council summoned specially for that purpose; and after comparing it with the instructions given to M. D'Oubril before his departure, and with the subsequent orders sent to him at Vienna, it was declared by the council, that M. D'Oubril, in signing these articles, had not only departed from his instructions, but had acted directly contrary to their sense and spirit; and upon this ground his imperial majesty was advised to withhold his ratification of the treaty. His resolution to that ef fect was accordingly signified without delay to the French govern ment, and notified by a circular letter to all the Russian ministers at foreign courts. M. D'Oubril was disgraced and exiled from court, but neither deprived of his rank nor of his appointments.

Notwithstanding the declaration of the Russian council, that D'Oubril, in signing this treaty, had acted in the face of his instructions, the very slight punishment to which he was condemned for conduct so in excusable, if truly represented, leaves some doubt upon the mind, whether he had so far deviated from his secret instructions as to justify the imputations cast upon him. On the other hand, the difficulty of giving any rational explanation of the change of opinion on the subject of peace, which must be supposed to have taken place in the court of St. Petersburg after his departure from Vienna, if he negotiated in confor mity to secret instructions which were afterwards disavowed, inclines

us to believe, that he must have de. served in some degree his disgrace; and his remarkable expression after signing the treaty, "that he would carry to Petersburg his work and his head, and lay them before the feet of his master," seems to imply, that he was conscious of having incurred a dangerous responsibility, by acting in opposition to his instruc tions. It has been said, that he was led into this error by a private conversation which he had with the em. peror before his departure from St. Petersburg, in which he imagined that he discovered a more pacific spirit and more accommodating policy in his sovereign, than was contained in the public instructions of the ministers; and to this circumstance, if true, may perhaps be imputed the mildness of his punishment. It has been also said, that in addition to the impression made on his weak and pusillanimous charac ter by the menacing language of the French, he was precipitated into the fatal measure of affixing his name to the treaty, by an erro. neous opinion, that the new ministers at St. Petersburg were less favourably inclined to England than their predecessors. In this idea, however, he was widely mistaken. General Budberg, the successor of Czartorinski, was a man of inferior talents and reputation, but equally attached to the connection of Russia with England, and disposed to make every sacrifice and exertion to maintain the alliance of the two powers.

CHAP.

to the greatest military genius of this or of any other age. But, exceptionable as was the plan of a military council to direct the operations of the war, it may be questioned, whether it was not exposed to fewer objections than the appointment of such a commander as the duke of Brunswick to be generalissimo of the army. A more unfortunate choice for that important situation it was impossible to have made. The duke of Brunswick had distinguished himself, in early youth, under his uncle prince Ferdinand, as an active, successful partizan; and had afterwards gained a high reputation in courts, by the prosperous issue of his expedition against the Dutch patriots in Holland; but that reputation, which among military men had been always somewhat equivocal, he had subsequently forfeited by his miscarriages in France; and on no occasion had he ever displayed the talents of a great general, or shewn a mind sufficiently capacious and comprehensive to direct the movements of a great army. A well. disposed sovereign and well-bred courtier, he was neither a good general nor a great man. Elevated to his present high command, not by the opinion of his merit, or the recollection of his services, but by his skill and management of intrigue, it was soon evident, that the narrowness of his mind was unequal to the magnitude of a situation, which he had ambition to covet, but wanted ability to fill. Wrapped up in mystery and concealment, he had little intercourse with officers of merit, and admitted no general but Mollendorf to his councils of war, where he discussed military plans with the king, Haug

witz and Lucchesini. Immersed in detaris, he bestowed on inferior concerns the time, which should have been occupied with business of importance; and yet so deficient was he in method and arrangement, that the sole result of his labours was confusion and discontent.

Unable to form and combine a well digested system of operations for the conduct of the campaign, his perplexed and contradictory orders, the irregular marches and counter-marches of his troops, shewed too plainly, that he pursued no steady plan, nor had any welldefined object in view. Disconcerted and alarmed by every movement of the French, it was manifest, that he had not penetrated the designs of the enemy, nor provided against their success. So obvious was his incapacity, that his army quickly perceived his unfitness to command them, and lost all confidence in their general.

Early in October the Prussian head-quarters were at Naumburg, where also their principal magazines were collected, and their army extended itself in the country bordering on the Saale in Upper Saxony. On the 4th of that month their head-quarters were moved forward to Erfurt, and on the 10th to Weimar. The position of their army was nearly as follows.

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Their left, commanded by prince Hohenlohe, under whom were general Tauenzein and prince Lewis of Prussia, occupied Saalfeld, Schleitz, and Hof, and its advanced posts extended to Munchberg and Culmbach. Their centre, commanded by the duke of Brunswick, marshal Mollendorf, and the king in person, was distributed in the neighbour

hood

hood of Erfurt, Weimar, Gotha, and Eisenach, and its vanguard under the duke of Saxe Weimar, was stationed at Meinungen on the Werra. Their right commanded by general Ruchel extended to Mulhausen. From this disposition of the Prussian army it is probable, that had not the duke of Brunswick been anticipated by the French, it was was his intention to have begun hostilities by bearing down with his right on Frankfort, with his centre on Wurtzberg, and with his left on Bamberg. A separate corps under general Blucher which had been stationed at Gottingen, for the protection of Westphalia, joined the main army before the battle. Hesse was neutral, but the Saxons acted as auxiliaries to the Prussians, and served in the left under prince Hohenlohe. The reserve of the Prussian army under prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, did not arrive from Custrin till after the battle of Auerstadt. The whole force, Prussians and Saxons, under the command of the duke of Brunswick, did not amount to less than 150,000 men.

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While this immense army remained inactive on the banks of the Saale, the French were collecting their scattered troops and concentrating their forces in the neighbourhood of Bamberg. On the 6th of October Bonaparte arrived in that city, and on the 8th the French army was in motion to attack the Prussians. Why the French were suffered peaceably to assemble their forces, without any movement of the Prussians to attack them before the divisions of their army had formed a junction, it seems difficult to explain. If offensive operatious

did not enter into the plan of the campaign, why did Prussia hurry on the war so unnecessarily; why advance beyond her frontiers, to meet an enemy, whom she had determined not to attack? was it to get the start of Bonaparte in Saxony, an d prevent its elector from acting towards her the part, which the elector of Bavaria had done last year towards Austria? but, had that been her motive, would Prussia have consented to the neutrality of Hesse, for no better reason than to indulge the avarice of the elector, who hoped to obtain from England, by an affected back. wardness in the war, a larger subsidy for his assistance? And, after all, what were the Saxons and Hessians in comparison of the Rus'sians, from whom every step taken by the Prussians in Thuringia was removing them to a greater distance? If the Prussians were too weak to attack the French, before the armies of the latter had united, they were still less able to resist them after their junction; and in that case nothing remained for the weaker party, but to fall back on the allies, who were coming up to its aid.

out protection, exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and when cut off from these, the Prussians had no alternative but to fight or starve. There were no resources in the barren country of Weimar for maintaining so large an army and numerous cavalry as the Prussian. There was no bread, no beer, no brandy for their men, and no fodder for their horses. When their cavalry took the field on the morning of the battle of Auerstadt, the horses had been without corn, and the men without food for two nights and a day. Another fatal error in the disposition of the army was its encampment on the, left bank of the Saale, by which the electorate of Saxony, the chief fortresses of the Prussian States, and the capital itself were laid open to the enemy; and the Prussians, in case of a disaster, were cut off from Magdeburg, the only rallying point, where they could assemble, or place of refuge, where they could be in safety.

The French army advanced on the 8th, in three divisions. The right, composed of the corps of marshals Soult and Ney, and of a division of Bavarians, set out from Amberg and Nuremberg, joined at Bayreuth, and from thence marched against Hof. The centre commanded by the grand duke of Berg, the prince of Ponte Corvo (Berna'dotte), and marshall Davoust, marched from Bamberg to Cronach, and from thence to Saalburg and Schleitz. The left, composed of the corps of marshals Lannes and Augereau, advanced from Schweine furth upon Coburg, Graffenthal, and Saalfeld. By these movements the left wing of the Prussians, which stretched to a great distance from

their centre, was exposed to the attack of the whole of the French army. Aware of their danger, the Prussians at Hof, who were at the extremity of the line, and in the greatest danger of being cut off, fell back upon Schleitz before the arrival of marshal Soult. Some prisoners, however, were taken, and all the magazines at Hof fell into the hands of the enemy. Soult, followed by Ney, at the distance of half a day's march, pressed forward to Plauen in Upper Saxony, where he arrived on the 10th. The French centre passed the Saale at Saalburg, after a slight resistance on the part of the Prussians, and advanced on the 9th to Schleitz, where a body of 10,000 Prussians was posted under the command of of general Tauenzein. An action ensued, in which the Prussians were worsted with considerable loss, and next day the French advanced to Auma, and on the 11th to Gera, within half a day's march of Naumburg, where lay the great magazines of the Prussian army. The French left had equal success with the other divisions of their army. Lannes entered Coburg on the 8th, and advanced to Graffenthal on the 9th. On the 10th he attacked at Saalfeld the advanced guard of prince Hohenlohe, commanded by prince Lewis of Prussia, and gained over it a signal victory. Prince Lewis, to whose rashness and disobedience of orders in quitting his position at the bridge of Saalfeld, and advancing to attack the enemy, this misfortune was entirely to be attributed, fell in the action. The Prussians were completely routed, and lost 30 pieces of cannon, besides 600 men killed, 1000 taken prisoners, and a great number wounded.

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