1

thought fit and refolv'd, That the Deputies M. Buys and Vander Dufen fhall be requir'd and authoriz'd, as they are by these Prefents, to fignify it by a Letter to the faid Plenipotentiaries, without entring into a Debate upon the Contents of the Letter above-mention'd, notwithftanding it might with much Facility and Reafon be refuted, as well with refpect to Things as Words.

That befides, a Copy of the faid Letter fhall be put into the hands of the faid M. de Randwijck, and other Deputies of their High Mightineffes for Foreign Affairs, that they may concert with the faid Minifters what is proper to be done further, conclude thereupon with them, and make a Report of the whole here to this Affembly.

[This agrees with the Regifter.]

F. Fagel.

The Refolution of their High Mightineffes the Lords the States-General of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Pafs'd on Sunday the 27th of July 1710. Copied from their Regifter.

M.

De Randwijck and other Deputies of their High . Mightineffes for Foreign Affairs, having by virtue of their Commiforial Refolution of the 23d inftant, and to acquit themselves of the Duty therein prefcrib'd them, confer'd with the Minifters of the High Allies, upon the Letter of the Marfhal de Vxelles and the Abbot de Polignac, written to the Counsellor Penfionary Heinfius, and dated from Gertruydenberg the 20th paft, being in anfwer to what had been propos'd to them in the last Conference, by the Deputies M. Buys and Vander Duffen, and which was the Subject of that Conference And having confulted together what might be proper to do and to refolve thereupon, reported to the Affembly, That the faid Ministers, jointly with them the Deputies, had unanimoufly exprefs'd a deep Concern to fee that the Enemy, by breaking off the Negotiations which had been refum'd in order to attain a good and general Peace, had diffipated the Hopes that were entertain'd from thofe Negotiations, and put back the Peace which was fo earneftly wifh'd for on the part of the

Allies:

Allies. But having confider'd that Peace cannot be made unless the Enemy are willing, and it appearing clearly that fuch Willingness is as diftant from their Thoughts, as in fpecious Words 'tis prefent in their Mouths, nothing remains for the State and their High Allies to do, but to acquiefce, tho with regret, with this Rupture, and to fatisfy their own Minds with the firm Perfuafion they are in, that their Intentions to fettle Peace upon folid and equitable Foundations, were fincere; and that having ardently defir'd to attain thereto, had the thing been poffible, no impartial and equitable Perfon can impute to them the Rupture of the Negotiations and the Continuance of the War: For tho the abovefaid Letter abounds in reproachful Accufations and odious Expreffions, and endeavours to faften upon the High Allies the Diffolution of the Conferences and the Prolongation of the War, as if they demanded things new, unjuft, and impoffible to be executed; the Truth of Fact remains ever the fame, and fhews clearly that the fault lies wholly in the Enemy, who have departed from the Foundation on which the Negotiation was begun, and ftudy Pretences to elude the Execution of the capital Point, that is to fay, the Reftitution of Spain and the Indies.

To prove this evidently, let it be confider'd, that for a long time, while the Enemy were defiring to enter into fome Conferences, and into a Negotiation for Peace, the Allies neither would nor could confent to it, unless for a Foundation certain Points were agreed, upon which the Work of the Negotiation might be built and upheld for obtaining a good and general Peace; among which Points the firft and principal was, Reftitution of Spain and the Indies to King Charles the Third: which was granted by France, even before the coming of M. Rouille and the Marquifs de Torcy into this Country; and confequently before the Conclufion of the Preliminary Articles by which that Reftitution is confirm'd more at large, and itipulated and promis'd a-new. And therefore no Perfon can think it ftrange, that the High Allies infift upon fo capital a Point as that which was the Caufe of their entring into the War, and for which it has lafted fo long a time; nor that the faid Allies require intire Security upon a Point of fo great importance.

The

The faid Allies judging that Security was no otherwise to be had than by the 37th Article of the Preliminaries, and his Majefty the moft Chriftian King having not thought fit to approve the faid Preliminaries, because of the faid 37th Article; therefore that Article came to be the Subject of the Negotiation which the Enemy have now broken off, and which was fet on foot for the finding out fome Equivalent, by which the fame Security might be given to the Allies as they had by the faid 37th Article of the Preliminaries. In the firft Conference held upon this Subject at Gertruydenberg, between the Marfhal de Uxelles and the Abbot de Polignac on the one part, and M. Buys and Vander Duffen on the other; thefe latter having reprefented, That the Propofitions which till then had been made, to give to the Allies cautionary Towns in the Netherlands, to ferve in lieu of the Security which they fuppos'd they had by the 37th Article of the Preliminaries, could not be accepted, because the Allies would be thereby engag'd in a feparate and uncertain War against Spain, while France would enjoy Peace; and that it could not reasonably be requir'd of the Allies, that they fhould continue in a War liable to all kinds of Accidents, and wherein they should even run the rifque of never recovering Spain and the Indies; but that 'twas neceffary the Peace fhould be general: the Plenipotentiaries of France appear'd fo well perfuaded of it, that in that firft Conference, and in the others next following it, they propos'd, That fince they faw the Allies would be fatisfy'd with no other than a general Peace, with the Reftitution of Spain and the Indies, of which King Philip continu'd poffefs'd, there were but two ways to induce him to relinquifh them; the one that of Compulfion, the other that of Perfuafion. The first, they faid, would be hard to France, and the laft would not be practicable, unless fome Portion of the Spanish Monarchy might be put into their hands, by means of which the forefaid King might be induc'd to give up the reft. And thereupon having demanded, whether for the procuring a general Peace, the Allies might not hearken to a Partition, they propos'd feveral Alternatives, one of which being agreed, the Monarchy of Spain, deducting from it the Portion to be left to King Philip, fhould be transfer'd to King Charles. After divers Conferences, the Plenipoten

tiaries

tiaries of France reduc'd at laft the faid Alternatives to Sicily and Sardinia, which on the part of the High Allies neither could nor ought to be understood otherwife, than that those two Kingdoms being left to the Grandfon of his most Christian Majefty, he should be thereby perfuaded by France to reftore to the High Allies the rest of the Monarchy of Spain of which he was ftill in poffef fion But the High Allies difcovering, from what pafs'd in the last Conference but one, and by the Report of the Deputies, that if the High Allies fhould prevail with themselves to accept the Propofition which had been made for obtaining a general Peace, it would remain uncertain whether they should thereby acquire a general Peace, becaufe the faid Plenipotentiaries of France did not explain themselves clearly, whether in fuch cafe Spain and the Indies would be put into the hands of King Charles, conformably to the Preliminaries; and even because they appear'd to fuppofe the contrary: for one of the two took upon him to propofe (tho as his private Thought) that the Allies fhould content themselves if the King of France would affift them with a certain Sum of Möny to help them to conquer Spain and the Indies; they judg'd that before they declar'd. themfelves upon that Propofition, 'twas neceffary to be thorowly inform'd of the Intentions of France in fo weighty and fo effential an Affair.

In order to this, they defir'd M. Perkum, who formerly had been employ'd in the Negotiation, and was fo again for this end, to talk about it with the Plenipotentiaries of France, and to acquaint them that the High Allies could not accept what had been propos'd touching a Subfidy, because that fuppos'd a feparate Peace with France, and the Continuance of a War feparately against Spain, to which the Allies could not confent, for the Reasons alledg'd in the firft Conference; requiring at the fame time a plain Declaration of the Intentions of France upon the Point of evacuating Spain and the Indies in favour of King Charles, conformably to the Prelimiharies, before which the Allies could not explain themfelves upon the Propofition of a Partition. And withal, M. Perkum was to declare on the part of the Allies, that their Intention was, that the Foundation which had been laid, namely the Reftitution to them of Spain and the Indies according to the Preliminaries, fhould retain firm Vol. II

Hh

and

and that on that foot the Negotiation might be continu'd; but if any Offer was made to depart there-from, thể Continuance of the Conferences would be fruitless. The faid Plenipotentiaries having not thought fit to answer in any manner to what M. Petkum reprefented to them, and having fome days after demanded a new Conference, and the Deputies having intimated in their Anfwer to that Demand, That they were ready to explain themfelves upon what M. Petkum had propos'd, the faid Depu ties went again to Gertruydenburg; where the faid Plenipotentiaries told them, that tho they did not think themselves oblig'd to receive a Meffage by M. Perkum, yet they had fent his Propofition to the Court, but that in their Opinion it had been found there fo general and ambiguous, that they had not receiv'd any Order thereupon. Wherefore the faid Deputies did fo well explain and justify the faid Propofition to the faid Plenipotentiaries, that they left remaining no Doubt or Ambiguity concerning it; representing to them, that the High Allies could not accept the Propofal of Subfidies, for the Recovery of Spain and the Indies; and deducing their Reafons for it, namely, becaufe by the Difcourfe which pafs'd about it in the preceding Conference, they clearly perceiv'd, that no Agreement could ever be made, but that mighty Dif ficulties would occur, either as to the Sums, or the Security for the Payment of them, or the Security to be given by France not to affift directly or indirectly the Duke of Anjou. [From which it appears, that the Refufal of all Offers of Mony of what nature foever, and what Security foever could be propos'd, is a little too liberally afferted in that Letter.] But the principal and effential Reason why that new Propofition of the faid Plenipotentiaries could not be accepted, was, because it fuppos'd a feparate War with Spain, and that that King dom and the Indies were to be conquer'd by the Arms of the Allies; which was contrary to the first Foundation, and to the Intention of the High Allies.

Further, in explanation of the remaining part of the Propofition of the faid M. Petkum, the faid Deputies reprefented, fupporting what they advanc'd with good Reafons, That the faid Plenipotentiaries having propos'd a Partition, and having reduc'd it to Sicily and Sardinia, the High Allies had always been, and still were perfuaded

that