expression of his desire of peace, and a short but firm exposition of the ability of Great Britain to continue the contest.

A correspondence of some length

The Frenchman continued in custody till the 7th of March, when he was sent under the care of a messenger to Harwich, and embarked on board of a vessel bound for Husum. He had arrived at Gravesend in a vessel called the Toby, Van Zoust master, declared from Embden, under Prussian colours, but supposed to have come direct from Holland.

+ March 5.

¶ March 2.

Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, March 26.

ensued,

which France seemed to feel so much repugnance

Whether M. Tallyrand calculated on the probability of such commuHications between the two courts, or was only anxious to prolong a correspondence, which might ultimately lead to a negotiation, he wrote a letter on the 2d of June, in the form of an answer to Mr. Fox's dispatch of the 20th of April, in which, after some vague observa. tions on the nature of alliances, and some trivial objections to a joint negotiation, he proposes,

ensued, in which, as M. Talleyrand observes, there is a cha. racter of openness and precision, that had not hitherto been seen in the communications between the two courts. The great difficulty consisted in the admission of Russia into the negotiation. M. Talleyrand endeavours with much ingenuity to represent that power as interposing its authority between two great na. tions fully competent to adjust their own differences, but Mr. Fox insists on her being a party in the question, and an ally of Great Britain, whose interests are insepara-"first, to negotiate in the same prebly connected with her own. To bring the discussion to a point, Mr. Fox states explicitly, that his majesty was willing to negotiate conjointly with Russia, but would not consent to negotiate separately. A month elapsed without any answer being given to this dispatch, and the first overture may be said to have failed in consequence of the determination of England not to negotiate separately, and the unwillingness of France to admit the intervention of Russia. But, though no arrangement took place, "the spirit of conciliation manifested on both sides, was considered as a great advance to peace;"+ and in the course of the month of May, the English cabinet were, no doubt, enabled to ascertain with greater precision, the views and intentions of the court of St. Petersburg, and enabled to determine how far the substance and advantage of a joint negotiation might be preserved, without insisting on the forms, to

Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, April 20. + Id. to Id. April 8.

liminary forms, which were adopted during the administration of the marquis of Rockingham, in 1782; forms, which were not renewed with so much advantage in the negotiations of Lisle, but which were perfectly successful in the negotiations which preceded the treaty of Amiens;-secondly, to establish as a basis two fundamental principles; the first, taken from Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March, namely, "That the two states should have for their object, that the peace be honourable for them and their respective allies, and at the same time, of a nature to secure, as far as it is in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe;" the second principle to be an acknowledgment on the part of the two powers, of their mutual right of intervention and guaranty in continental, and in ma. ritime affairs. ‡

The English government does not seem to have returned any immediate answer to this letter. Indeed,

* From M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox, June 2d.

though

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