oppose the object of the bill; he would not have raised his voice on the subject, if the motion did not call on him to violate a provision of the constitution of the United States. He had referred the senate to a case, in which the chair had evinced an inclination to decide that the bill could not be received. At the time when this intimation was given, he (Mr. F.) had thought that the decision was incorrect, and that then, as now, it was a question for the decision of the senate, and not of the president. A bill of this character, however, ought to pass first under the consideration of the immediate representatives of the people. He refused leave to introduce this bill, because the constitution forbids that the first action on a bill of this character should be in the senate. He had suggested, with a view to get rid of the difficulty, that the objectionable clause should be stricken out. The senator from Kentucky had no especial favour for it; but the gentleman from Kentucky had not met his wishes. He would now, with a view to get over the difficulty, move to amend the motion for leave, by adding to it the words "with the exception of those clauses which raise the duties on the articles named therein."

The chair pronounced the motion to amend to be out of order.

Mr. Clay said, that the clause which the senator from Georgia wishes to have stricken out was essential to the object of the bill. In the progress of the bill, the

whole of its provisions, even the title, might be stricken out. He admitted that it was the practice to call all these bills revenue bills. This bill, however, might with more propriety be called a bill for the reduction of protection. In reference to the bill of the senator from Missouri, it originated in this body, and contained an item raising the rate of duty, and it was on the question of the second reading that the president intimated a doubt whether it was in order.

He expressed his great regret that the senator from Massachusetts did not view this measure in so favourable a light at this moment, as he hoped that he would do on further examination of the bill. In reference to the dangers which surround the tariff, he would say that he believed that there was a majority of the people of the U. States decidedly in favour of protection in some form. Still he believed that from some causes, which the gentleman from Massachusetts was as well informed of as himself, the system was at this moment exposed to very great danger. He concurred with his friend from Massachusetts in the opinion, that these dangers might be temporary in their nature, and might be followed by a reaction, during which the tariff of protection might be revived. For one, he would say, without any affectation, that he felt himself to be growing old. He had seen enough of turmoil and strife; and if they could adopt any measure which would pacify the country, he would not

trouble himself concerning what might be the effect of it some eight or nine years hence, but would take the present practical good, and remove that alienation of feeling wnich has so long existed between certain parts of this widely spread confederacy, so as to enable us to transmit to after times the substantial blessings, as well as the name, of the glorious fabric of wisdom which our fathers bequeathed to us.

The call for the yeas and nays was then, with the assent of the senate, withdrawn, and leave given to introduce the bill.

The next day, February 13, pursuant to a notice given in the debate of the previous day, Mr. Webster offered the following

resolutions:

Resolved, That the annual revenues of the country ought not to be allowed to exceed a just estimate of the wants of the government; and that as soon as it shall be ascertained, with reasonable certainty, that the rates of duties on imports, as established by the act of July 14, 1832, will yield an excess over those wants, provision ought to be made for their reduction; and that in making this reduction, just regard should be had to the various interests and opinions of different parts of the country, so as most effectually to preserve the integrity and harmony of the Union, and to provide for the common defence, and promote the general welfare of the whole, But whereas, it is certain that the diminution of the rates of duties on some articles, would increase, instead of reducing, the aggregate amount of revenue

collected on such articles; and, whereas, in regard to such articles as it has been the policy of the country to protect, a slight reduction of one might produce essential injury, and even distress, to large classes of the community, while another might bear a larger reduction without any such consequences; but whereas, also, there are many articles, the duties on which might be reduced, or altogether abolished, without producing any other effect than the reduction of revenue: Therefore,

Resolved, That in reducing the rates of duties imposed on imports by the act of the 14th July aforesaid, it is not wise or judicious to proceed by way of an equal reduction, per centum, on all articles: but that, as well the amount, as the time of reduction, ought to be fixed, in respect to the several articles distinctly, having due regard in each case to the questions, whether the proposed reduction will affect revenue alone, or how far it will operate injuriously on those domestic manufactures hitherto protected, especially such as are essential in time of war, and such, also, as have been established on the faith of existing laws: and above all, how far such proposed reduction will affect the rates of wages, and the earnings of American manual labour.

Resolved, That it is unwise and injudicious, in regulating imports, to adopt a plan hitherto equally unknown in the history of this government, and in the practice of all enlightened nations, which shall either immediately or pros

pectively reject all discrimination in articles to be taxed, whether they be articles of necessity or luxury, of general consumption, or of limited consumption, and whether they be, or be not, such as are manufactured and produced at home; and which shall confine all duties to one equal rate per centum, on all articles. Resolved, That since the people of the United States have deprived the state governments of all power of fostering manufactures, however indispensable, in peace or in war, or however important to national independence, by commercial regulations, or by laying duties on imports, and have transferred the whole authority to make such regulations, and to lay such duties, to the congress of the United States; congress cannot surrender or abandon such power, compatibly with its constitutional duty; and, therefore,

Resolved, That no law ought to be passed on the subject of imports, containing any stipulation, express or implied, or giving any pledge or assurance, direct or indirect, which shall tend to restrain congress from the full exercise, at all times hereafter, of all its constitutional powers, in giving reasonable protection to American industry, countervailing the policy of foreign nations, and maintaining the substantial independence of the U. States.

The bill was then referred, after some discussion, to a select committee, composed of Messrs. Clay, Calhoun, Grundy, Webster, Clayton, Rives, and Dallas.

The debate on the enforcing bill was then resumed and continued by Mr. Rives, who sustained the course of the president, and drew a distinction between the doctrines of South Carolina and these promulgated by Virginia in 1798, which he said went no farther than an assertion of a right on the part of a state to declare a law of congress to be unconstitutional, but not of a right to annul the law.

This called up Mr. Calhoun, who, in a long and able speech, defended the grounds assumed by his native state. Mr. Calhoun said, he knew not which was most objectionable, the provision of the bill, or the temper in which its adoption had been urged. If the extraordinary powers with which the bill proposed to clothe the executive, to the utter prostration of the constitution, and the rights of the states, be calculated to impress our minds with alarm at the rapid progress of despotism in our country; the zeal with which every circumstance calculated to misrepresent or exaggerate the conduct of Carolina in the controversy, was seized on, with a view to excite hostility against her, but too plainly indicated the deep decay of that brotherly feeling which once existed betwen those states, and to which we are indebted for our beautiful federal system. It was not his intention, he said, to advert to all the misrepresentations, but there were some so well calculated to mislead the mind as to the real character of the con

troversy, and hold up the state in a light so odious, that he did not feel himself justified in permitting them to pass unnoticed. Among them, one of the most prominent was the false statement that the object of South Carolina was to exempt herself from her share of the public burthens, while she participated in the advantages of the government. If the charge were trueif the state were capable of being actuated by such low and unworthy motives, mother, as he considered her, he would not stand up on this floor to vindicate her conduct. Among her faults, and faults he would not deny she had, no one had ever yet charged her with that low and most sordid of vices-avarice. Her conduct, on all occasions, had been marked with the very opposite quality. From the commencement of the revolution-from its first breaking out at Boston till this hour, no state had been more profuse of its blood in the cause of the country; nor had any contributed so largely to the common treasury, in proportion to her wealth and population. She had, in that proportion, contributed more to the exports of the Union, on the exchange of which, with the rest of the world, the greater portion of the public burden had been levied, than any other state. No, the controversy was not such as has been stated; the state did not seek to participate in the advantages of the government without contributing her full share to the public treasury. Her object was far different. A

deep constitutional question lay at the bottom of the controversy. The real question at issue is, has the government a right to impose burdens on the capital and industry of one portion of the country, not with a view to revenue, but to the benefit of another; and he must be permitted to say, that after the long and deep agitation of this controversy, it was with surprise that he perceived so strong a disposition to misrepresent its real character. To correct the impression which those misrepresentations were calculated to make, he would dwell on the point under consideration for a few moments longer.

The federal government has, by an express provision of the constitution, the right to lay duties on imports. The state has never denied or resisted this right; nor even thought of so doing. The government has, however, not been contented with exercising this power as she had a right to do, but had gone a step beyond it, by laying imposts, not for revenue, but for protection. This the state considered as an unconstitutional exercise of power-highly injurious and oppressive to her and the other staple states, and had accordingly met it with the most determined resistance. He did not intend to enter, at this time, into the argument, as to the unconstitutionality of the protective system. It was not necessary. It is sufficient that the power is no where granted; and that from the journals of the convention which formed the

constitution, it would seem that it had been refused. In support of the journals, he might cite the statement of Luther Martin, which had already been referred to, to show that the convention, so far from conferring the power on the federal go vernment, had left to the state the right to impose duties on imports, with the express view of enabling the several states to protect their own manufactures. Notwithstanding this, congress had assumed, without any warrant from the constitution, the right of exercising this most important power, and had so exercised it, as to impose a ruinous burden on the labour and capital of the state, by which her resources were exhausted-the enjoyments of her citizens curtailed-the means of education contracted and all her interests essentially and injuriously affected.

There was another misstatement as to the nature of the controversy so frequently made in debate, and so weil calculated to mislead, that he felt bound to notice it. It has been said that South Carolina claims the right to annul the constitution and laws of the United States; and to rebut this supposed claim, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Rives) has gravely quoted the constitution to prove that the constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme laws of the land; as if the state claimed the right to act contrary to this provision of the constitution. Nothing can be more erroneous; her object is

not to resist laws made in pursuance of the constitution; but those made without its authority, and which encroach on her reserved powers. She claims not even the right of judging of the delegated powers; but of those that are reserved, and to resist the former when they encroach upon the latter. He would pause to illustrate this important point.

All must admit that there are delegated and reserved powers; and that the powers reserved are reserved to the states respectively. The powers then of the government are divided between the general and the state governments; and the point immediately under consideration is, whether a state has any right to judge as to the extent of its reserved powers, and to defend them against the encroachments of the general government. Without going deeply into this point, at this stage of the argument, or looking into the nature or origin of the government, there was a simple view of the subject which he considered as conclusive. The very idea of a divided power implied the right, on the part of the state, for which he contended. The expression was metaphorical when applied to power. Every one readily understands that the division of matter consists in the separation of the parts. But, in this sense, it was not applicable to power. What, then, is meant by a division of power? He could not conceive of a division, without giving an equal right to each to judge of the extent of