COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. BOOK THE THIRD. Of Private Wrongs. CHAPTER I. OF THE REDRESS OF PRIVATE WRONGS BY THE MERE AT the opening of these commentaries, (a) municipal law was in general defined to be, "a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong." (b)(1) From hence therefore it followed, that the primary objects of the law are the establishment of rights, and the prohibition of wrongs. And this occasioned (c) the distribution of these collections into two general heads; under the former of which we have already considered the rights that were defined and established, and under the latter are now to consider the wrongs that are forbidden and redressed, by the laws of England. *2] *In the prosecution of the first of these inquiries, we distinguished rights into two sorts: first, such as concern, or are annexed to, the persons of men, and are then called jura personarum, or the rights of persons; which, together with the means of acquiring and losing them, composed the first book of these commentaries: and secondly, such as a man may acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with his person, which are called jura rerum, or the rights of things: and these, with the means of transferring them from man to man, were the subject of the second book. I am now therefore to proceed to the consideration of wrongs, which for the most part convey to us an idea merely negative, as being nothing else but a privation of right. For which reason it was necessary, that before we entered at all into the discussion of wrongs, we should entertain a clear and distinct notion of rights: the contemplation of what is jus(2) being necessarily prior to what (a) Introd. 2. (b) Sanctio justa, jubens honesta, et prohibens con traria. Cic. 11. Philipp. 12. Bract. l. 1, c. 3. (1) I imagine this to be a misquotation of the following passage:-" Est enim lex nihil aliud, nisi recta et a numine Deorum tracta ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens contraria. Phil. xi. 12.-COLERIDGE. ["Law is nothing else than right reason drawn from the will of the gods, commanding what is right and prohibiting the contrary."] (2) [Right.] may be termed injuria, (3) and the definition of fas(4) precedent to that of nefas. (5) Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species: private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: (6) the latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and misdemeanors. To investigate the first of these species of wrongs, with their legal remedies, will be our employment in the present book; and the other species will be reserved till the next or concluding one. The more effectually to accomplish the redress of private injuries, courts of justice are instituted in every civilized society, in order to protect the weak from the insults of the stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws, by which rights are defined and wrongs prohibited. This remedy is there*3] fore principally to be sought by application to these *courts of justice; that is, by civil suit or action. For which reason our chief employment in this book will be to consider the redress of private wrongs by suit or action in courts. But as there are certain injuries of such a nature that some of them furnish and others require a more speedy remedy than can be had in the ordinary forms of justice, there is allowed in those cases an extrajudicial or eccentrical kind of remedy; of which I shall first of all treat, before I consider the several remedies by suit: and, to that end, shall distribute the redress of private wrongs into three several species: first, that which is obtained by the mere act of the parties themselves; secondly, that which is effected by the mere act and operation of law; and, thirdly, that which arises from suit or action in courts, which consists in a conjunction of the other two, the act of the parties co-operating with the act of law. (7) And first of that redress of private injuries which is obtained by the mere act of the parties. This is of two sorts: first, that which arises from the act of the injured party only; and, secondly, that which arises from the joint act of all the parties together: both which I shall consider in their order. Of the first sort, or that which arises from the sole act of the injured party, is I. The defence of one's self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these his relations, (8) (3) [Injury.] (4) [Lawful.] (5) [Unlawful.] (6) For further definition of wrongs see Ayers et al. v. Lawrence et al., 59 N. Y. 198 (1874). Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 20 (1827). Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 669 (1892). State v. Rickey et al., 9 Halstead's Rep. (N. J.) 293 (1827). (7) Territory v. Flowers, 2 Mon. 531; 534 (1877). (8) It is said that, according to I Salk. 407, I Ld. Raym. 62, and Bul. N. P. 18, a master cannot justify an assault in defence of his servant, because he might have an action per quod servitium amisit [By which he lost his service] (see Book 1, p. 429). But, according to 2 Rol. Abr. 546, D. pl. 2, Owen, 151, Bac. Abr. Master and Servant, P., such an interference by the master is lawful; and lord Hale (1 vol. 484) says, "That the law had been for a master killing in the necessary defence of his servant, the husband in defence of his wife, the wife of the husband, the child of the parent, or the parent of the child, for the act of the assistant shall have the same construction in such cases as the act of the party assisted should have had if it had been done by himself; for they are in a mutual relation to one another." But though, as observed by the learned commentator, the law respects the passions of the human mind, yet it does not allow this interference as an indulgence of revenge, but merely to prevent the injury, or a repetition of it; and therefore, in a plea by a father, master, etc., founded on this ground, it is necessary to state that the plaintiff would have beat the son, servant, etc., if the defendant had not interfered; and if it be merely alleged that the plaintiff had assaulted or beat, etc., it will be demurrable, for if the assault on be forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force; and the breach of the peace which happens is chargeable upon him only who began the affray. (d) For the law in this case respects the passions of the human mind, and (when external violence is offered to a man himself, or those to whom he bears a near connection) makes it lawful in him to do himself that immediate justice to which he is prompted [*4 by nature, and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain. It considers that the future process of law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied with force; since it is impossible to say to what wanton lengths of rapine or cruelty outrages of this sort might be carried unless it were permitted a man immediately to oppose one violence with another. (9) Self-defence, therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society. (10) In the English law particularly it is held an excuse for breaches of the peace, nay, even for homicide itself: but care must be taken that the resistance does not exceed the bounds of mere defence and prevention: for then the defender would himself become an aggressor. (11) II. Recaption or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of the party injured. This happens when any one hath deprived another of his property in goods or chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child, or servant: in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or master, may lawfully claim and retake them wherever he happens to find them, so it be not in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace. (e) The reason for this is obvious; since it may frequently happen that the owner may have this only opportunity of doing himself justice: his goods may be afterwards conveyed away or destroyed; and his wife, children, or servants concealed or carried out of his reach; if he had no speedier remedy than the ordinary process of law. If therefore he can so contrive it as to gain possession of his property again without force or terror, the law favors and will justify his proceeding. But as the public peace is a superior consideration to any one man's private property; and as, if individuals were once allowed to use private force as a remedy for private injuries, all social (d) 2 Roll. Abr. 546. 1 Hawk. P. C. 131. (e) 3 Inst. 134. Hal. Anal. 2 46. the master, etc. be over, the servant cannot strike by way of revenge, but merely in order to prevent an injury. 2 Stra. 953. When a person does not stand in either of these relations, he cannot justify an interference on behalf of the party injured, but merely as an indifferent person, to preserve the peace. 2 Stra. 954.-CHITTY. See Webb's Pollock on Torts, 201. A son is justified in using the same means to protect his mother, who is seriously ill, against danger to her life by the noise of rioters, as though such danger resulted from an attack upon her person. Patten v. The People, 18 Mich. 314. The defence of a servant will be excused or justified by the same means used to justify or excuse the defence of one's self. Pond v. The People, 4 Cooley (Mich.) 205. (9) A man may justify an assault and battery in defence of his land or goods or the goods of another delivered to him to be kept. Hawks, P. C. b. 1, c. 60, 23. Seaman v. Compledick Owen's R. 150. But one is not justified in assaulting a trespasser without first requesting him to depart or desist and upon his refusal sufficient force may be used to compel him. Weaver v. Bush, 8 Term R. 78. Butler's N. P. 19, I East, P. C. 406. But where notice to desist or depart cannot be given from the nature of the case, it may be dispensed with. Pond v. The People, 4 Cooley (Mich.) 150. As to the amount of force one may use, see Scribner v. Beach, 4 Denio, 450 (1847). 2 Barb. Rights of Persons and Property, 774. Pond v. The People, 4 Cooley (Mich.) 150 (1860). Logue v. The Commonwealth, 38 Pa. 265 (1869). (10) Law of Self Defense, Anthony, 3. (1) The force should be no more than is sufficient to ward off the injury. Malone's Criminal Briefs, 291 (1886). People v. McLeod, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 420 (1841). The quality, quantity and time of justifiable defence depend upon the reasonable necessity of each case and the reasonable necessity, depending upon the particular circumstances of the case, is a question of fact. Aldrich v. Wright, 53 New Hampshire, 419 (1873). justice must cease, the strong would give law to the weak, and every man would revert to a state of nature; for these reasons it is provided that *5] this natural right of recaption *shall never be exerted where such exertion must occasion strife and bodily contention, or endanger the peace of society. If, for instance, my horse is taken away, and I find him in a common, a fair, or a public inn, I may lawfully seize him to my own use; but I cannot justify breaking open a private stable, or entering on the grounds of a third person, to take him, except he be feloniously stolen; (f) but must have recourse to an action at law. (12) III. As recaption is a remedy given to the party himself for an injury to his personal property, so, thirdly, a remedy of the same kind for injuries to real property is by entry on lands and tenements when another person without any right has taken possession thereof. (13) This depends in some measure on like reasons with the former; and like that, too, must be peaceable and without force. There is some nicety required to define and distinguish the cases in which such entry is lawful or otherwise; it will therefore be more fully considered in a subsequent chapter; being only mentioned in this place for the sake of regularity and order. (f) 2 Roll. Rep. 55, 56, 208. 2 Roll. Abr. 565, 566. (12) In the case of personal property improperly detained or taken away, it may be retaken from the house and custody of the wrong-doer, even without a previous request. Bowler v. Eldridge, 18 Conn. 1, 17 (1846). Where one's property is wrongfully taken, the owner may retake it wherever he may find it. He may enter upon the lands of another to do so providing he gives notice of his intent. But he is not justified in breaking the peace. Richardson v. Bartley, 2 Monroe (Ky.) 328 (1842). And, unless it was seized or attempted to be seized forcibly, the owner cannot justify doing any thing more than gently laying his hands on the wrong-doer in order to recover it, (8 T. R. 78. 2 Roll. Abr. 56, 208. 2 Roll. Abr. 565, pl. 50. 2 Leonard, 302. Selw. N. P. tit. Assault and Battery;) nor can he without leave enter the door of a third person, not privy to the wrongful detainer, to take his goods therefrom. 2 Roll. Abr. 55, 56, 308. 2 Roll. Abr. 565, I. pl. 2. Bac. Abr. Trespass, F. If the possession of one's property be held by another, the owner may take possession if he can do so without tumult and riot or breach of the peace; but he has no right to use unreasonable violence. Davis v. Whitridge, 2 Strobh. 232. The owner of personal property left in the possession of a third person may, by his own act, repossess himself of such property, though it be taken from the possession of such third person by virtue of a writ of replevin; and the plaintiff in the replevin cannot maintain trespass against him. Spencer v. McGowen, 13 Wend. 256. One whose chattel has been wrongfully taken from him may enter upon the land of the taker for the purpose of retaking it, without subjecting himself even to nominal damages. Chambers v. Bedell, 2 Watts & Serg. 225.-SHARSWOOD. But where one lawfully acquires possession of the property the owner is not justified in entering upon his land to retake the goods. The Law of Torts, Clark and Lindsell, 270 (1889). Hillard's Law of Torts, 139 (3 ed.). Marvell v. Gray's Lessee, I Swan's 104 (1851). Moore v. Shenk, 3 Pa. 19 (1846). Anthony v. Haney, I Moore and Scott's Reports, 307-8. Bingham's, 193 (1832). Shireman v. Jackson, 14 Ind. 460 (1860). Yet, where one makes a forcible entry in order to gain possession of land wrongfully detained, an action for trespass will not lie, although an indictment for breach of the peace may be had. Jackson v. Stansbury, 9 Wend. 201 (1832). Bowler v. Eldridge, 18 Conn. 1(1846). Where one sells goods which are in his possession the vendee has an implied license to take them. Lawson's Personal and Property Rights, 1764 (1890). (13) With respect to land and houses also, resumption of possession by the mere act of the party is frequently allowed. Thus, if a tenant omit at the expiration of his tenancy to deliver up possession, the landlord may legally, in his absence, break open the outer door and resume possession, though some articles of furniture remain therein; and, if the landlord put his cattle on the land, and the tenant distrain them as damage-feasant, he may be sued. 1 Bing. R. 158. 7 T. R. 431, 432. I Price R. 53. And. 109. 6 Taunt. If the landlord, in resuming possession, be guilty of a forcible entry with strong hand, or other illegal breach of the peace, he will be liable to an indictment. 7 T. R. 432. 3 T. R.,295. 6 Taunt. 202. 8 T. R. 364, 403. But the circumstance of the owner 202. |