lence, had marked the spirit of hatred which animated our enemies, and the moderation of our soldiers, who, tranquil at the aspect of all their movements, astonished only at receiving no orders, rested under the double confidence of courage and a just cause. Our first duty has been to pass the Rhine ourself, to form our camps, and to cause the sound of war to be heard. It has spread into the hearts of all our warriors. Rapid and combined marches have brought them, in the twinkling of an eye, to the spot we had indicated. All our camps are formed; we are going to march against the Prussian armies, and to repel force by force. At all times, we ought to say it, our heart is sorely affected at this constant preponderance which the genius of mischief obtains in Europe, occupied incessantly in traversing the designs we form for the tranquillity of Europe, the repose and happiness of the present generation-besieging every cabinet by every kind of seduction leading those astray whom it cannot corrupt-blinding them to their true interests, and launching them into the midst of disputes, without any other guide than the passions it has known how to inspire them with. The cabinet of Berlin itself has not chosen with deliberation the part it takes it has been thrown into it with art, and with malicious address. The king has found himself, all at once, an hundred leagues from his capital, on the frontiers of the confederation of the Rhine, in the midst of his army, and opposite the French troops dispersed in their cantonments, and who thought themselves justified in counting upon the ties which unite the two states, and upon the lavish

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protestations made in all circumstances by the court of Berlin. In a war so just, in which we take arms only to defend ourself, who have provoked by no act, by no pretension, and of which it would be impossible to assign the true cause, we reckon entirely on the support of the laws and the people; whom circumstances call upon, to give us new proofs of their love, of their devotion, and of their courage. On our part, no personal sacrifice will be painful to us, no danger will stop us, whenever it is the question to assure the rights, the honour, and the prosperity of our people.

Given at our imperial quarters, at Bamberg, the 7th Oct. 1806. By the emperor, (Signed) Napoleon. The minister secretary of state. (Signed) H. B. Maret.

Copy of the Note of M. de Knobelsdorff, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sept. 12, 1806.

The undersigned, feeling how much it is of the first importance to answer immediately the note which his excellency the prince of Benevento, minister for foreign affairs, has done him the honour of addressing to him this evening, feels himself compelled to limit himself to the representation of the following observations. The motives which have engaged the king, my master, to make armaments, have been the effect of a scheme of the enemies of France and Prussia; who, jealous of the intimacy which exists between these two powers, have done every thing in their power to alarm, by false reports, coming at once from every quarter. But above all, what

convinced of this by experience; this moment was the most painful of his reign.

It was the affair of France to reject the modifications under which the king had confirmed the treaty, if she did not approve them. But she avoided doing this, for the whole Prussian army was still under arms. She continued to be lavish of assurances of friendship: she fulfilled the treaty as far as it suited her; but when his majesty wished to reap the only advantage which he had proposed to himself from the late negotiations, and which was nearest to his heart, she suddenly altered her language. The modifications, added to the treaty of Vienna, were now rejected at Paris. Endeavours were made to force Prussia into the most injurious measures; and when count Haugwitz, who was at Paris, remonstrated against this, the unconditional fulfilment of the treaty was haughtily insisted on, as were the immediate cession of the three provinces, and the recal of the patent by which the occupation of Hanover was declared provisional. Prussia was required to resign a part of the advantages stipulated, and to shut the ports against the British flag, in the same manner as if the French had returned into the electorate.

The king, at length, was perfectly convinced of the true character of the friendship of the emperor of the French-a soporific draught for a power which still feels its own strength; an instrument of degradation, and finally of subjection, to every power which no longer possesses strength.

In the mean time, Napoleon was is possession of every advantage. The Prussian army had returned, his own, after some movements of

no consequence, at which deceived Germany prematurely rejoiced, on some frivolous pretences, established itself on this side the Rhine. The first conflict might produce misfortunes. War which is not, under all circumstances, the greatest of evils, might become such under those then existing. The king determined to continue the part he had hitherto acted, for some time longer. Wishing to preserve his force, now more than ever necessary to Europe, and at least to secure the tranquillity of the north, he confirmed the new treaty. Confidence, however, was now utterly lost. Prussia was convinced that, on the first opportunity to weaken her without danger, she might expect an attack from her pretended ally; convinced there is a degree of ambition which nothing can satisfy-which proceeds, without intermission, from usurpation to usurpation, sometimes without a plan, but ever intent on destruction; careless of the choice of means, and employing alike arms, and the pen, violence, and oaths. But even with this conviction, so great is the unfortunate superiority obtained by such policy, over those who wish only to be just, the king fulfilled all the conditions of the treaty with the punctuality of a faithful ally. It is known what the consequences were with respect to the connections of his majesty with England. France gained nothing by this; but she triumphed in secret at the thought of having disunited two courts, the union of which might have been dangerous to her; and what, in the views of France, gave the principal value to her alliance with the king was, that this alliance isolated his majesty, since it produced an opinion, that Prassia was a participator

It was not enough that these despotic acts were immediately injuri ous to Prussia. The emperor of France was intent on rendering them sensible to the person of the king in all his allied states. The existence of the prince of Orange was under the common guarantee of the two powers; for the king had acknowledged the political changes in Holland only under this condition. For several years this prince had expected that the claims, secured by the mutual stipulations of Prussia and France, should be satisfied. The Batavian republic had been willing to enter into an accommodation, but the emperor Napoleon forbad it. Neither the recollection of this circumstance, nor the consideration of the ties of blood which united his majesty to the prince, nor the declaration, twenty times repeated, that the king could not desert the rights of his brother-inlaw, could prevent his being added to the heap of victims. He was the first who was deprived of his paternal property. Eight days before, he had received from the emperor a letter, condoling with him, in the customary forms, on the death of his father, and wishing him joy on

each throws a light on the whole. Cleves had been allotted to prince Murat. Scarcely become a sovereign, he wished likewise to be a conqueror.-His troops took possession of the abbies of Essen, Werden, and Elten, under the pretext that they appertained to the duchy of Cleves, though they were entirely territories newly acquired, and there was not the shadow of a connection between them and the ceded province. Great labour was employed, in vain, to give even a colour to this outrage.

Wesel was to belong to the new duke, not to the emperor Napoleon. The king had never resolved to give up the last fortress on the Rhine into the power of France.-Without a word by way of explanation, Wesel was annexed to a French department.

The existing state of the Austrian monarchy, and of the Porte, had been mutually guaranteed. The emperor Napoleon certainly wished that Prussia should be bound by this guarantee; for in his hands it was an instrument which he might employ as suited his politics, a pretext for demanding sacrifices in a contest which his ambition might occasion. He himself, however, did not observe it longer than it contributed to his interest. Ragusa, though under the protection of the Porte, was taken possession of by his troops. Gradiska and Aquileia were wrested from Austria, under nearly the same pretexts which had been employed when the French seized the three abbeys.