confederation, but as valid under this constitution. This, then, sir, is declared to be a constitution, A constitution is the fundamental law of the state; and this is expressly declared to be the supreme law. It is as if the people had said, "we prescribe this fundamental law," or "this supreme law;" for they do say that they establish this constitution, and that it shall be the supreme law. They say that they ordain and establish it. Now, sir, what is the common application of these words? We do not speak of ordaining leagues and compacts. If this was intended to be a compact or league, and the states to be parties to it, why was it not so said? Why is there found no one expression in the whole instrument indicating such intent? The old confederation was expressly called a league, and into this league it was declared that the states, as states, severally entered. Why was not similar language used in the constitution, if a similar intention had existed? Why was it not said, "the states enter into this new league, the states form this new confederation," or "the states agree to this new compact?" Or, why was it not said, in the language of the gentleman's resolution, that the people of the several states acceded to this compact in their sovereign capacities? What reason is there for supposing that the framers of the constitution rejected expressions appropriate to their own meaning, and adopted others wholly at war with that meaning? Again, sir, the constitution speaks of that political system which is established as "the government of the United States.” Is it not doing strange violence to language, to call a league or a compact between sovereign powers a government? The government of a state is that organization in which the political power resides. It is the political being, created by the constitution or fundamental law. The broad and clear difference between a government and a league or compact is, that a government is a body politic; it has a will of its own; and it possesses powers and faculties to execute its own purposes. Every compact looks to some power to enforce its stipulations. Even in a compact between sovereign communities, there always exists this ultimate reference to a power to insure its execution; although in such case, this power is but the force of one party against the force ef anotherthat is to say, the power of war. But a government executes its decisions by its own supreme authority. Its use of force in compelling obedience to its own enactments is not war. It contemplates no opposing party having a right of resistance. It rests on its own power to enforce its own will; and when it ceases to possess this power, it is no longer a government. SO Mr. president, I concur generally in the very able speech of the gentleman from Virginia, near me, (Mr. Rives,) that it is not without diffidence and regret, that I venture to differ with him on any point. His opinions, sir, are redolent of the doctrines of a very distinguished school, for which I have the highest regard, of whose doctrines I can say, what I also can say of the gentleman's speech, that, while I concur in the results, I must be permitted to hesitate about some of the premises. I do not agree that the constitution is a compact between states in their sovereign capacities. I do not agree that, in strictness of language, it is a compact at all. But I do agree, that it is founded on consent or agreement, or on compact, if the gentleman prefer that word, and means no more by it than voluntary consent or agreement. The constitution, sir, is not a contract, but the result of a contract; meaning, by contract, no more than assent. Founded on consent, it is a government proper. Adopted by the agreement of the people of the United States, when adopted, it has become a constitution. The people have agreed to make a constitution; but when made, that constitution becomes what its name imports. It is no longer a mere agreement. Our laws, sir, have their foundation in the agreement or consent of the two houses of congress. We say, habitually, that one house proposes a bill, and the other agrees to it; but the result of this agreement is not a compact, but a law. The law, the statute, is not the agreement, but something created by the agreement; and something which, when created, has a new character, and acts by its own authority. So, the constitution of the United States, founded in or on the consent of the people, may be said to rest on compact or consent; but it is itself not the compact, but its result. When a people agree to erect a government, and actually erect it, the thing is done, and the agreement is at an end. The compact is executed, and the end designed by it attained. Henceforth, the fruit of the agreement exists, but the agreement itself is merged in its own accomplishment; since there can be no longer a subisting agreement, or compact, to form a constitution or government, after that constitution or government has been actually formed and established. It appears to me, Mr. president, that the plainest account of the establishment of this government presents the most just and philosophical view of its foundation. The people of the several states had their separate state governments; and between the states there also existed a confederation. With this condition of things the people were not satisfied, as the confederation had been found not to fulfil its intended objects. It was proposed, therefore, to erect a new common government, which should possess certain definite powers, such as regarded the prosperity of the people of all the states; and to be formed upon the general model of American constitutions. This proposal was assented to, and an instrument was presented to the people of the several states for their consideration. They ap proved it, and agreed to adopt it as a constitution. They executed that agreement, they adopted the constitution as a constitution, and, henceforth, it must stand as a constitution, until it shall be altogether destroyed. Now, sir, is not this the truth of the whole matter? and is not all that we have heard of compact between sovereign states the mere effect of a theoretical and artificial mode of reasoning upon the subject? a mode of reasoning which disregards plain facts for the sake of hypothesis? Mr. president, the nature of sovereignty, or sovereign power, has been extensively discussed by gentlemen on this occasion, as it generally is, when the origin of our government is debated. But I confess myself not entirely satisfied with arguments and illustrations drawn from that topic. The sovereignty of government is an idea belonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing is known in North America. Our governments are all limited. In Europe, sovereignty is of feudal origin, and imports no more than the state of the sovereign. It comprises his rights, duties, exemptions, prerogatives, and powers. But, with us, all power is with the people. They, alone, are sovereign; and they erect what governments they please, and confer on them such powers as they please. None of these governments is sovereign, in the European sense of the word, all being restrained by written constitutions. It seems to me, therefore, that we only perplex ourselves when we attempt to explain the relations existing between the general government and the several state governments, according to those ideas of sovereignty, which prevail under systems essentially different from our own. But, sir, to return to the constitution itself, let me inquire what it relies upon for its own continuance and suppport. I hear it often suggested that the states, by refusing to appoint senators and electors, might bring this government to an end. Perhaps that is true, but the same may be said of the state goverments themselves. Suppose the legislature of a state, having the power to appoint the governor and the judges, should omit that duty; would not the state governments remain unorganized? No doubt, all elective governments may be broken up by a general abandonment, on the part of those intrusted with political powers, of their appropriate duties. But one popular government has, in this respect, as much security as another. The maintenance of this constitution does not depend on the plighted faith of the states, as states, to support it; and this again shows that is not a league. It relies on individual duty and obligation. The constitution of the United States creates direct relations between this government and individuals. This government may punish individuals for treason, and all other crimes in the code, when committed against the United States. It has pow er, also, to tax individuals, in any mode, and to any extent; and it possesses the further power of demanding from individuals military service. Nothing, certainly, can more clearly distinguish a government from a confederation of states, than the possession of these powers. No closer relations can exist between individuals and any go vernment. On the other hand, the government owes high and solemn duties to every citizen of the country. It is bound to protect him in his most important rights and interests. It makes war for his protection, and no other government in the country can make war. It makes peace for his protection, and no other government can make peace. It maintains armies and navies for his defence and security, and no other government is allowed to maintain them. He goes abroad beneath its flag, and carries over all the earth a national character, imparted to him by this government, and which no other government can impart. In whatever relates to war, to peace, to commerce, he knows no other government, All these, sir, are connexions as dear and sacred as can bind individuals to any government on earth. It is not, therefore, a compact between states, but a government proper, operating directly upon individuals, yielding to them protection on one hand, and demanding from them obedience on the other. There is no language in the whole constitution applicable to a confederation of states. If the state be parties, as states, what are their rights, and what their respective covenants and stipulations? And where are their rights, covenants, and stipulations expressed? The states engage for nothing, they promise nothing. In the articles of confederation they did make promises, and did enter into engagements, and did plight the faith of each state for their fulfilment; but, in the constitution there is nothing of that kind. The reason is, that, in the constitution it is the people who speak, and not the states. The people ordain the constitution, and therein address themselves to the states, and to the legislatures of the states, in the language of injunction and prohibition. The constitution utters its behests in the name and by the authority of the people, and it exacts not from states any plighted public faith to maintain it. On the contrary, it makes its own preservation depend on individual duty, and individual obligation. Sir, the states cannot omit to appoint senators and electors. It is not a matter resting in state discretion or state pleasure. The constitution has taken better care of its own preservation. It lays its hands on individual conscience, and individual duty. It incapacitates any man to sit in the legislature of a state, who shall not first have taken a solemn oath to support the constitution of the United States. From the obligation of this oath no state power can discharge him. All the members of all the state legislatures as are religiously bound to support the constitution of the United States, as they are to support their own state constitution. Nay, sir, they are as solemnly sworn to support it, as we ourselves are, who are members of congress. No member of a state legislature can refuse to proceed, at the proper time, to elect senators to congress, or to provide for the choice of electors of president and vice president, any more than the members can refuse, when the appointed day arrives, to meet the members of the other house, to count the votes for those officers, and ascertain who are chosen. In both cases the duty binds, and with equal strength, the conscience of the individual member, and it is imposed on all by an oath in the same words. Let it then, never be said, sir, that it is a matter of discretion with the states, whether they will continue the government, or break it up, by refusing to appoint senators, and to elect electors. They have no discretion in the matter. The members of their legislatures cannot avoid doing either, so often as the time arrives, without a direct violation of their duty and their oaths; such a violation as would break up any other go vernment. Looking still further to the provisions of the constitution itself, in order to learn its true character, we find its great apparent purpose to be, to unite the people of all the states under one general government, for certain definite objects, and to the extent of this Union, to restrain the separate authority of the states. Congress only can declare war-therefore, when one state is at war with a foreign nation, all must be at war. The president and the senate only can make peace; when peace is made for one state, therefore, it must be made for all. Can any thing be conceived more preposterous, than that one state should have power to nullify the proceedings of the general government, respecting peace and war? When war is declared by a law of congress, can a single state nullify that law, and remain at peace? And yet she may nullify that law as well as any other. If the president and senate make peace, may one state, nevertheless, con, tinue the war? And yet, if she can nullify a law, she may quite as well nullify a treaty. The truth is, Mr. President, and no ingenuity of argument, no subtlety of distinction can evade it, that as to certain purposes, the people of the United States are one people. They are one in making war, and one in making peace; they are one in regulating commerce, and one in laying duties of impost. The very end and purpose of the constitution was to make them one people in these particulars; and it has effectually accomplished its object. All this is apparent on the face of the constitution itself. I have already said, sir, that to obtain a power of direct legislation over the people, especially in regard to imposts, |