Upon the French revolution, and the coalition of the European powers against France, it is but just to believe, that the difference between these great men, was one of real political opinion. As far as it was a measure of mere foreign policy, the one was tempted to it by the flattering hope of increasing the military power of Britain, and extending her influence upon the continent. At the same time it afforded the best counteraction of the turbulent spirit of reform, which then so much embarrassed him at home, and which, had he not suppressed it, by occupying the public attention with foreign war, and by strong and unusual measures of domestic coercion,would certainly have effected a reform in parliament, by means which must have endangered the due equipoise of the well adjusted powers which that constitution combines in a mixed government. The other was led to observe more thoroughly the consequence of an attack upon the infant republic of France, and knowing that the coalition was composed, as all coalitions are, of powers jealous of each other, and that England neither possessed a great military establishment, nor a Marlborough to give to a small one an ascendancy over its allies, and a superiority over its more numerous enemies, wisely predicted that the conflict must end in rendering France a nation of soldiers, who would become the masters of all the continent. Whether the minister, having quenched the flames of popular contention at home, might have chosen a happy moment for the cessation of the war abroad, is a question which puts the political sagacity of Mr. Pitt to a test the most difficult for his reputation. But, it must be considered, when perhaps he desired peace most it was unattainable; for he had exasperated and aggrandized the enemy, and had raised up a war party, and, created an unusual military establishment at home. If this could have been avoided, it would have been well: since, in the end, great military establishments have generally led nations to external conquest at the expence of domestic liberty. On this ground and because even successful war must have this tendency, Mr. Fox opposed it with firmness, and, as we ought to believe, with sincerity; for in support of his opinions he employed his pen in the only composition which he ever avowed, and sacrificed even the friendship of Burke to his conviction of their truth. To conclude our parallel, they were men of such transcendent talents and towering ambition, that had they lived in a republic, one or the other would probably have been dictator; in an absolute monarchy, either might have founded a new dynasty; while in a mixed government they were rival statesmen, alternately ministers, and during life the leaders of the house of commons, whose names may be fairly placed in competition with any of the ministers of modern empires, or the popular leaders of ancient republics. Let those who think less of them, consider how much more men are to be governed by their prejudices and their passions, than by their reason, and then endeavour to take the lead in opposing or in directing the affairs of a mixed government, like ours, in times of difficulty, with greater talents, more virtue, and less 3 N 3 faction faction; for ourselves, we shall still continue to think, that under the guidance of such men, Britain must ever remain great, prosperous, and invincible. Some Account of Lieut. Col. M'Leod, of the 78th Regiment, with a Narrative of the Battle of Maida. Lieut. colonel Patrick M'Leod, was third son of Donald M'Leod, of Geanies, esquire; sheriff depute of the shires of Ross and Cromarty, in Scotland; and was born at Geanies in Rossshire on the 18th April, 1776. Being destined for the army, an ensign's commission in the 42nd regiment was procured for him immediately after his leaving college, and Great Britain being then at peace, he obtained leave of absence from his regiment, to repair to a military academy at Brunswick, to study there the principles of his profession. After two years' residence at Brunswick, he returned home on the breaking out of the war with France, in 1793, and soon after accompanied his regiment, with the rank of lieutenant, to the continent, where he served his first campaign. Having afterwards obtained a captain's commission in the 2d battalion of the 78th, he embarked with it in the expedition against the Cape of Good Hope, assisted at the capture of that important settlement, and, though still a very young man, such was the opinion entertained of him by sir Alured Clarke and sir James Craig, that he was appointed by them fort major of Cape Town. This situation he retained, till the 2d battalion of the 78th was ordered to India, to be incorporated with the first. Captain M'Leod accompanied the battalion to India, and remained there till 1802, when bad health compelled him to return to Europe Soon after his arrival in England, he became major of the 78th by purchase, and was then appointed to the command of a battalion of recruits, for different regiments, in India, collected in the Isle of Wight, with whom he was dispatched soon afterwards to the isle of Guernsey, then threatened with invasion from the coast of France. While stationed in Guernsey, major M'Leod prepared a plan of defence for the island, in case it should be invaded, which was highly approved of by the general officer, commanding in the island, to whom it was submitted. Major general Fraser having, in the mean time, obtained an order from government for raising again a 2nd battalion of the 78th, major M'Leod was recalled from Guernsey and sent to Scotland to assist in superintending the levy, and when the battalion was completed, he was appointed to the immediate command of it, with the rank of lieut. colonel. The care and attention he bestowed in forming and disciplining this young corps were unremitted, and the steadiness they displayed at the battle of Maida, is a proof that his labour was not thrown away upon them. We have subjoined the orders which he issued to his battalion, before their disembarking, and the letter which he wrote to general Fraser, giving an account of the battle. No one can read without a mixed sensation of pleasure and regret, the natural and animated description of his feelings, as he looked along the line, and observed the and diness of the young young soldiers he had formed, while he led them on to make their first charge against an enemy. It is worth remarking, that when the battle of Maida was fought, hardly eighteen months had elapsed since the battalion which so distinguished itself under his command, had been first passed as a regiment. After the evacuation of Calabria, colonel M'Leod remained in Sicily, till a detachment of the army, in which the 2d battalion of the 78th was included, received orders to proceed to Egypt, and take possession of Alexandria. In the second fatal attempt upon Rosetta, this battalion of the 78th was employed; and evinced, during that disastrous expedition, the same steady courage and discipline, which they had displayed on the plains of Maida. Col. M'Leod commanded the advanced guard of the army, in its march from Alexandria; and after dispossessing the enemy of the different posts which they occupied, drove them into Rosetta. While the rest of the army invested the town. He was dispatched, with a small reinforcement, to the post of El Hamed. The particulars of the melancholy catastrophe which followed, are not yet fully known to the public. But the detachment at El Hamed was overpowered and cut off; and col. M'Leod fell during the action, fighting bravely at the head of his grenadier company; and making every possible exertion to extricate his small corps from the furious attacks of his numerous and barbarous assailants. Lieut. Col. M'Leod's BattalionOrders, on board the Transports, previous to disembarking in Calabria, 29th of June, 1806. On Board the Valiant Transport, at Sea, June 29, 1806. As the battalion will, in all probability, on disembarkation, have to act in the face of an enemy; lieut. col. M'Leod thinks it proper to state to all officers and non-commissioned officers, the most essential points of their attention while so situated. It must be obvious to all, that the steady compactness of any body of men, while either halted or in movement, is that which makes it appear most respectable and most formidable to an enemy, as being, in that state, more prepared, either to make, or repel an attack; while a body of men, in any degree separated or unconnected, gives advantages of an alarming nature to an active enemy. The only manner in which this principle can be sustained, amidst the hurry and bustle likely to take place on such an occasion, is by the animated exertion of the officers at the heads of companies, aided by their junior officers and non-commissioned officers, to preserve the most perfect compactness in their own companies, in every situation, in the first instance; and in the next, that connection with their companies on right and left, which secures the compactness of the battalion. Officers commanding companies, should therefore make their junior officers and non-commissioned officers perfectly familiar with the particular duty that will be required from them on this occasion; and they should be so divided in the rear as to furnish the most effectual aid in securing instantaneous and implicit obedience to the orders of their commanding officer: they should, for this purpose, be frequently spoken to by their com3 N 4 manding manding officers, collectively and individually, previous to debarkation; and through their means, care should also be taken to instil into their men, that all our success will depend upon their exact attention, at the moment, to the orders they receive. Next to compactness, the attention of all officers and noncommissioned officers will be required in endeavouring to preserve coolness and steadiness while firing at, or under the fire of an enemy, and to prevent, by every means in their power, an unnecessary waste of ammunition; a fault, which young soldiers are too apt to fall into: sometimes a fire is opened upon an imaginary enemy, the consequence of an excessive anxiety and eagerness; it therefore evidently requires much collectedness and attention in an officer at the head of a company, to prevent such an error. It must be well recollected by officers in command of companies, that whatever accident may separate the companies of a battalion from each other, no circumstance should arise to make a separation of a company, as it must always be kept compact, as already mentioned. Lieut.-col. M'Leod most earnestly entreats all officers commanding companies, not to permit their attention or eyes to be taken for one moment from their companies, as upon their unremitting exertions in preserving compactness and composure, together with the effect of their own example, in an energetic and implicit obedience to all orders they receive from superior officers, will depend the rendering in any respect effectual, the natural spirit and ardour which now influences every rank and individual in the battalion. While the battalion is in movement, major Stewart will direct his attention to, and guide the conduct of, the three rear companies of the battalion; while formed in line, the three left-hand companies will, in a similar way, be his charge. The serj. major will constantly attend him to circulate his orders. Major Macdonell will, in a similar manner, take charge of the three central companies: assistant serj. major Cooper will constantly attend him for the same purpose; lieut..col. M'Leod proposing to guide the four leading companies in column of march, or right hand companies, while formed in line. The men are to land and march with their spats over their hose, to preserve the latter. If the battalion should be ordered to disembark with cooked provisions, the necessaries must be somehow put up in the inside of the blanket. Such magazines as have not yet been fixed on, to be carefully put into the haversack: it is hoped that officers are now aware of the value of every round of ammunition, and that they have taken every precaution to instil the same principle into every individual man in their companies. Lieut.col. M'Leod is most proud to find, that the disposition of all the officers and non-commissioned officers is such, as to produce in his mind a well-grounded expectation that, when an opportunity offers, their zeal and gallantry will be publicly established and confirmed. It must be recollected by all, that the 2nd battalion of the 78th regiment, has yet its fame in the field to establish, and by it to support, in its fullest extent, the well earned reputation of its elder battalion. Let every individual individual, therefore, belonging to it, feel proud of the prospect held out to him, and to endeavour to display in every part of his conduct, all the characteristics of the genuine Highland soldier., Lieut.-Col. M'Leod's Letter to Maj. Gen. M. Fraser, giving an Account of the Battle of Maida, dated July 7, 1806. Camp near Maida, Calabria, 7th July, 1806. My dear general, It is now only that I have been able to obtain a leisure moment, to retrace in my memory the different particulars in the progress of an enterprise undertaken by maj. gen. sir John Stewart, to relieve this province of the Neapolitan kingdom from the tyranny and oppression of our boasting and insolent foe; and although extreme fatigue and consequent lassitude render me at this moment unequal to the task, I will, nevertheless, exert myself to convey to you such a view of the whole as is immediately present to my recollection. Your 2nd battalion may, probably, be frequently introduced in the recital, owing, in the first instance, to my naturally interesting feelings in respect to them; and next to a conviction, that a faithful representation of their proceedings in particular, cannot fail to excite in you an equal degree of interest. Dispatches being now preparing, I must not delay longer, although sensible that my narrative will bear upon it the appearance of hurry. Soon after I wrote you of our review at Messina, stating my gratifying feelings, in the favourable impression-it excited among the several general officers of the army; we were ordered, with two other regiments, to march to a flying encampment at Milazzo, about 26 miles N. W. of Messina: the dissi pation of Messina had augmented the number of our sick list to about 100 rank and file, whom I was obliged to leave there; so that our effective number. at the camp did not exceed 700. Brigadier-general Acland commanded the brigade, and I must here state, how strong my feelings of obligation are to him for forwarding, at head-quarters, such objects as I proposed for the good of the battalion, and the distinguished manner in which he has uniformly treated us. We were suddenly apprised of an embarkation of the brigade on the morning of the 27th June; and it took place accordingly in the bay of Milazzo, on the same evening; the regiments being ordered to put up their packs in store, and embark in light marching order: The extent and destination of the enterprise was, at this time, matter of the most anxious, nay irksome, speculation, in my mind, under the impressions and opinions I had formed, together with all the information I could obtain, on the circumstances of the enemy in the neighbouring continent; I therefore did not conceive it to have so formidable an object as an invasion of these provinces, without any apparent co-operation or support beyond our own very limit. ed means. The expedition from Milazzo and Messina united in the course of the following evening, and came to an anchor close in shore, in a bay in the gulph of St. Euphemia, being the northern boundary of Lower Calabria. In the evening of the 30th of June, at half past one o'clock in the morning, the debarkation of the army commenced under the |