munity. Their treasury would contain five hundred dollars. Three are a majority; and they, by supposition, have contributed three hundred as their portion, and the other two (the minority) two hundred. The three have the right to make the appropriations as they may think proper. The question is, how would the principle of the absolute and unchecked majority operate, under these circumstances, in this little community? If the three be governed by a sense of justice-if they should appropriate the money to the objects for which it was raised, the common and equal benefit of the five, then the object of the association would be fairly and honestly effected, and each would have a common interest in the government. But, should the majority pursue an opposite course; should they appropriate the money in a manner to benefit their own particular interest, without regard to the interest of the two, (and that they will so act, unless there be some efficient check, he who best knows human nature will least doubt,) who does not see that the three and the two would have directly opposite interests, in reference to the action of the government? The three, who contributed to the common treasury but three hundred dollars, could, in fact, by apropriating the five hundred to their own use, convert the action of the government into the means of making money, and, of consequence, would have a direct interest in increasing the taxes. They put in three hundred and

take out five; that is, they take back to themselves all that they had put in-and, in addition, that which was put in by their associates; or, in other words, taking taxation and appropriation together, they have gained, and their associates have lost two hundred dollars by the fiscal action of the government. Opposite interests, in reference to the action of the government, are thus created between them; the one having an interest in favour and the other against the taxes; the one to increase and the other to decrease the taxes; the one to retain the taxes when the money is no longer wanted, and the other to repeal them when the objects for which they were levied have been executed.

Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised to twenty-four individuals, to be governed in like manner by the will of a majority; it is obvious that the same principle would divide them into two interests— into a majority and a minority, thirteen against eleven, or in some other proportion: and that all the consequences which he had shown to be applicable to the small community of five, would be equally applicable to the greater the cause not depending upon the number, but resulting necessarily from the action of the government itself. Let us now suppose that, instead of governing themselves directly in an assembly of the whole, without the intervention of agents, they should adopt the representative principle, and that, instead of being governed

by a majority of themselves, they should be governed by a majority of their representatives. It is obvious that the operation of the system would not be affect ed by the change; the representatives being responsible to those who choose them, will conform to the will of their constituents, and would act as they would do, were they present, and acting for themselves; and the same conflict of interest which we have shown would exist in one case, would equally exist in the other. In either case, the inevitable result would be a system of hostile legislation on the part of the majority, or the stronger interest against the minority or the weaker interest; the object of which, on the part of the former, would be to exact as much as possible from the latter, which would necessarily be resisted by all the means in their power. Warfare by legislation, would thus be commenced between the parties, with the same object, and not less hostile than, that which is carried on between distinct and rival nations-the only distinction would be in the instruments and the mode. Enactments in the one case, would supply what could only be effected by arms in the other, and the inevitable operation would be to engender the most hostile feelings between the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism-that feeling which embraces the whole, and substitute in its place the most violent party attachment; and, instead of having one common center of attachment,

around which the affections of the community might rally; there would in fact, be two-the interest of the majority, to which those who constitute that majority would be more attached than they would be to the whole; and that of the minority, to which they in like manner would also be more attached than to the interest of the whole. Faction would thus take the place of patriotism, and, with the loss of patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow, and in its train anarchy, and finally despotism, or the establishment of absolute power in a single individual, as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile interests, on the principle that it is better to submit to the will of a single individual, who, by being made lord and master of the whole community, would have an equal interest in the protection of all the parts.

Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calamitous train of consequences, this little community should adopt a written constitution, with limitations restricting the will of the majority, in order to protect the minority against the oppression which he had shown would necessarily result without such restrictions. It is obvious that the case would not be in the slightest degree varied, if the majority be left in possession of the right of judging exclusively of the extent of its powers, without any right on the part of the minority, to enforce the restrictions imposed by the constitution on the will of the majority. The point is

Nothing can be more certain, than that when a constitution grants power, and imposes limitations on the exercise of that power, whatever interests may obtain possession of the government, will be in favour of extending the power at the expense of the limitations; and that, unless those in whose behalf the limitations were imposed, have, in some form or mode, the right of enforcing them, the power will ultimately supersede the limitation, and the government must operate precisely in the same manner as if the will of the majority governed without constitution or limitation of power.

He had thus presented all possible modes, in which a government based upon the will of an absolute majority, would be modified, and had demonstrated that, in all its forms, whether in a majority of the people, as in a mere democracy, or in a majority of their representatives, without a constitution, or with a constitution, to be interpreted by the will of the majority, the result would be the same; two hostile interests would inevitably be created by the action of the government, to be followed by hostile legislation, and that by faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism.

The great and solemn question here presented itself is there any remedy for these evils; on the decision of which depends the question, whether the people can govern themselves, which has been so often asked

doubt. There is a remedy, and but one, the effects of which, whatever may be the form, is to organize society in reference to this conflict of interests, which springs out of the action of the government; and which can only be done by giving to each part the right of self-protection; which, in a word, instead of considering the community of twenty-four as a single community, having a common interest, and to be governed by the single will of an entire majority, shall, upon all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen against the eleven, take the will, not of the twenty-four as a unit, but that of the thirteen and that of the eleven separately, the majority of each governing the parts, and where they concur, governing the whole, and where they disagree, arresting the action of the government. This he would call the concurring, as distinct from the absolute majority. It would not be as was generally supposed, a minority governing a majority. In either way, the number would be the same, whether taken as the absolute, or as the concurring majority. Thus, the majority of the thirteen is seven, and of the eleven six, and the two together make thirteen, which is the majority of twenty-four. But though the number is the same, the mode of counting is essentially different; the one representing the strongest interest, and the other the weaker interests of the community. The first mistake was in supposing

that the government of the absolute majority is the government of this people-that beau ideal of a perfect government, which had been so enthusiastically entertained in every age by the generous and patriotic, where civilization and liberty had made the smallest progress. There could be no great error; the government of the people is the government of the whole community-of the twenty-four, the self government of all the parts; too perfect to be reduced to practice in the present, or any past stage of human society. The government of the absolute majority, instead of the government of the people, is but the government of the strongest interests, and when not efficiently checked, is the most tyrannical and oppressive that can be devised. Between this ideal perfection on one side, and despotism on the other, none other can be devised but that which considers society, in reference to its parts, as differently affected by the action of the government, and which takes the sense of cach part separately, and thereby the sense of the whole in the manner already illustrated.

These principles, as he had already stated, are not affected by the number of which the community may be composed, and are just as applicable to one of thirteen millions, the number which composes ours, as of the small community of twenty-four, which I have supposed for the purpose of illustration; and are not less applicable to the twentyfour states united in one com

munity, than to the case of the twenty-four individuals. There is, indeed, a distinction between a large and a small community, not affecting the principle, but the violence of the action. In the former, the similarity of the interests of all the parts, will limit the oppression from the hostile action of the parts in a great degree, to the fiscal action of the government merely; but in the large community, spreading over a country of great extent, and having a great diversity of interests, with different kinds of labour, capital and production, the conflict and oppression will extend, not only to a monopoly of the appropriations, on the part of the stronger interests, but will end in unequal taxes, and a general conflict between the entire interests of conflicting sections; which, if not arrested by the most powerful checks, will terminate in the most oppressive tyranny that can be conceived, or in the destruction of the community itself.

If we turn our attention from these supposed cases, and direct it to our government, and its actual operation, we will find a practical confirmation of the truth of what has been stated, not only of the oppressive operation of the system of an absolute majority, but also a striking and beautiful illustration, in the formation of our system, of the principle of the concurring majority, as distinct from the absolute, which he had asserted to be the only means of efficiently checking the abuse of power,

and, of course, the only solid foundation of constitutional liberty. That our government, for many years, has been gradually verging to consolidation; that the constitution has gradually become a dead letter; and that all the restrictions upon the power of government have been virtually removed, so as practically to convert the general government into a government of an absolute majority, without check or limitation, cannot be denied by any one who has impartially observed its operation.

It is not necessary to trace the commencement and gradual progress of the causes which have produced this change in our system; it is sufficient to state that the change has taken place within the last few years. What has been the result? Precisely that which might have been anticipated; the growth of faction, corruption, anarchy, and if not despotism itself, its near approach, as witnessed in the provisions of this bill. And from what have these consequences sprung? We have been involved in no war! We have been at peace with all the world. We have been visited with no national calamity. Our people have been advancing in general intelligence, and, I will add, as great and alarming as has been the advance of political corruption, the morals and virtue of the community at large, have been advancing in improvement. What, he would again repeat, is the cause? No other can be assigned but a departure from the fundamental principles of the

constitution, which has converted the government into the will of an absolute and irresponsible majority, and which, by the laws which must inevitably govern in all such majorities, have placed in conflict the great interests of the country, by a system of hostile legislation; by an oppressive and unequal imposition of taxes; by unequal and profuse appropriations, and by rendering the entire labour and capital of the weaker interest subordinate to the stronger.

This is the cause and these the fruits, which have converted the government into a mere instrument of taking money from one portion of the community to be given to another, and which has rallied around it a great, a powerful and mercenary corps of office holders, office seekers, and expectants, destitute of principle and patriotism, and who have no standard of morals or politics but the will of the executive-the will of him who has the distribution of the loaves and fishes. He held it impossible for any one to look at the theoretical illustration of the principle of the absolute majority in the cases which he had supposed, and not be struck with the practical illustration in the actual operation of our government. Under every circumstance, the majority will ever have its American system-(he meant nothing offensive to any senator)-but the real meaning of the American system, is that system of plunder which the strongest interest has ever waged, and will ever wage against