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they willingly paid to her for relieving their necessities and grati. fying their wants: merchants, not armies, were the collectors of her foreign revenue: barter, not conquest, was her means of drawing to herself the riches of the world: and so fortunate for the general good of human society was the peculiarity of her situation, that it was impossible for her to increase her own wealth and resources, without communicating to other nations a portion of that spirit of industry which animated her people.

But, great and splendid as were the present circumstances, and fair as were in some respects the future prospects of England, her situation, on the whole, was, at this period, full of danger and alarm. She had embarked in hostilities with a most formidable adversary, and had hazarded a most unequal and dispro. portionate stake in the contest. The greatest injury which she could inflict on her enemy, was the destructien of his commerce, and the subjugation of his colonies-objects which she had already almost accomplished. She might also, if she were inclined, retard by her in. trigues, the peaceful settlement of his domestic affairs, and prolong, for a few years more, the reign of military government in his dominions. But she was unable to make any serious impression on his territories, or to weaken in the least the solid foundations of his power. While the utmost exertions of her hostility were limited to such paltry, ineffectual warfare, the blow she was exposed to in return was of a most deadly nature. It was not her power and pre-eminence only, but her existence, that was threatened with danger and this menace proceeded from an enemy, who was ac

tuated by every motive of policy, ambition, and resentment, to pur sue her utter ruin and destruction. England was the only power that had ever set bounds, to his ambition, or maintained with him a successful contest. She had defeated, in a former war, his most favourite en terprize, and had rejected, with scorn and contempt, the offers of peace, which, in the first overflowings of unlooked for success, he had addressed to her sovereign.-Daring the short interval of peace that succeeded to the revolutionary war, his pride had been shocked by the coldness with which she met his ad. vances, and his vanity had been mor tified and provoked, by the inces sant libels against his person and government, that issued from her press. After a short and unsatis factory experiment of peace, he had been disturbed by her interference, while employed in new modelling his empire; in pursuing plans of commercial and colonial aggrandisement; and perhaps in meditating fu ture schemes of aggression against the peace and liberties of mankind : and, without any adequate cause or provocation, he had been compelled by her, to make his choice between renewing the war, to which he was most averse, or renouncing, publicly, in presence of France and of Furope, that which was known to have been the favourite object of his ambition, and the point he had been most anxious to secure by the treaty of peace, which he had so recently signed. Since the renewal of hostilities it was to the machina tions of England, he believed, that he was to attribute a dangerous conspiracy within his dominions, which had threatened the existence of his government, and endangered B 2

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the safety of his person: and there could be no doubt, that it was to her enmity, he was chiefly indebted for the late confederacy against him, which, with such good fortune and distinguished ability, he had defeated and put down. England once subdued, he might plausibly argue, he would be the sole and undisputed master of the universe: but, while England retained her independence, her maritime superiority, and her inveteracy against him, he must expect to be thwarted in all his commercial and colonial views, confined to the continent of Europe, and compelled, for safety, to surround his throne with an armed force, instead of emerging, as he desired, from the precarious and uncertain condition of a military chief, to be the head of a regular government, and the founder of a dynasty of kings.

That Bonaparte, after the renewal of hostilities, was animated by the most, implacable hatred against England, and that he thenceforward considered her govern. ment, as the eternal enemy of his peace and repose, cannot well be doubted: but why he chose to begin the war with such ostentatious threats of invasion, such insolent denunciations of vengeance, is a point not easy to decide. It may have been merely to give vent to his own spleen, or to spirit up his people to a new war, that he used such impolitic, such unbecoming language towards his enemy. He may have acted from a deeper, though mistaken calculation, and supposed, that if he could terrify the English nation with the sound of his preparations, their government would yield to his terms; and, indeed, the publicity which he af

fected to give at this time to all his plans and operations, would seem to countenance such a conjecture. He may possibly have under-rated the difficulties of invasion, and seriously intended at first to carry his menaces into effect. But, if his object in these measures was to obtain peace by intimidation, never was his sagacity more in fault. The English were exasperated, not intimidated by his threats, and the little confidence, which they reposed at that time in the vigour of their own government, served only to call forth, in brighter colours, their zeal and ardour in defence of their country. It would neither be consonant to reason to believe, nor agreeable to truth to assert, that it was patrio. tism alone, which filled the ranks of the volunteers. Exemption from more dangerous and more disagreeable service contributed, no doubt, to swell the numbers of these citizen soldiers. But, it cannot be denied, that the spirit which the English nation manifested on this occasion, shewed at once their belief in the sincerity of Bonaparte's threats, and proved how far he had been mistaken in supposing, that their minds were enervated by luxury, or their military ardour extinguished by commerce.

But, though the body of the En glish people were thoroughly persuaded, that Bonaparte meant speedily to invade them, and waited only for a favourable opportunity to embark his forces; and, though there were men of talents and consideration in the country, who believed, or affected to believe, that such was his intention; those who had considered well his character, when they reflected on the difficul. ties and uncertainty of the attempt,

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could not bring themselves to be lieve, that he was in earnest in his threats. Such reasoners alledged, that of all men, who had risen from an obscure situation to a throne, Bonaparte was the most prudent and wary; that his caution and circumspection in forming his plans, were as remarkable as his boldness and activity in carrying them into exeman had ever cution; that no trusted so little to fortune, or used ensure so many precautions to in all his enterprises; that though ever no one had displayed greater presence of mind, or manifested greater resources in danger, no man had ever shewn himself more averse to engage unneces. sarily in hazardous undertakings, or more disposed to distrust his fortune in the hour of success. His moderation in victory, which he affected to call magnanimity, they attributed to his prudence; and the offers and professions of peace, which he was continually addressing to his enemies, they regarded, not as mere traps for popularity, but as indications of a frame of mind, which, though actuated by the most restless ambition, and the sport at times of the most ungovernable temper, was nevertheless too thorough. ly impressed with the instability of human affairs, not to seek every opportunity of guarding against the uncertainty of fortune. But, with such an opinion of Bonaparte's cha racter, it was difficult to believe him sincere in his threats of invasion For, though the against England. numbers and discipline of his army, the excellence of his officers, the genius and experience of his generals, might inspire him with the most confident hopes of success, provided the military force of his

empire could be brought into contact with that of England;' what expectations could he reasonably entertain, of transporting to her of sufficient an army shores force to subdue the country; and, if he landed with an army of infe therefore inadequate rior, and therefore strength, what chance had he, deprived of the assistance of a fleet, of maintaining his communications with the continent. But, while the invasion of England was difficult and unpromising of success, the consequences of failing in so great Besides the an enterprize, deserved the most serious consideration. disgrace that necessarily attends miscarriage in affairs of such magnitude; the injurious effects of the loss of reputation to a military chief, whose popularity was founded on his uninterrupted successes; the probability of discontent and mutiny in his army, at the sight of so many thousands of their comrades sacrificed to an experiment, which, if it failed, every one was sure to condemn; was it not clear, that powers, whom the continental France had recently humbled and defeated, would be roused by her misfortune, to try 'once more with Was the her the chance of war. disaster of Aboukir already forgot ten, or the formidable coalition to which it gave rise? Was Russia less hostile to France than in the time of Paul, or Austria better reconciled to the loss of so many of her ancient provinces? But, while there were so many reasons against attempting the invasion of England, Bonaparte had no urgent cause for stirring at all, and the prospect of many advantages by remaining perfectly quiet. The presence of his army at Boulogne was sufficient

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without invasion, to give occupation to a great part of the English army, and to keep England in a state of constant preparation and alarm. The expences of the war were exhausting the resources of Enggland, while the evils attending that state of things in France were comparatively small. The interruption of her foreign trade had produced little inconvenience, except in some particular districts, after the first six months of the war. Her agriculture was flourishing. Her domestic manufactures were encouraged by the difficulty of procuring manufactured articles from abroad. Her capital was invested in occu pations, which the hostility of England could not materially disturb. There was nothing to precipitate Bonaparte's measures, except the impatience of his army, which was pining in inaction at Boulogne. But it was not difficult to foresee, that, if the discontents of his troops should ever compel him to take the field, he would contrive to carve out for himself some easier work on the continent, than the perilous expedition against England.

But, whatever opinions might have been held with respect to the probability or improbability of invasion, antecedent to the period of which we treat, the issue of the late unfortunate campaign upon the continent had, at this time, materially altered the grounds, on which the question might formerly have been argued. It belongs not to us, as historians of 1806, to enter at length into the history, or to expatiate on the errors of the illconcerted and worse conducted coalition of 1805. Without any definite or attainable object in view, it was formed of discordant mate

rials, which accident had lately brought together, but which time had not cemented. Russia, recently in the closest connection with France, had been disgusted with her ally, on account of an atrocious and unprovoked act of violence, committed by order of the French government within the territory of the German empire, the independence of which Russia as well as France was bound by treaty to protect. The resentment of Russia for this offence had been increased by the bad faith of the French government towards herself, in some private transactions between them, not very reputable to either party; and the petulant and insolent tone, with which her complaints and claims of redress were answered by France, had provoked her to recal her minister from Paris, and to break off all in_ tercourse with the French govern. ment. In this moment of disgust and ill humour, she was unfortu nately prevailed upon by the solicitations of England, to come forward as the champion and protector of the liberties of Europe, which only two years before she had lent her aid to oppress and subvert. Austria, who still owed her a grudge for her conduct on that occasion, was, next, most unwillingly and reluctantly dragged into the confede racy. Prussia, without whose cooperation, hostilities against France should never have been resolved upon, was unaccountably neglected or overlooked in the formation of the alliance: and so little were her sentiments with regard to it known, that, even when the allies had taken the field, it was doubtful whether she would not throw her weight into the opposite scale, and declare

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against them.* To recapitulate the mistakes and oversights of the disastrous campaign that followed, would be a task as useless as it would be painful. Suffice it to say, that the armies of Austria were ruined without a battle; her capital was taken without resistance; and scarcely had the miserable remains of her army joined the Russians, who were coming up to their assistance, when they were compelled to hazard an engagement, which decided the fate of Europe, and completed the triumph of France over the continent. In this too memorable action it is true that a small part only of the Russian army was engaged. But, as the French justly boasted, the secret of the Russians was discovered, and the inferiority of their blind, though steady courage, when tried against the disciplined valour and scientific tactics of their opponents, was but too clearly and fully ascertained. Russia, indeed, was still unconscious and unapprehensive of this truth. Further and more severe lessons from experience, were necessary to convince her, that the power of an empire is not to be measured by its extent, and that Serfs and wandering Barbarians are removed by an immense interval from an equality with the civilized nations of the west of Europe.

After the peace of Presburgh, France was at liberty to direct her whole force and energies to the subjugation of England. No longer deterred from invasion by the

fear of a continental confederacy, she had only to decide what was the most expedient and practicable mode of conducting it. If it appeared possible to convert the Boulogne flotilla to any useful purpose, and employ it in the service for which it was prepared, Bonaparte might now risk a part of his army in such an expedition, without fear. ing a mutiny of his troops, or rebellion of his people, in case it failed. If transports and ships of war were thought necessary for carrying over his army, he had (besides the ports of France) Flushing and Ferrol, and Lisbon (when he chose), to receive and give shelter to the naval forces which he destined for the enterprize. If England had nothing to apprehend from any number of troops, which he could land upon her shores, there were other parts of the Bri tish empire, not equally invulnerable to his attacks. Ireland was exposed by her grievances to the se. duction of his emissaries, and easily accessible by her situation to the invasion of his army. Rebellion had in that country been put down, but discontent still existed in the minds of the people. which had lately blazed with such fury, was smothered, but not extinguished. The late rejection of the Catholic petition by parliament had not tended to conciliate that body: and, though the more moderate of the Catholics were ready to postpone the discussion of their claims, till the only obstacle to the

The fire,

"The arrival of the second Russian army was delayed more than a month by the first armaments which the court of Berlin threatened to oppose to those of Russia." Extract from a memoir on the situation of affairs, communicated by Count Stahremberg. Sup. Papers, P. 52.

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